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False recollection refers to the retrieval of contextual information associated with
an event that has not occurred. For instance, during a recognition task, one might identify
a nonstudied word presented at test as old because she remembers the font color of the
word during study. Although instances such as this are rare and typically occur at a
varying rate of 0-5%, current models of recognition such as the Complementary Learning
Systems (CLS) model and the Dual-Process Signal-Detection (DPSD) model do not
contain a mechanism to account for their occurrence. Although both the CLS and DPSD
models have support from studies demonstrating functional dissociations,
neurophysiological dissociations, and behavioral findings of process dissociation, their
ability to explain false memories has been more elusive; neither theory specifically
addresses false recollection. Instead, such models have ignored false recollection as
inconsequential noise in the data.
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine whether the false recognition
effect obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm was due to false recollection or familiarity.
The Payne-Eakin paradigm is based on the PIER2 model, which theorizes that targets
implicitly activated during study lead to the falser recognition of a false-target pair. Using

a modified version of the Payne-Eakin paradigm, we investigated the nature of the false
recognition effect using a priori behavioral analyses and statistical modeling.
The findings of this dissertation provide a step toward a more solid understanding
of the cognitive mechanisms involved in the recognition of nonstudied items. This
dissertation demonstrates that modeling false recollection is possible. The results of this
dissertation suggest that, because current models of recognition do not provide a
mechanism to account for false recollection, our understanding of recognition is not fully
understood. The results highlight that the current understanding of how false recollection
contributes to recognition performance is an area in need of further development.
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INTRODUCTION
Recognition refers to a specific type of memory that involves identifying stimuli
presented at test as having been previously experienced (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).
Different from recall, which occurs when specific context can be retrieved from longterm memory, recognition is unique in that a discrimination response can be given to a
stimulus with or without retrieval of the specific context. For instance, one can recognize
a person seen on a bus as being familiar without being able to recall from where one
knows that person (Mandler, 1980). Early explanations of recognition stemmed from a
communication engineering framework that discriminated signals from noise, called the
signal-detection framework (Green & Swets, 1966). This framework was later adopted by
recognition researchers to interpret old/new recognition data (Peterson, Birdsall, & Fox,
1954). The signal-detection framework was expanded in a set of theories referred to as
dual-process models (Atkinson & Juola, 1973; Mandler, 1980), which combined an
additional recollection process with the familiarity-based signal detection process.
However, the early frameworks were limited in terms of identifying the underlying
cognitive processes involved in recognition memory. More recently, approaches to
identifying and understanding these cognitive processes have included both neuroscience
(e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; O’Reilly &
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Rudy, 2001) and statistical modeling techniques (e.g., Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Wixted,
2007; Yonelinas, 1994, 1999, 2002).
Models of Recognition
Neuroscience techniques such as neuroimaging and brain models have provided
researchers tools to examine how the theorized cognitive processes in recognition are
implemented by the brain. One model that has helped provide a brain-based explanation
of recognition is Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003) Complementary Learning Systems
(CLS) model. According to their model, recognition involves activity occurring in both
the hippocampus and the medial temporal lobe cortex (MTLC), with each brain region
performing functionally different evaluative recognition processes. In their model,
recognition consists of two processes, familiarity and recall. The familiarity process is
described as a signal-detection process of the overall activation in the MTLC and recall is
described as a representational matching process that involves the retrieval of contextual
information. The CLS model has been supported through behavioral studies that have
validated the model’s predictions (Kim & Yassa, 2013; Stark, Bayley, & Squire, 2002).
For instance, Stark et al. (2002) found that patients with hippocampal lesions had
significant deficits in their recognition performance, demonstrating the role of the
hippocampus in recognition. Although the CLS model provides explanation for how
recognition processes are implemented in the brain, the model is limited in explaining
how—or whether—the two processes work together to produce recognition. In addition,
the assumptions of the model are supported mainly by simulations and behavioral
findings. Other computational models of recognition have proved to provide additional
information about the cognitive processes of recognition.
2

One of the predominant computational models of recognition is Yonelinas’s
(1994, 2002) dual-process signal-detection (DPSD) model. In accordance with traditional
dual-process theory, the DPSD model also describes recognition as being composed of
two processes, familiarity and recollection. Familiarity is defined as a signal-detection
process that includes an evaluation of the overall memory signal of an item and
recollection is described as a threshold-like process that operates like the CLS model’s
(Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) recall process. Consistent with the CLS model, the DPSD
model requires the retrieval of study context for recollection to occur. Therefore, the
model posits that accurate recollection can only occur for studied items.
Although both the DPSD and the CLS models have support from studies
demonstrating functional dissociations, neurophysiological dissociations, and behavioral
findings of process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991), their ability to explain false memories
has been more elusive (Atkinson & Juola, 1973; Heathcote, Raymond, & Dunn, 2006;
Mandler, 1980); neither theory specifically addresses false recollection. Instead, both
models have ignored false recollection as inconsequential noise in the data (Elfman &
Yonelinas, 2015; Higham & Vokey, 2004; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010), citing
the low rates at which these false recollections occur as evidence for this decision
(Yonelinas et al., 2010). Yonelinas et al. (2010) cite false recollection as violating the
boundary conditions of recognition and, therefore, irrelevant to modeling recognition.
False Recognition and False Recollection
Despite their lack of explanation by current recognition models, evidence for false
recollection in recognition memory consistently has been reported by many different
researchers (e.g., Gallo, Foster, & Johnson, 2009; Higham, 1998; Higham & Vokey,
3

2004; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Jones, 2013; Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Norman,
Schacter, & Reder, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, 1996; Schacter,
Koutstaal, & Johnson, 1997; Strange, Garry, Bernstein, & Lindsay, 2011; Whittlesea,
2002). Evidence for false recollection has been obtained as a result of implicit
associations among words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), misattributions of source
(Lane & Zaragoza, 1995), the influence of prior knowledge (Jones, 2013), and stimulus
fluency (Higham & Vokey, 2004), as will be discussed.
False recollection has not been specified by either the CLS or DPSD models.
According to the CLS model, processes in the hippocampus protect against false
recollection through a two-step matching process. When an item is studied, a sparse
representation of the features of the event is stored in long-term memory. At test, when
an item is presented for recognition, the item’s representation of its features is compared
against the stored, sparse representation of the studied item’s features; a high degree of
match between the features of the two representations is required for the hippocampus to
allow for retrieval of the studied context and for recollection to occur. This conservative
matching process should reject items that have not been studied, making the likelihood
that items are falsely recollected improbable. In particular, the fact that context is not
retrieved without a match serves the assumption of the DPSD model that retrieval of the
context from the study event is required for recollection. False recollection should not
occur when there is no study context associated with a new test item to inform
recollection. However, false recollection has been reported in the literature and, although
the DPSD model has been criticized for its inability to account for false recollection
(Higham & Vokey, 2004), even Yonelinas et al. (2010) has acknowledged that if a
4

paradigm could be designed to increase the number of false recollections from the small
numbers found using typical recognition paradigms, then they could be better understood
as more than a boundary condition violation. Armed with such data, perhaps the model
could be amended to account for them differently than treating their rare occurrence as
random error (Yonelinas et al., 2010).
Payne-Eakin paradigm
Payne and Eakin (2017) capitalized on the principles of the Processing Implicit
and Explicit Representations (PIER2) theory (Nelson, McKinney, Gee, & Janczura,
1998) and findings by Roediger and McDermott (1995) regarding the impact of implicitly
activated associates on false memory to develop a paradigm for increasing the potential
for false recollection with the goal of providing data to inform the DPSD model. The
Payne-Eakin paradigm applies theories specified by PIER2 (Nelson et al., 1998)
regarding the associative nature of words in semantic memory. According to the PIER2
model (Nelson et al., 1998), when a related cue-target paired-associate word pair—the
type of stimuli used in the paradigm—is studied, the cue and target are activated in
semantic memory. This activation then spreads to other words that are associated with
both the studied cue and target, resulting in the implicit activation of those words as well.
The critical piece is that activation does not spread to all associates of the cue and all
associates of the target; rather, only associates that are shared by both the cue and target
are implicitly activated. This activation of shared implicit associates at encoding results
in those implicit associates being part of the stored representation of the explicitly studied
paired associate in memory and, as such, they can impact recognition (e.g., McEvoy,
Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999; Nelson et al., 1998; Nelson, Zhang, & McKinney, 2001).
5

For the Payne-Eakin paradigm, a list of cue-target paired associates was created
for which each studied cue-target pair shared an associate that theoretically would be
implicitly activated when the pair was studied together (studied pairs). False-target test
pairs were created by recombining the studied cue with the implicitly activated associate
as the target. Additionally, new test pairs were created by creating new, control cue-target
test pairs that were unrelated in any way to studied pairs. The theoretical supposition was
that, because the false target was implicitly activated during study and shared the study
context, false recollection would be higher for these test pairs than for control test pairs.
The results obtained in two pilot studies showed that people confidently, but falsely,
recognized the false-target pairs as old more often than the control pairs, indicating that
they were certain that they had studied those pairs. Not only was the occurrence of false
recognition outside the bounds that would be considered random error but also, the kind
of high-confidence responses given to these false recognitions suggests that they were
due to recollection, not familiarity. However, that conclusion cannot be definitively made
using the pilot data alone.
Dissertation Experiment
The purpose of this dissertation was to extend the findings of the pilot
experiments to determine whether the false recognition obtained by the Payne-Eakin
paradigm was due to recollection or familiarity. Based on PIER2 (Nelson et al., 1998),
false recollection was theorized to have occurred using this paradigm due to the implicit
activation of the false target during study of a cue-target paired associate. According to
the CLS model, this implicit activation could have led to features of the implicitly
activated associate to be part of the sparse representation of the study pair in the
6

hippocampus. Then, when the implicitly activated associate is paired with a studied cue
as the target in a test pair, the feature overlap between the test and study pairs should be
enough to trigger a match in the hippocampus, resulting in retrieval of the study context
and recollection. Therefore, based on predictions from the CLS model, the false
recognition of the false-target test pairs obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm should be
due to recollection and not familiarity. However, this supposition is in direct contrast
with assumptions of the DPSD model that do not allow for recollection of nonstudied
items. The DPSD model requires the retrieval of study context for recollection to occur
and, because a new test pair should not be associated with the study context, any error in
calling a new pair old—even a false-target test pair—should only be due to familiarity,
never recollection. However, because the implicit associate shared study context with the
explicitly studied cue-target pair, it is possible in the Payne-Eakin paradigm for the
context to be retrieved, resulting in a false recollection of those new test pairs.
Determining whether false recognition in the Payne-Eakin paradigm was due to
recollection or familiarity was done by taking both a behavioral and statistical modeling
approach. Results from both approaches served to inform assumptions of both the CLS
and DPSD models. The Payne-Eakin paradigm was modified to include five different
types of test pairs. Along with the original false-target test pairs (FTi) and the control test
pairs (R-Control) used in the original paradigm, three new types of test pairs were added.
FTx test pairs included a studied cue with a new, associated false target; however, this
false target was not implicitly activated during study of the study pair. This condition was
added to provide a direct test of the impact of the implicit target on recognition. RePaired test pairs took cues from a set of unrelated study pairs and repaired them with a
7

target from a different studied pair. This condition was added to include a condition of
high familiarity; both the cue and target were previously studied, although not together.
Finally, a set of unrelated, unstudied test pairs were created to serve as control pairs for
the Re-Paired condition (U-control test pairs). Following the convention of experiments
testing the DPSD model, recognition was measured using a 6-point confidence
recognition scale. The 6-point confidence recognition scale is favorable to old/new
judgments because different theories, such as DPSD, make specific predictions regarding
how these confidence ratings map on to process parameters such as recollection and
familiarity.
Aim 1
The first aim of this dissertation was to demonstrate whether the false memory
effect obtained using the Payne-Eakin paradigm is due to the activation of an implicitly
associated word during study of an explicitly presented cue-target pair. To accomplish
this goal, we compared the false recognition rate for FTi test pairs to R-control and FTx
test pairs. The purpose of these comparisons was to allow us to determine whether the
presence of the implicit associate facilitated false recognition. The comparison between
the FTi and FTx test pairs was especially important because the only difference between
the two types of pairs was whether the false target was an implicit associate of the studied
pair. In addition to comparing the false recognition rate between the test pairs, we also
compared the rate of high-confidence old responses for FTi pairs and FTx test pairs,
operationalized as false recollection. This comparison was done to determine whether the
implicitly activated false target facilitated false recollection.
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Aim 2
The second aim of this dissertation was to examine the false memory effect
obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm using the distribution of response patterns to
determine whether the responses were produced by recollection or familiarity. According
to Elfman, Parks, and Yonelinas (2008), response patterns stemming from recollection
should produce different distributions than response patterns stemming from familiarity.
Because recollection is characterized as an all-or-none process, responses stemming from
recollection should result in a dichotomous distribution whereas responses stemming
from familiarity should result in a Gaussian-shaped distribution (Diana, Yonelinas, &
Ranganath, 2008; Elfman et al., 2008). Therefore, we compared the response
distributions of FTi test pairs to R-control and FTx test pairs using both histogram
comparisons and receiver-operator characteristic (ROC) curves to determine whether an
impact of recollection could be observed.
Aim 3
The third aim of this dissertation was to determine whether the re-presentation of
both a studied cue and target, though not together, in the Re-Paired test pairs increased
the level of familiarity associated with the presented test pair. Because FTi and FTx pairs
both included a studied cue, the impact of familiarity on those pairs could be similar.
Therefore, to fully evaluate the impact of high familiarity on recognition, we included the
Re-Paired test pairs and compared the false recognition rate of those pairs to both FTi and
U-control pairs. However, because high familiarity can contribute to high-confidence
responses like recollection, we also compared the response distributions for the Re-Paired
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pairs to U-control and FTi test pairs using both histogram comparisons and ROC curves
to detect differences between the two processes.
Aim 4
Finally, the last aim of this dissertation was to evaluate whether the prediction of
the DPSD model that familiarity alone could account for the false memory effect
obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm or if the inclusion of a false recollection
parameter in the model would be required to account for the data. According to the DPSD
model, recollection does not occur for nonstudied items (Yonelinas, 1994; 2002;
Yonelinas et al., 2010); despite behavioral evidence to suggest otherwise (e.g., Higham &
Vokey, 2004; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Payne & Eakin, 2017; Roediger & McDermott,
1995). Unfortunately, the behavioral results are limited in their ability to tease apart the
contribution of the two processes due to similar predictions, resulting in difficulty
disentangling the two processes. Therefore, we developed two models that included a
false recollection parameter and fit them to the behavioral data produced by the PayneEakin paradigm. We then compared the fits of the two models to the DPSD model to
determine whether the false memory effect obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm was
due to recollection, or solely to familiarity.
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RECOGNITION
People often find themselves unable to recall the answer to a question; however,
when the answer is presented among a list of choices, they find they can accurately
recognize the answer. The cognitive process responsible for this phenomenon is
recognition memory. Recognition memory is a specific type of memory involving the
ability to determine whether an item has been previously encountered in the environment
(Medina, 2008). In a traditional recognition memory paradigm, participants study a list of
words. After study, participants then take a recognition test. At test, participants are
presented with a list of words that includes studied words mixed with new words that
have not been studied, or foils. As each word is presented, participants are asked to
answer either old, indicating that the word was studied or new, indicating that the word
was not studied. Recognition accuracy is measured by calculating the number of correctly
identified studied items as old and nonstudied items as new tempered by errors of
identifying a studied item new or a nonstudied item old. The theory underlying this
manner of evaluating recognition memory is signal-detection theory (Green & Swets,
1966; Peterson et al., 1954). Signal-detection theory has been highly influential in the
development of theories of recognition and has provided a foundation for several
computational models of recognition. Therefore, understanding the underlying
assumptions of the theory and how it relates to recognition research is essential toward
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understanding current theories of recognition, including the DPSD model examined in
this dissertation.
Signal-Detection Theory
Signal-detection theory was originally developed by engineers as a framework for
discriminating electrical signals from background noise for communication purposes
(Peterson et al., 1954). The theory was later adapted by recognition researchers because
of the similarity of the theory’s core assumptions to recognition memory (Green & Swets,
1966). Old/new responses are interpreted in terms of whether the item presented is
actually old or new. The interaction of the word’s actual state of being old or new and the
participant’s responses of old or new creates four possible outcomes: two types of
correct—hits and correct rejections—and two types of incorrect—misses and false
alarms— responses. As shown in Table 1, an old response given to a studied word is
categorized as a hit and a new response given to a nonstudied word is categorized as a
correct rejection. A new response given to a studied word is categorized as a miss and an
old response given to a nonstudied word is categorized as a false alarm. These four
categories provide the foundation for the signal-detection framework and are the factors
on which all subsequent measures essential for fully evaluating recognition memory are
based.
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Table 1
Signal-detection Categorization of Recognition Responses
Study Condition:

Old:

New:

Studied

Hit

Miss

False Alarm

Correct Rejection

Not Studied

At the core of signal-detection theory is the assumption that all words on a
recognition test have varying degrees of memory strength (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984;
Kintsch, 1970; Murdock, 1982; Wickelgren & Norman, 1966). Whether the underlying
signal is based on frequency or familiarity strength varies. However, one commonality
among theories is that the signal strength of each item is based on the frequency with
which a word has been encountered; words encountered frequently have a higher level of
strength than words that have been encountered rarely (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984;
Kintsch, 1970). When a word has been recently encountered—for instance, by being
studied on a list—the strength of that word increases from its baseline strength. These
varying levels of strength are assumed to be normally distributed, producing a Gaussian
distribution. According to signal-detection theory, because words that have been recently
studied increase in strength, the combination of studied and nonstudied words on a
recognition test produces two separate distributions along a continuum of memory
strength; the distribution of nonstudied foil words have a mean strength that is lower than
that of the distribution of studied words, as shown in Figure 1. This assumption that new
words are a separate distribution of strength from old words is fundamental to signal-
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detection theory and is essential in calculating response bias and discriminability, two
other factors that contribute to the interpretation of recognition memory.

Figure 1.
A graphical representation of signal-detection theory’s word distribution
assumptions, discriminability, and bias.
Response bias, or β, is the likelihood that a word will elicit either an old or new
response. Theoretically, response bias—also called criterion bias—is representative of a
threshold, predetermined by either within-person factors or due to manipulations using
the instructions of a recognition test (Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998, pg. 198),
that the memory strength of words must surpass to elicit an old response. If response bias
is set to a low value, then a large portion of words, both studied and nonstudied, will be
given an old response, resulting in more hits, but also more false alarms. If response bias
is set to a high value, then only a small portion of studied words will be given an old
response, resulting in fewer hits, but more correct rejections. Response bias is typically
denoted with β and is determined by calculating the proportion of hits to false alarms.
False alarms and hits are used to calculate bias because the rate at which each of these
occurs is indicative of what portion of the studied and nonstudied word distributions
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surpassed the criterion threshold. However, the degree to which hits and false alarms
occur is heavily dependent upon the discriminability of the old and new words presented
at test.
Discriminability, or sensitivity, refers to the degree to which studied and
nonstudied word distributions are separated from each other on the memory strength
continuum. Discriminability is determined by measuring the distance between the mean
of the distribution for studied words and the mean of the distribution for nonstudied
words. The statistical sensitivity index, d’ (pronounced d-prime), is typically used when
calculating discriminability in signal-detection theory. Because it is assumed that the
strength of all words is normally distributed, the means of the distributions for old and
new words can be calculated by normalizing, or adjusting the values of the distributions
to a comparable scale, which is the rate at which hits and false alarms occur. Then, after
the hit and false alarm rates have been normalized, the false alarm rate is subtracted from
the hit rate, thus providing a measure of discriminability.
Discriminability, response bias, and the rate at which the four categories of
recognition outcomes occur are all used when assessing recognition performance.
Typically, performance is first assessed by calculating the hit rate. A high hit rate
demonstrates that participants could accurately identify a large portion of studied words
as old. However, the hit rate must always be moderated by the false alarm rate. A high hit
rate tempered by a high false alarm rate indicates that there was little discrimination
between saying old to studied items or to nonstudied items. A combination of a high hit
rate and false alarm rate can be indicative of two things: participants either used a liberal
response criterion or that studied and nonstudied words were difficult to discriminate
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between. For instance, foils that are semantically related to studied words are more
difficult to distinguish than non-related foils (e.g., McEvoy et al., 1999; Payne & Eakin,
2017). D’ is typically used when evaluating discriminability, and allows researchers to
determine whether participants are operating at chance; a low d’ value indicates at chance
performance whereas a high d’ value indicates a strong level of discriminability.
However, it could also be that a high hit rate combined with a high false-alarm rate is
indicative of participants using too liberal of a response criterion in determining whether
words were old. Unfortunately, because signal-detection theory uses a dichotomous
measure for determining both discriminability and criterion threshold, differentiating
between the two is difficult. This issue can be resolved by measuring each of the four
parameters in the signal-detection framework and evaluating each parameter in relation to
each other.
Although signal-detection theory provides a computational framework for
understanding recognition, the theory is limited. One limitation of signal-detection theory
is that it fails to describe the processes involved in recognition and how they work.
Instead, the theory only provides a framework that can be used to measure and interpret
recognition performance. For instance, although the signal-detection framework suggests
that list-length effects occur in recognition because of reduced discriminability, the
framework cannot explain why increasing the length of a studied list of items decreases
discriminability. Additionally, according to the current dominant account of recognition,
recognition is described as a dual-process system (Yonelinas, 1994, 1999, 2002) and not
a single-process. This view is in direct contrast with signal-detection theory which only
describes a single process. As a result, researchers have had to use other methods of
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evaluating recognition performance to investigate the cognitive processes theorized to be
involved. Computational modeling, a mathematical method of theorizing and evaluating
how cognitive systems operate, fills this gap.
Computational Modeling
Computational modeling is a mathematical method used to examine how
cognitive systems, such as recognition memory, operate. Computational modeling has
become an important tool in the examination of recognition memory in that they provide
researchers a means of examining cognition in ways that are beyond the capabilities of
current behavioral and neuroimaging methods. For instance, current neuroimaging
techniques such as fMRI provide methods for examining the underlying neural correlates
of the theorized cognitive processes; however, these methods do not provide insight into
the nature of the processing. Computational modeling, on the other hand, requires that
cognitive processes be not only defined, but also computationalized, resulting in a higher
degree of specificity. For instance, computational models of recognition such as Gillund
and Shiffrin’s (1984) model require that a specific number is assigned to the overall
memory signal of to-be-retrieved items as well as to a threshold which memory signals
must surpass to be recognized as old. This requirement allows models to make specific
predictions as to what items will and will not be retrieved. These model predictions can
then be statistically compared to human behavior to determine the accuracy of the model,
or the fit of the model to the behavioral data.
Although computational models provide a more specific method of evaluating
how cognitive processes work, most recognition models have derived directly from the
signal-detection framework. For instance, both Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003) CLS
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model and Yonelinas’s (1994, 2002) DPSD model use the signal-detection framework to
characterize their recognition process of familiarity. However, the unique aspect of these
model’s signal-detection characterization is that they provide additional specificity to
recognition by including a second retrieval process that is responsible for the retrieval of
contextual information associated with a studied item. In so doing, both models provide a
distinction between the types of information that can be retrieved and how the
manipulation of this information impacts recognition. These two models are discussed in
detail next because of their relevance to the research questions addressed in this
dissertation.
CLS Model
One recognition computational model is Norman and O’Reilly’s (2003) CLS
neural-network model. The CLS model is different from other recognition models in that
it focuses on identifying the neural mechanisms theorized to support the cognitive
processes involved in recognition in addition to defining how those processes work.
According to the CLS model, recognition consists of two separate retrieval processes,
familiarity and recall, with each process having its own underlying neural mechanisms.
As a result, each process is implemented within its own neural network model which
work together to produce overall recognition performance.
In the CLS model, familiarity is the product of cognitive processing in the medial
temporal lateral cortex, or MTLC. Processing in the MTLC is implemented via a cortical
neural-network model consisting of multiple layers. One layer is an input layer that
projects in a feedforward fashion to other layers. These layers are theorized to be
analogous to lower level cortical activity. As items are first being learned, a large number
18

of nodes are activated at an overall lower level, as shown in Figure 2A. When items are
repeated, the number of activated nodes is reduced, but activation in each node is
increased, making an overall higher level of activation for repeated items, as shown in
Figure 2B. This process of specifying which nodes become activated within the presence
of a specific cue occurs through Hebbian learning in the model and is referred to as a
process of sharpening. Norman (2010) validates this sharpening process of cortical nodes
by citing that this process is consistent with neurophysiological findings that some
cortical neurons show decreased response as a function of how often a stimulus has been
presented.

Figure 2.
A) A pictorial representation of a large portion of nodes being activated at
an overall lower level in the MTLC model. B) A pictorial representation of nodes being
sharpened with activation increased and constrained to fewer nodes in the MTCL model.

The process of sharpening highlights the purpose of the cortical model in the CLS
model: to extract statistical regularities in the environment to make for quicker and more
generalizable learning. However, this aspect of the cortical model also influences the way
in which items are retrieved. Because the cortical model concentrates on capturing
statistical regularities in the environment, the model cannot isolate specific learning
instances, or target events. Instead, the ability of the model to sharpen overall activation
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patterns is used to discriminate between studied and nonstudied stimuli. Specifically,
when an item is presented at test, studied items result in a sharper activation pattern in the
cortex whereas nonstudied items result in a “duller” activation pattern. Stemming directly
from signal-detection theory, the cortical model then uses the sharpness of the activation
to produce an overall value, or memory signal. This value is then compared against a predetermined criterion threshold to determine whether the item is studied or nonstudied. If
the value is greater than the threshold value, it is recognized as old; if it is less than the
threshold value, it is recognized as new. This aspect of the model is important for
recognition in that it allows the model to quickly determine whether an item has been
encountered previously (i.e., is familiar). However, the cortical model is limited in its
ability to identify unique items. Therefore, the CLS model includes a recall process to
account for the identification of unique stimuli.
In the CLS model, recall is instantiated via the hippocampal sub-model. The
hippocampal model is different from the cortical model in that it makes recognition
decisions based on the content of the information retrieved rather than the amount of
information retrieved. In the hippocampal model, when an item is studied, the
representation of that item is stored in two different ways. One representation is a sparse
representation, concentrating only on features that are unique to that item. The second
representation is more elaborate and the co-occurring context from the study event. When
an item is presented at test, the test item’s representation is compared to that of the stored
item’s sparse representation. If the test item’s representation has enough overlap with the
stored item’s sparse representation, then a process referred to as pattern completion
begins. During pattern completion, all information related to the test item is retrieved,
20

including contextual information from the studied event. The retrieved information is
subsequently compared to that of the presented test item for a second time. If the test
item’s representation does not match the stored item’s representation, then that item is
rejected as new and is not recognized. However, if the test item’s representation does
match the stored item’s representation, then that item is accepted and recognized as old.
This process of matching in the hippocampal model allows the model to discriminate
between unique studied and nonstudied items, as well as to provide a more stringent
criterion for determining whether an item has been studied.
Norman and O’Reilly (2003) tested the strength of their hippocampal model in its
ability to discriminate between studied and nonstudied items by simulating the models’
ability to discriminate between studied items and related lures. In this simulation, both
the cortical and hippocampal model studied a list of items. At test, a portion of the
studied items were re-presented along with a set of both related and unrelated nonstudied
lures. The goal of this simulation was to determine whether the hippocampal model was
better at discriminating between the studied and related-lure items, highlighting the
strength of the hippocampal model at identifying unique study events. Norman and
O’Reilly (2003) predicted that the cortical model would have a higher false alarm rate for
the related lures than the hippocampal model due to its lower level of discrimination
using a signal-detection-like process. Norman and O’Reilly (2003) posit that in the
cortical model related lures would activate a large number of studied item nodes due to
their overlapping representational patterns, resulting in a higher degree of activation.
Therefore, the overall memory signal for related lures should be higher and result in a
higher likelihood of surpassing the criterion threshold for those items. However, in the
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hippocampal model, the level of overlap required between a test item’s representation
and a stored item’s representation was very high—greater than 80%—due to the unique
sparse representation of the studied event, resulting in a lower likelihood that a related
lure would match. The results of the simulation were consistent with their predictions.
The hippocampal model was superior at discriminating between studied items and
nonstudied items compared to the cortical model with the cortical model having a higher
false alarm rate for related lures (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).
Elfman et al. (2008) tested the predictions of the CLS model by comparing the
data produced by the model to behavioral data using receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves. To understand their findings, a brief detour to understand ROC curves is
required. A ROC curve of recognition data is created by graphing the proportion of hits—
studied items that were correctly identified as old—to false-alarms—nonstudied items
that were incorrectly identified as old. However, rather than using a dichotomous old/new
scale, a 6-point confidence recognition scale is used to extend the number of points that
can be plotted on the curve. Items can receive confidence ratings of 6, 5, or 4 with 6
indicating a high degree of confidence that the item was old or confidence ratings of 3, 2,
or 1 with 1 indicating a high degree of confidence that the item was new. Points on the
ROC curve are plotted as a function of confidence: the first point includes only the most
confidently recognized items (i.e., words that elicited a 6 response on the confidence
scale). Subsequent points on the scale are cumulative: the second point includes words
that received 6 responses plus those that received 5 responses. Each of the subsequent
points on the ROC curve plots the cumulative hits as a function of the false-alarms until
the final point which represents the total cumulative count for all of the responses on the
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scale. Discriminability can be extracted using normalized ROC curves. Discriminability
is the degree to which studied items are distinguished from nonstudied items and is
provided by the space of the curve from the probability line (i.e., the further the curve is
from the line, the higher the level of discriminability). Figure 3 shows an example of a
typical ROC curve for behavioral recognition data from Yonelinas (1994).

Figure 3.

ROC curve for typical recognition data.

ROC curves are often used to evaluate recognition data because of the distinct
shape that they produce for standard behavioral recognition paradigms. Typically, item
recognition ROCs produce a noticeable curve in probability space with a slight bump in
the y-axis, as shown in Figure 3 (Egan, 1975; Murdock, 1974; Yonelinas 1994). It is
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theorized that the reason item recognition ROC curves are curved in probability space is
due to the influence of familiarity which produces a Gaussian-like distribution of
responses. The observed bump in the y-axis is due to the influence of recollection
(Yonelinas, 1994, 2002).
Because the CLS model characterizes familiarity as a signal-detection process of
an overall memory signal in the MTLC and recall as an all-or-none process using
representational matching in the hippocampus, predictions about the shape of the receiver
operating characteristics (ROC) curves produced by each of these processes can be made.
Specifically, items recognized by the cortical sub-model should produce a Gaussian
distribution of responses whereas items recognized by the hippocampal sub-model should
produce a high-confidence dichotomous response distribution. Elfman et al. (2008) tested
this model prediction that cortical ROC curves would be curvilinear and hippocampal
ROC curves would be linear by conducting a series of simulations with each model and
comparing them to ROC curves observed in behavioral data.
Each simulation done by Elfman et al. (2008) consisted of 500 simulated subjects.
For each simulation, a list of 10 items was presented on the left of the screen and 10
items on the right of the screen in random order during study. By pairing items with
source data, Elfman et al. (2008) created a requirement that distinct representations of the
studied event must be retrieved to ensure accuracy. This source requirement necessitates
that the hippocampal model be used for retrieval. New items were generated for each list
as well as for each subject. Different learning rates were implemented for each simulated
subject to be more comparable with behavioral data. They also included an encoding
variability variable to mimic varying levels of encoding for the simulated objects during
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study (i.e., some objects were encoded better than others). As expected, the hippocampal
model produced threshold-like output, and the cortical model produced two overlapping
Gaussian-shaped strength distributions, consistent with signal detection models of
familiarity. That is, in the cortical model, studied items produced a distinct second
distribution in which the overall familiarity signal of those items was larger than
nonstudied items causing the studied-item distribution to separate from the nonstudieditem distribution. The distributions produced by both the cortical and hippocampal
models were converted into ROC curves. Elfman et al. (2008) found that the ROC curves
produced by the cortical model were curvilinear and symmetrical whereas the ROC
curves produced by the hippocampal model were linear, supporting their predictions.
This ability of the models to produce ROC curves that are consistent with the current
theorized recognition processes provides support for the CLS model.

Figure 4.
Elfman et al.’s (2008) simulation ROC curves generated by the CLS
hippocampal and cortical models.
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Finally, additional support for the CLS model comes from studies investigating
recognition performance in patients suffering from hippocampal lesions (Broadbent,
Gaskin, Squire, & Clark, 2010; Broadbent, Squire, & Clark, 2004; Clark, Zola, & Squire,
2000; Stark et al., 2002; Zola et al., 2000). Stark et al. (2002) compared recognition
performance between healthy control patients and amnesic patients with bilateral lesions
thought to be limited primarily to the hippocampal region. According to the CLS model,
because recognition performance is based on retrieval processing that occurs in both the
MTLC and hippocampal regions, if one region is impaired then overall recognition
performance also should be impaired. A total of four amnesic patients studied a list of 10
houses paired with a unique face; participants were encouraged to form an association
between each house-face pair. Stark et al. (2002) used paired associates to specifically
target the ability of the hippocampus to create unique representations of the studied event,
predicting that amnesic patients would have a significantly lower recognition accuracy
than healthy controls. At test, participants were shown house-face pairs and were asked to
determine whether the pair was an intact pair shown at study or a recombination of a
house and a face that had been studied, but as part of different pairs.
The addition of recombined house-face pairs tested the influence of the MTLC.
Because the recombined pairs contained houses and faces that both had been previously
studied, those recombined pairs should activate a large number of overlapping, sharpened
nodes. Therefore, if the MTLC is the only neural construct responsible for overall
recognition performance, then patients would not be able to discriminate between studied
house-face pairs and recombined pairs. However, because the recombined house-face
pairs were not studied together, those items should be recognized as new. If the
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hippocampus stores unique representational features associated with a studied event, as
suggested by the CLS model, then the representation of the recombined house-face pairs
should create a mismatch in the hippocampus due to having not been studied together,
resulting in the rejection of those pairs. Therefore, when the recombined pairs are
presented at test, if the hippocampus contributes to overall recognition performance, then
those recombined items should be rejected as new, resulting in low false alarm rate.
However, because the amnesic patients have hippocampal lesions, those patients should
have a lower hit rate as well as a higher false alarm rate.
Stark et al. (2002) found that healthy controls correctly identified 74% of the
studied house-face pairs as compared to 59% by the amnesic patients. Healthy controls
also had a significantly lower false-alarm rate of 18% than the 45% false-alarm rate of
the amnesic patients. These results are consistent with the predictions of the CLS model.
Because the amnesiac patients cannot identify the unique studied event of the recombined
house-face pairs, they are unable to reject those pairs as new, resulting in a higher false
alarm rate, as predicted by the CLS model. However, because the amnesic patients
performed near chance at identifying house-face pairs, Stark et al. (2002) performed a
second experiment to boost their performance from possible floor effects by increasing
the number of times each pair was studied from one to eight times. Although the purpose
of increasing the number of study presentations was to prevent possible floor effects, it
also served as a second test of the CLS model. Because the CLS model predicts that
repeated study presentations results in a more sharpened activation pattern in the MTLC,
increasing the number of study presentations should result in identification of a larger
number of house-face pairs by the MTLC. However, the increased hit rate in the MTLC
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should be accompanied by fewer false alarms to recombined pairs; because the items in
the recombined pairs were not studied together, their representation at test should not
evoke as high of a level of activation as studied, sharpened pairs. Stark et al. (2002)
found that increasing the number of study presentations significantly increased the
amnesic patients’ hit rate from 59% to 74% and also significantly decreased their falsealarm rate from 45% to 35%; however, they continued to perform significantly worse
than healthy controls who scored 100% for pairs studied eight times. This result further
supports the CLS model’s (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) predictions. Because these
amnesic patients are unable to rely on their hippocampus, they are unable to form a stored
item representation for each house-face pair, leaving them to rely solely on the familiarity
of the pair which cannot discriminate between unique events. However, according to the
CLS model, as the number of times that an item is studied increases, the activation for
those items is sharpened in the MTLC, resulting in a more accurate activation pattern for
that item. Therefore, when the MTCL is presented with an item that has a sharpened
activation pattern, the MTLC is more likely to accurately recognize that item as old and is
less likely to false alarm to similar lures for that item.
Because the CLS model identifies both familiarity and recall to be involved in
recognition, with familiarity being tied to the MTLC and recall to the hippocampus, Stark
et al.’s (2002) results are not surprising. If recognition was the product of processing in
the hippocampus alone, then the amnesic patients would not have been able to identify
the house-face pairs at an above-chance rate. On the other hand, if recognition was the
product of processing in the MTLC alone, then the amnesic patients would not have had
impaired recognition performance when compared to the controls. Therefore, Stark et
28

al.’s (2002) results from their two experiments provide strong evidence to support the
CLS’s model of separate recognition processes, familiarity and recall.
Although Elfman et al. (2008) and Stark et al. (2002) provide strong evidence to
support the CLS model, the model is limited. The CLS model is vague about how the
cortical and hippocampal models work together to produce overall recognition decisions
(Norman, 2010). The CLS model is clear as to how the cortical model and hippocampal
model operate independently; however, the model does not specify the degree to which
the two interact on a given single item. For instance, Norman and O’Reilly (2003) do not
specify the timing of the two processes; does familiarity occur after recollection fails,
vice versa, or do the two processes occur in parallel? Instead, Norman and O’Reilly
(2003) treat recognition decision-making, or the process of making a recognition
judgment, as a separate process and do not include it in their model. Norman (2010)
addresses this weakness by stating that the purpose of the CLS model is to understand the
neural mechanisms underlying recognition retrieval processes, not to understand how the
processes interact to produce overall recognition performance. This limitation of the CLS
model is a hurdle for recognition researchers who are still debating the underlying
recognition processes that produce recognition responses. Therefore, recognition
researchers have, instead, mostly relied on Yonelinas’s DPSD model (1994, 2002).
DPSD Model
Yonelinas’s (1994, 2002) DPSD model is different from the CLS model in that it
is a more traditional mathematical recognition model. Unlike the CLS model, the DPSD
model does not seek to identify the neural correlates that underlie recognition processes.
Instead, the DPSD model concentrates on identifying the recognition retrieval processes
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and how they interact to produce overall recognition performance. According to the
DPSD model, recollection and familiarity are the two cognitive processes responsible for
recognition. Familiarity can best be described as an assessment of the information related
to an item that provides a value that must reach some pre-defined criterion, and
recollection is the result of an active retrieval process initiated by an item at test and
produces an all-or-none result (Yonelinas, 1994; 2002). Yonelinas (2002) also uses the
same equal-variance distribution as signal-detection theory to describe familiarity.
Although Yonelinas (2002) draws heavily from signal-detection in terms of describing
his familiarity process in the DPSD model, the recollection process is characterized as a
threshold process. Recollection is a separate and independent cognitive process from
familiarity that operates at the same time during retrieval and is an all-or-none process
that requires the retrieval of veridical contextual information associated with a target
item.
According to the DPSD model, the recollection process can result in identifying
an item as either old or new. If an item is recollected and the contextual information that
is retrieved matches the item that is currently being presented, then that item is
immediately recognized as old and elicits a high-confidence response on a 6-point
confidence recognition scale (i.e., a 6-response). Recollection in the DPSD model is
consistent with the CLS model’s (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) recall process. Just as recall
in the CLS model involves the retrieval of contextual information associated with a
targeted studied item, recollection in the DPSD model also requires the retrieval of
contextual information. Additionally, in the CLS model, recall is responsible for
retrieving items associated with a studied event by storing information with unique event
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features. Therefore, for recall to occur, items presented at test must have a high level of
overlap between a test item’s representation and a stored item’s representation, resulting
in a high degree of accuracy. Similarly, Yonelinas (1994, 2002) also describes
recollection as a highly accurate retrieval process that can only occur for studied items.
However, unlike the CLS model, the DPSD model posits that if an item is not
recollected, then that item undergoes the familiarity process for retrieval. In the DPSD
model, the signal-detection process of familiarity occurs for both studied and nonstudied
items. According to the model, because familiarity is a signal-detection process, retrieved
items will yield an equal distribution of varying levels of familiarity with most items
associated with a middle level of familiarity. Therefore, because items can have varying
levels of familiarity, they also will have varying levels of confidence associated with
them as well. For instance, studied items that have a low level of familiarity associated
with them might yield a low-confidence unsure response, as shown in Figure 5 below.
This unsure response would most likely translate to a 4-response on a 6-point confidence
recognition scale. Conversely, nonstudied items might be associated with a higher degree
of familiarity and evoke a less-confident unsure new response, as shown in Figure 5
below. This unsure new response would likely translate to a 3-response on a 6-point
confidence recognition scale.
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Figure 5.
A pictorial representation of the familiarity signal for both studied and
nonstudied items divided into varying levels of confidence.

However, rather than using equal variance distributions like shown in Figure 5,
Yonelinas (2002) typically represents recognition data using ROC curves to provide
evidence for the DPSD model. Yonelinas (2002) argues that ROC curves of recognition
data provide the strongest arguments for the presence of recollection. If recognition was
based on a single cognitive process—because familiarity is theorized to be a normally
distributed measure (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Mickes, Wixted, & Wais, 2007; Wixted,
2007)—then ROC curves of recognition data should be symmetrical, producing a slope
equal to 1.0 and a y-intercept equal to 0 when normalized. Specifically, using the 6-point
confidence recognition scale should produce mostly ratings of three and four with only a
small portion of familiar items categorized as highly familiar 6 responses, and relatively
few unfamiliar items categorized as very unfamiliar 1 responses, as shown in Figure 5.
However, recognition data typically produces a skewed distribution with approximately
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10% of data falling into the high-confidence 6 category, creating an asymmetrical ROC
curve and an increased y-intercept, shown in Figure 3 (Egan, 1958; Heathcote, 2003;
Mandler & Boeck, 1974; Mickes et al., 2007; Murdock & Dufty, 1972). Other
recognition models have attempted to explain this asymmetry by theorizing that studieditem distributions create a larger amount of variance, thus allowing for a larger portion of
data to fall into the right tail of the studied item distribution. However, those models have
difficulty accounting for as much as 10% of the data falling into the right tail (Mickes et
al., 2007).
The DPSD model can account for the increased proportion of high-confidence
responses observed. Because the DPSD model includes a recollection process that is
independent from familiarity, recollection contributes independently to recognition
performance. Also, because recollection involves the active retrieval of contextual
information associated with an item, information retrieved via recollection is more likely
to induce a stronger feeling of confidence for either accepting the item as old or rejecting
it as new. For instance, if information such as the font color of a word during encoding is
retrieved, the likelihood that a high-confidence 6 will be given is much more likely than a
lower confident response (Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009). Therefore, the inclusion of
this recollection process in the DPSD model allows the model to account for the
increased number of high-confidence responses that produce an increased y-intercept and
asymmetrical shape on the ROC curves.
Yonelinas (1994) performed an experiment to demonstrate the statistical validity
of the DPSD model in terms of being able to fit behavioral data. For this experiment,
Yonelinas (1994) hypothesized that, if recollection is a separate cognitive process that
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contributes to overall recognition performance, then manipulations that have been shown
to negatively impact the retrieval of contextual information, but not familiarity (e.g.,
inclusion/exclusion instructions; Jacoby, 1991), should negatively impact recognition
performance, evidenced by either a decreased y-intercept or decreased slope. The
experiment was a 2 (List Length: short, long) X 2 (Instructions: inclusion, exclusion)
experimental design. List length was included because it has been shown to have an
inverse relationship with recollection; as the number of to-be-remembered items
increases, recollection for those items decreases (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996). The
instruction manipulation was included to evaluate the differential impact of recollection
because of prior research that has demonstrated that exclusion instructions differentially
impacted recollection over familiarity (Jacoby, 1991). Both list length and test
instructions were manipulated within subjects. The order of the studied list length and test
instructions were counterbalanced across participants. Participants completed a total of
eight study-test blocks. Each study-test block consisted of two studied lists, either short
(i.e., 10 words) or long (i.e., 30 words); each word was presented at a rate of 2 seconds
each. Immediately following the study phase of each block, participants then completed
two recognition tests using either inclusion instructions or exclusion instructions. In the
inclusion instruction condition, the first test asked participants to only respond old (i.e.,
4-, 5-, or 6-response) to an item if it was recognized as being in List 1, and the second test
asked participants to only respond old (i.e., 4-, 5-, or 6-response) to a word if it was
recognized as being in List 2. In the exclusion instruction condition, the first test asked
participants to respond new (i.e., 1-, 2-, or 3-response) to a word if it was recognized as
being from either List 2 or was never studied, and the second test asked participants to
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respond new (i.e., 1-, 2-, or 3-response) to a word if it was recognized as being from
either List 1 or was never studied. Although these instructions are similar, they are
thought to differentially bolster recollection and familiarity.
According to Jacoby (1991), inclusion and exclusion instructions impact
recollection and familiarity differently because recollection is an intentional process that
can be consciously controlled, whereas familiarity is an automatic process. Inclusion
instructions are the same as typical recognition test instructions and are thought to impact
both recollection and familiarity by asking participants to recognize words from a
specific list as old, allowing for both recollection and familiarity to operate. However,
exclusion instructions emphasize recollection by asking participants to exclude words
recognized from other lists as new; only words recognized from the specified lists should
be identified as old. By asking participants to concentrate on which word belongs to
which lists, the controlled process of recollection operates to identify words’ source or
contextual information (i.e., other words that also appeared on the same list, internal
contextual cues felt during the study of this word, etc.), to determine whether the word
was on the targeted list or not. Therefore, exclusion instructions emphasize the impact of
recollection and minimize the impact of familiarity.
In terms of the behavioral data, Yonelinas (1994) found that for the inclusion
instructions, participants were slightly more accurate at recognizing words from a short
list of words (M = .78) than from a long list of words (M = .70), demonstrating a listlength effect (Strong, 1912). However, for the exclusion instructions the opposite was
found; participants were more accurate at identifying words from a long list of words (M
= .30) than a short list of words (M = .22). Yonelinas (1994) then calculated the impact of
35

recollection and familiarity separately. Because the exclusion instructions were thought
to emphasize the impact of recollection over familiarity, recollection was calculated by
subtracting the probability of accepting a studied word under exclusion instructions from
the probability of accepting a studied word under inclusion instructions. Familiarity was
calculated by dividing the exclusion score by one minus the estimated probability of
recollection. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on both recollection and
familiarity in terms of list length found that recollection was negatively impacted by list
length. Recollection was significantly higher for short lists (M = .56) than for long lists
(M = .40), whereas familiarity was not affected by list length. This finding is consistent
with Yonelinas and Jacoby (1996) results’ that also demonstrated recollection was worse
for longer lists than for shorter lists.
Yonelinas (1994) provided additional evidence of recollection by plotting
recognition data using ROC curves. Figure 6 shows the plotted ROC curves for each of
the four experimental conditions: List Length (short, long) X Instructions (inclusion,
exclusion). For the inclusion conditions, the curve for the long list fell slightly below the
curve for the short list, demonstrating that recognition accuracy was higher for the short
list than the long list. The inclusion curves also demonstrate a higher y-intercept than the
exclusion instructions indicating a higher degree of recollection for those items (i.e., sure
old, or 6-responses, on the 6-point recognition confidence scale). However, for the
exclusion conditions, both curves had significantly lower y-intercepts and slopes. At first
glance, these results suggest that the impact of recollection was significantly lowered
rather than increased, as predicted; however, looking at the 1-reponses demonstrates that
recollection was increased. The ROC curve for the exclusion instructions show a large
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increase in high-confident new responses as compared to the inclusion instructions. This
increase in high-confident new responses indicates that participants were using
recollection to reject information (as evidenced by the increased number of 1 responses)
rather than accept information (which would have been evidenced by an increased
number of 6 responses). Because participants were asked to exclude items recognized
from another studied list as new rather than accept items recognized as old, recollection
is more likely to impact sure new, or 1-, responses more so than sure old, or 6-,
responses. Therefore, these results demonstrate that participants could consciously
retrieve contextual information associated with a target word to determine whether the
word was old or new which provides support for a second cognitive process.

Figure 6.

ROC curves for Yonelinas (1994) Experiment 1 results.

In terms of fitting the DPSD model, Yonelinas (1994) created ROC curves using
the DPSD model and estimated parameters based on the observations from the behavioral
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data. From these simulations, Yonelinas (1994) found that the DPSD model accurately
predicted the y-intercepts and slopes of the observed ROC curves for both short and long
lists under inclusion instructions. The predicted and observed y-intercepts were 1.70 and
1.60, respectively, for the short lists, and the 1.33 and 1.33 for the long lists. The
predicted and observed slopes were .64 and .57, respectively, for the short lists, and .76
and .74 for the long lists. Although Yonelinas (1994) found that the DPSD model could
accurately predict the observed behavioral data, he did not provide any statistical
measures, such as a maximum likelihood estimate, to demonstrate the model’s ability to
fit the data.
Although the DPSD model provides a good account of recognition data and has
allowed researchers to more fully understand the cognitive process involved in
recognition, the model has its limitations. One limitation of the DPSD model is that it
assumes that recollection can only occur for studied items and not nonstudied items.
Therefore, the model cannot account for instances in which contextual information for
nonstudied items might be retrieved, or recollected. This aspect of the model has been
problematic in that there have been several studies that have shown recollection of
nonstudied information (e.g., Dennis, Bowman, & Peterson, 2014; Gallo & Roediger,
2003; Higham & Vokey, 2004; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995). Higham and Vokey (2004)
criticized the DPSD model for its inability to account for false recollections, stating that
the seriousness of false recollections for models of recognition has been
underemphasized. Specifically, Higham and Vokey (2004) argue that the inability of
current models of recognition to account for the retrieval of contextual information for
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nonstudied items suggests that our current understanding of recognition retrieval
processes is incorrect.
Yonelinas acknowledged this limitation of the DPSD model by referring to
instances in which the model fails as violations of the model’s boundary conditions
(Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010). According to Yonelinas, the purpose of the
DPSD model is to account for conditions that are typical for recognition; therefore,
conditions that are atypical fall outside the purview of the model and violate the model’s
boundary conditions. An example of an atypical condition in recognition is a high level
of semantic and perceptual similarity between a studied item and a nonstudied lure (i.e.,
RAT and RATS). Under these conditions, recollection has difficulty discriminating
between the two items. As a result, this difficulty can result in false recollection of the
nonstudied lure (i.e., falsely recollecting RATS). Yonelinas et al. (2010) goes on to
explain why this violation occurs using verbiage from the CLS model, stating that the
similar semantic and perceptual information results in a high level of feature overlap
during test. According to the CLS model, if there is a high enough level of feature
overlap (approximately 80%) then the hippocampus will retrieve incorrect contextual
information for that item. Therefore, a high level of semantic and perceptual information
between a studied and nonstudied item can result in a high level of feature overlap that
can lead to the false recollection of the nonstudied item.
Although Yonelinas et al. (2010) acknowledges that there are conditions under
which false recollection can occur, he has not amended his DPSD model to account for
them. Rather, Yonelinas et al. (2010) defends the DPSD model’s (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002)
limitation by claiming that false recollection is simply a violation of a boundary condition
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of the model. Instead, Yonelinas et al. (2010) argues that because false recollection
produces such a small effect—from 0% to approximately 5%—in conditions that are
typical to recognition, the cost of modeling such a small proportion of data is not worth
the benefit of fitting them. As a result, Yonelinas (2010) typically removes any false
recollection data and classifies it as erroneous noise. Norman (2010) goes on to defend
this limitation of the DPSD model stating that models such as the DPSD and CLS models
(Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) are purely measurement models,
“… a measurement model does not have to be exactly correct to be a useful
source of converging evidence, and it does not have to be applicable in every
situation… We just need to be aware of the boundary conditions, and mechanistic
models like CLS give us a way of developing intuitions about what these
boundary conditions will be.” (pg. 12)
Although Yonelinas et al. (2010) and Norman (2010) provide a somewhat valid
argument, they fail to address that one consequence of their decision to not include a
mechanism that can account for false recollection is that our understanding of recognition
retrieval processes is incorrect. Although false recollections may occur infrequently in
typical experiments used to test the DPSD model, because false recollection has been
shown to systematically occur under certain conditions—demonstrating that they are not
the byproduct of erroneous error—then nonstudied items should be impacted by the same
factors shown to influence studied items. Aim 1 of this dissertation was to implement a
paradigm designed to increase the potential for false recollections (discussed in Chapter
III) using an experimental manipulation theorized to increase false recollection. With
more false recollections in hand, Aim 4 of this dissertation was designed to directly test
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the DPSD model to determine whether the addition of a false recollection parameter was
necessary to fit false recollection data. Before presenting the specific aims of this
dissertation, we will discuss the literature on false recollection and the conditions under
which they have occurred.
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FALSE RECOLLECTION
False recollection refers to the retrieval of contextual information associated with
an event that has not occurred (e.g., Dennis et al., 2014; Gallo & Roediger, 2003; Higham
& Vokey, 2004; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995). For instance, during a recognition task, one
might identify a nonstudied word presented at test as old because she remembers the font
color of the word during study (Mickes et al., 2009). Although instances such as this are
rare and typically occur at a varying rate of 0-5%, they have been found to occur in many
different studies under a variety of conditions (e.g., Barba, 1993; Dennis et al., 2014;
Dewhurst, 2001; Eakin, Schreiber, & Sergent-Marshall, 2003; Gallo et al., 2009; Higham,
1998; Higham & Vokey, 2004; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lane & Zaragoza,
1995; Jones, 2013; Mather et al., 1997; Norman et al., 1996; Payne, Elie, Blackwell, &
Neuschatz, 1996; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Roediger, 1996; Schacter et al., 1997;
Strange et al., 2011; Whittlesea, 2002), demonstrating their robustness.
For the next portion of this dissertation, I will discuss four studies with varying
experimental factors that have shown to induce false recollection. Each study will be
discussed in terms of the current DPSD model and Yonelinas’s recollection boundary
condition explanation using the CLS model.
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Implicit Associations
One experimental factor that has been shown to influence false recollection is the
manipulation of implicitly activated associations among a list of words. In the DeeseRoediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants are given a list of 15 related words
such as BED, REST, AWAKE, TIRED, DREAM, WAKE, SNOOZE, BLANKET,
DOZE, SLUMBER, SNORE, NAP, PEACE, YAWN, and DROWSY to study. After a
short delay, participants are given an old/new recognition test containing studied words,
unrelated nonstudied words (e.g., GOAT), and a single related nonstudied word often
referred to as the critical lure (e.g., SLEEP). The critical lure is a word that is associated
with each of the words on the studied list but is not presented at study. The DRM
paradigm produces a significantly higher false alarm rate for the critical lure on the
recognition test than for the unrelated word. Roediger and McDermott (1995) theorized
that the increased false alarm rate for the critical lure was due to the item being falsely
recollected as being a part of the list. This hypothesis stemmed from the idea that,
because the lure was associated with each of the other words on the list, it was implicitly
activated during study. This implicit activation of the critical lure resulted in the lure
being a part of the studied representation. However, because only old/new judgements
were used in initial study, the degree to which participants experienced these critical lures
as familiar or recollected cannot be determined. To determine whether participants were
experiencing these critical lures as familiar or recollected, Roediger and McDermott
(1995) performed a follow-up study that collected Remember/Know judgments in
addition to old/new judgments.
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Remember/Know judgments are given at the time of recognition to indicate the
underlying reason an item is recognized (Tulving, 1983). Participants are instructed to
provide a Remember judgment if contextual information is retrieved along with the test
item. For instance, if a person remembers an item as being presented in a particular font
color of the item, then that item would be given a Remember judgment. Participants are
instructed to provide a Know judgment if a test item seems familiar but no contextual
information about studying the item can be retrieved. For instance, if the test item seems
familiar but the font color in which it was presented cannot be recalled, then that item
would be given a Know judgment. As such, Remember judgments are thought to measure
the process of recollection, whereas Know judgments are thought to measure familiarity
(Tulving, 1983). In Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) study, more than half of the
nonstudied lures (M = .58) that were categorized as old by participants also received a
Remember judgment, suggesting that participants were recollecting contextual details
associated with the lure. This finding is surprising given that there should not be any
contextual information associated with these lures because they were never part of the
study event.
Roediger et al. (1998) explained the false recollection effect obtained by the DRM
paradigm using the theory of associative processes. According to this theory, false
memories occur because associations with studied list words are implicitly activated
along with the explicitly activated studied words (Nelson et al., 1998). Consequently,
these implicit associations become part of the studied event. For instance, when studying
the DRM list of words associated with the critical lure SLEEP, the word SLEEP is
implicitly activated when the list of associates for SLEEP, such as BED, DREAM, and
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PILLOW, are studied and becomes part of the stored representation of the studied list.
Therefore, during retrieval, the critical lure SLEEP, is falsely recollected as having been
studied because contextual information from the study event is also retrieved for that
item. Therefore, the contextual information that was part of the studied list is shared by
the implicitly activated critical lure, resulting in people to experience the critical lure as
having been studied when it was not, producing false recollection for that lure.
Roediger et al.’s (1998) theory of associative processes explanation is in
accordance with Yonelinas’s boundary condition explanation. According to Yonelinas’s
boundary condition explanation, when a studied and nonstudied item share a high degree
of feature overlap, information associated with the studied item can be incorrectly
recalled and associated with the nonstudied item. Therefore, regarding the DRM
paradigm, the implicit activation of the critical lure during study of the DRM lists results
in the lure being encoded as part of the studied list and subsequently sharing features with
studied items. During retrieval, because the lure shares these contextual features with
stored list items there is sufficient overlap to activated matching in the hippocampus. This
high degree of overlap, then results in the retrieval of the studied event information,
including contextual information, resulting in false recollection for that item.
Although Yonelinas would consider the conditions of the DPM paradigm as
violations of the boundary conditions for recollection, these false recollections do not
occur infrequently. Yonelinas et al. (2010), stated that, because false recollections
typically occur at such a low rate, accounting for them is not necessary. However,
Roediger and McDermott (1995) reported that as much as 58% of critical lures can be
falsely recollected, resulting in a much higher rate than seen in standard recognition
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paradigms. This finding demonstrates that false recollection effects can be very large,
highlighting the need to amend the DPSD model to better account for the retrieval
processes responsible for false recollection. One method of doing this would be to amend
the model to include a mechanism for recollection of nonstudied items. This amendment
was tested as a viable method as part of Aim 4 of this dissertation.
Source Attribution Errors
The studies on the DRM paradigm showed that veridical contextual information
from a studied event can be associated with and impact recollection of a nonstudied item.
The literature regarding source attribution errors has shown that incorrect contextual
information can produce false recollection. A source attribution error, or a source
misattribution, is an error that occurs when a person retrieves incorrect source
information for an event (Johnson et al., 1993). For instance, a person might study both
the word RAT and RATS but in two different contexts, RAT studied in white font and
RATS studied in black font. A source attribution error occurs, when someone retrieves
the word RAT as having been studied in black font instead of white. Although source
information can include information such as font color, but it can also refer to contextual
information regarding where the information was encoded (e.g., at a store versus at
school), how it was encoded (e.g., in a magazine or a book), or who produced the
information (e.g., a friend or a parent). According to the DPSD model, source
information, along with all other contextual information, should always be veridical.
However, studies demonstrating source attribution errors suggest that this might not
always be the case.
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Lane and Zaragoza (1995) investigated the subjective experience reported by
participants that often accompanies source attribution errors. Participants were presented
96 items—half of the items were presented as pictures, and the other half were presented
as words—and asked to state the use for each item (e.g., SCISSORS could be used to cut
a sheet of paper). One day later, participants took a recognition test consisting of some
items they had seen the previous day as pictures, some items they had seen as words, and
48 nonstudied items. Participants were instructed to only identify words as old that they
remembered seeing as a picture the day before. In addition, participants gave
Remember/Know judgments. They were instructed to indicate whether they remembered
seeing the word as a picture (i.e., retrieved contextual information associated with the
word) or only knew they had seen the word as a picture (i.e., the word was familiar but
no contextual information was retrieved). Participants were significantly more likely to
give a Remember judgment to a word incorrectly identified as a picture than to a new
item, indicating that participants retrieved false contextual information of the word being
presented as a picture, producing a false recollection due to a source attribution error.
Approximately 14% of the items incorrectly identified as having been studied as pictures
were given a Remember judgment by participants, demonstrating that participants were
experiencing false recollections for those items.
Although Lane and Zaragoza (1995) found that the source information on which
participants based their judgments was incorrect, they did show that people could base
their recognition judgements on incorrect contextual information retrieved for that item.
This finding is problematic for the DPSD model because it shows that veridical
contextual information can be misattributed to the wrong studied item, violating the
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DPSD model assumption that contextual information associated with the studied item
produces recollection. This finding is also problematic for Yonelinas’s boundary
condition explanation. According to the boundary condition explanation, a nonstudied
item must share a large enough portion of features with a studied item for contextual
information to be retrieved. However, in Lane and Zaragoza’s (1995) study, the items
studied as words and the items studied as pictures were not semantically related or
perceptually similar. Therefore, items studied as pictures should not have shared enough
features with items studied as words to surpass the retrieval criterion. Instead, Lane and
Zaragoza’s (1995) results could be due to either a binding error or a monitoring error
(Fandakova, Shing, & Lindenberger, 2013), but it currently unclear as to the cause of
their source misattributions. Regardless, Lane and Zaragoza’s (1995) results demonstrate
that false recollection due to source misattribution can occur outside of Yonelinas’s
recollection boundary condition, further highlighting the necessity for the DPSD model to
be amended.
Prior Knowledge
Although Lane and Zaragoza (1995) demonstrates that source information within
the context of a single study can be misattributed, there is also evidence that prior
experience can be result in source misattribution errors. Jones (2013) manipulated the
amount of prior knowledge participants demonstrated for the subject of a news headline.
Participants completed a pre-screen, consisting of five questions about various celebrity
actors, musicians, politicians, and sports figures (i.e., What is this person famous for?),
which researchers scored for accuracy. Correct answers were given a score of 1, resulting
in each subject receiving a total possible score of 0 to 5 for the five questions. Headlines
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receiving a score of 4-5 were categorized as high-knowledge, those receiving a score of
2-3 were categorized as middle-knowledge, and those scored 0-1 were categorized as
low-knowledge. Based on their results in the pre-screen, researchers created an
individualized list of 30 headlines for each participant consisting of 24 true headlines (8
high-knowledge, 8 middle-knowledge, and 8 low-knowledge) and 6 false headlines (2
high-knowledge, 2 middle-knowledge, and 2 low-knowledge). Each headline was
presented one at a time for 6 seconds each after which participants gave old/new
judgments about the headline and then Remember/Know judgments for headlines given
an old judgement. Participants were explicitly told to only provide Remember judgments
if they remembered having seen the headline before and could retrieve contextual
information for that event. Additionally, they were also told to provide Know judgments
if they knew (i.e., it was familiar) that they had seen the headline before but could not
recall any contextual information associated with the event. Jones (2013) found that false
headlines informed by a high level of prior-knowledge received significantly more
Remember judgments, followed by middle-knowledge false headlines, and then lowknowledge false headlines, as shown in Figure 7. This same pattern of results was found
for true headlines, demonstrating a relationship between the amount of prior knowledge
about the topic of a headline and the likelihood that a headline would be falsely
recollected.
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Figure 7.
Remember judgments for false headlines increased as a function of level
of prior knowledge (Jones, 2013).

Jones (2013) data is problematic for the DPSD model in two ways. The first
problem for the model is that Jones (2013) demonstrates that prior knowledge was
systematically impacting the likelihood that a headline, either true or false, would be
remembered, suggesting a systematic, rather than random, error in the retrieval process.
According to the DPSD model, only headlined events that had been previously
encountered should have been remembered. However, retrieval of contextual information
due to prior knowledge that was related with the topic of the false headline, especially for
high-knowledge headlines, resulted in false recollections. This systematic relationship
between prior knowledge and false recollections contradicts Yonelinas’s (2002)
assumption that false recollections are due to random error. The second problem that
Jones (2013) creates for the DPSD model is that it defies Yonelinas’s recollection
boundary condition explanation. According to Yonelinas’s boundary condition, false
headlined events must share a high degree of feature overlap with a true event for
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contextual information to be retrieved. However, Jones (2013) chose false headlines that
were deemed less plausible and less likely to have occurred based on previous pilot data.
Therefore, the false headlines that were used in her study should not have shared a high
degree of feature overlap with any true headlines. Instead, Jones (2013) attributes her
results to knowledge schemas that influenced retrieval processes. Regardless of her
conclusion, her results prove to be problematic for the current DPSD model and falls
outside the boundary conditions of recollection. According to Yonelinas et al.’s (2010)
boundary condition explanation, a nonstudied item must share enough features with a
studied item for contextual information to be retrieved. However, Jones (2013)
demonstrates that prior knowledge related to the topic of a nonstudied headline led to
false recollection. These false headlines did not share similar perceptual or semantic
information with true headlines. The only information that was shared was the topic of
the headline. Therefore, high-knowledge false headlines should not have shared enough
features with true headlined events to surpass the retrieval criterion (Norman & O’Reilly,
2003). It could be that false recollection of the false headline events could have been due
to an over-generalization of knowledge structures, but it is unclear as to how those
knowledge structures influenced retrieval. Jones (2013) results demonstrate that false
recollection due to prior knowledge can occur.
Stimulus Fluency
False recollections due to implicit associations, source misattributions, and prior
knowledge, all occur because of factors that result in the retrieval of contextual
information—whether veridical or misattributed—lead to false recollection. However,
false recollection has been shown to also occur due to factors that occur during retrieval.
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Higham and Vokey (2004) found that increasing the duration of a stimulus during test
impacted familiarity and recollection, and also produced false recollections. Although
this manipulation does not directly manipulate contextual information, this study does
highlight additional conditions that violate Yonelinas’s boundary condition explanation
of recollection. Higham and Vokey (2004) increased the duration that a target stimulus
was presented to hypothetically also increase the fluency of that target stimulus. Fluency
of a stimulus has been shown to influence familiarity, but not recollection (Higham &
Vokey, 2004). Therefore, Higham and Vokey (2004) hypothesized that increasing the
presentation time of a stimulus should impact Know judgments without impacting
Remember judgments. Participants studied a list of 74 five-lettered words by reading
them aloud. After study, participants were given an old/new recognition test and a
Remember/Know test. At test, participants were told to watch the screen for each word.
A fixation stimulus was presented on the screen, and participants were instructed to look
at the screen. After the researcher confirmed that the participant was looking at the
screen, a word was briefly presented and then masked with ampersands. Presentation
duration of the stimulus varied: half were presented for a short duration (6-34 ms) and the
other half were presented for a long duration (36-64 ms), depending on the refresh rate of
the monitor. Participants were instructed to write down the word that was presented,
guessing if needed. After writing down the word, participants pressed the space bar to
reveal the word that had been presented and indicated whether they had seen the word
before (i.e., old/new judgments) as well as whether they remember seeing the word or
just knew they had seen it previously (i.e., Remember/Know judgments).
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Participants were more likely to false alarm to new items that were presented for a
long-than a short-duration, demonstrating an impact of presentation time on recognition.
Overall, nonstudied items were more likely to receive Know than Remember judgments;
however, the probability that a nonstudied item received a Remember judgment
significantly increased when the item was presented for a longer duration. This finding is
problematic for the DPSD model because, in its current state, it cannot account for why
the systematic manipulation of the perceptual features of an item impacted false
recollection when the manipulation of presentation time should have only impacted the
process of familiarity. Higham and Vokey (2004) showed that presentation time impacted
recollection for both studied and nonstudied items, suggesting that contextual information
was retrieved for both items. However, the presentation duration of a stimulus during
retrieval should not have had any known impact on access to contextual information
related to a studied event. Therefore, it could be that the increased amount of presentation
time allowed for the retrieval of contextual information.
Although Higham and Vokey (2004) did not provide an explanation for their
finding, they did emphasize the fact that their findings cannot be accounted for by current
models of recognition. According to Yonelinas et al. (2010) false recollection is an issue
that violates the boundaries of recognition within the DPSD model. However, Higham
and Vokey’s (2004) findings provide an additional example of the need to modify the
model. Because Yonelinas states that only information that shares a high level of feature
overlap can evoke false recollection, the impact of stimulus duration on false recollection
falls outside of that boundary. Therefore, Higham and Vokey’s (2004) findings cannot be
explained by the DPSD model in its current state. That the DPSD model cannot account
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for Higham and Vokey’s (2004) findings, further demonstrates that our current
understanding of how recognition retrieval processes operate is limited.
Summary
Although evidence from Roediger and McDermott (1995), Lane and Zaragoza
(1995), and many others (e.g., Dennis et al., 2014; Gallo et al., 2009; Howe, 2007;
Schacter, Koutstaal, Johnson, Gross, & Angell, 1997) has demonstrated that, not only do
false recollections occur, they can also occur at a higher frequency than 0-5%. However,
their results must be tempered by the fact that they were obtained using Remember/Know
judgments and not a 6-point confidence recognition scale. A 6-point confidence
recognition scale is the typical scale used to measure recognition in a typical DPSD
recognition paradigm. The 6-point confidence recognition scale is necessary because of
its ability to provide a finer measure of the degree to which participants recognize items
at test than Remember/Know judgments. The 6-point confidence recognition scale also
has the advantage of mapping onto a signal-detection distribution. For instance, a 5response on a 6-point confidence recognition scale demonstrates that the item was
recognized as old with a certain level of confidence. However, it also reveals that the
item was not recognized with a high-level of confidence, suggesting that it was retrieved
via familiarity. It is assumed that Remember/Know judgments measure recollection
versus familiarity (Higham & Vokey, 2004; Jones, 2013; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995) and that Remember judgments are analogous to a 6response on a 6-point confidence recognition scale, but the Remember/Know scale has
been subject to criticism in terms of their ability to reliably measure recollection and
familiarity (e.g., Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008; Wixted & Mickes, 2010).
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Although Remember/Know judgments have been theorized to be directly
correlated with recollection and familiarity, respectively, several studies have
demonstrated that these judgments can sometimes be skewed because of their
dichotomous nature (e.g., Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998; Hicks &
Marsh, 1999). Specifically, Gardiner et al. (1998) found that when participants were not
given a third choice of “Guess” during a Remember/Know task, they were more likely to
assign either Remember or Know judgments to items that were not based on a memory
for that item (i.e., participants were guessing). However, if participants were given the
opportunity to provide a “Guess” response, the accuracy of the Remember/Know
judgments increased, as evidenced by verbal reports. Therefore, the validity of the
Remember/Know judgments provided in the Roediger & McDermott (1995), Lane and
Zaragoza (1995), Jones (2013), and Higham and Vokey (2004) studies can be challenged.
It should be noted that participants in Roediger & McDermott (1995) and Lane and
Zaragoza (1995) were only asked to provide Remember/Know judgments to items which
they had previously identified as old. Therefore, they were given the opportunity to reject
nonstudied items as new before providing a Remember/Know judgment. Participants in
Jones (2013) study were also given the opportunity to provide a Neither judgment and did
provide Neither judgments for approximately 95% of false headlines, demonstrating their
willingness to decisively use Remember/Know judgments. Additionally, participants
were told to only provide a Remember judgment for items in which they could retrieve
contextual information.
Although the scale that was used in Roediger and McDermott (1995), Lane and
Zaragoza (1995), Jones (2013), and Higham and Vokey (2004) can be criticized, the
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results from each of these studies demonstrate that false recollection can occur and be
manipulated by certain experimental conditions. Yonelinas et al. (2010) acknowledged
one way false recollection could occur was under conditions of high similarity. However,
Lane and Zaragoza (1995) demonstrated that not only were people able to recollect
veridical contextual source information for studied items, but they were also able to
recollect false contextual source information for studied items. This finding is
problematic for the DPSD model in that it demonstrates that contextual information
retrieved for studied items can be incorrect. Therefore, false recollection can occur in one
of two ways: a) retrieval of contextual information for nonstudied items, resulting in
recollection for an event that never occurred and b) retrieval of inaccurate contextual
information for a studied item. If incorrect contextual information is retrieved for a
studied item, then that information is false, resulting in a false recollection. Lane and
Zaragoza (1995) demonstrated that false recollection can occur in more than one way,
further highlighting the DPSD model’s limited ability to explain all aspects of the
recollection process.
Although false recollection has been acknowledged as a possible boundary
condition (Norman, 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2010), the fact that the DPSD model has not
been amended to account for their occurrence is problematic in two ways. First, because
the DPSD model has not been amended to include a false recollection parameter,
measuring the extent to which false recollection occurs is not possible. Instead, other
methods such as Remember/Know judgments must be used to measure the extent to
which false recollection occurs. This difference in methodology can be problematic
because it leaves open the possibility for measurement differences between the two. The
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second problem that results from the DPSD model not being amended to include a false
recollection parameter is a more global problem. Because the model does not account for
false recollection, it limits our understanding of recognition. The purpose of a
computational model is to further our understanding of the cognitive processes that they
represent. Therefore, by failing to model all parts of a cognitive process, the current
model limits our ability to fully understand how recognition operates.
One solution to this problem would be to investigate false memories using the
same methodology that is used in traditional recognition paradigms. Specifically, instead
of using Remember/Know judgments, we should use a 6-point confidence recognition
scale. By using a 6-point confidence recognition scale in a paradigm designed to increase
the number of false recollections, we can test the DPSD model’s currently ability to
account for this data. Unfortunately, most false memory paradigms have not been tested
using a 6-point confidence recognition scale and provide few instances of false
recollection. The Payne-Eakin paradigm (Payne & Eakin, 2017) was designed to address
both of these shortcomings.
The Payne-Eakin Paradigm
Payne and Eakin (2017) developed a paradigm for investigating false memories in
recognition memory that capitalized on the finding of the DRM paradigm that implicit
associate among words produced false recollections, as suggested by the theory of
associative processes (Roediger et al., 1998). However, unlike Roediger et al.’s (1998)
theory, Payne and Eakin (2017) quantified the associations in their paradigm using the
Processing Implicit and Explicit Representations 2 (PIER2) model; PIER2 specifies how
the associative relationships between words operate (Nelson et al., 1998). According to
57

PIER2, when a cue and target word pair are explicitly studied together, all words that are
associated with both the cue and target are activated implicitly through links in long-term
working memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). PIER2 states that presenting two words as
pairs not only activates the explicit representation of the two presented words, but also
activates words that are implicitly associated with both the cue and target (words that are
implicitly associated with only the cue or only the target falls away from activation).
Payne and Eakin (2017) capitalized on these explicit and implicit associative
relationships among words to develop a false memory paradigm based on principles
described by the PIER2 model. Cue-target word pairs were created by consulting the
University of South Florida Word Association Norms database (Nelson et al., 1992). The
USF Norms specify the forward and backward association strength of over 10,000 words
as well as measures of the number of associates of each word. For the Payne-Eakin
paradigm, a word list was created using the USF Norms that consisted of 72 associated
cue-target word pairs (e.g., GARLIC-SPICE). These pairs also were required to have a
shared associate that had a similar forward association strength to both the presented cue
and the presented target (mean characteristics of the actual words are detailed in the
method section). According to PIER2, when the studied word pairs were presented, not
only were the explicitly presented words activated, but also the shared associates of both
words were activated implicitly. Figure 8 depicts the studied, associated cue-target pair,
GARLIC-SPICE. Note that two implicit associates, SALT and SEASONING, are also
activated during study; because they also are associates of both GARLIC and SPICE,
activation spreads to these words as well. Activation does not spread in the same manner
to SMELL, because it is not an associate of both GARLIC and SPICE (PIER2; Nelson et
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al., 1998). Therefore, although SEASONING was not explicitly studied, in an implicit
sense, because it is an associate of both the cue-target pair that was explicitly studied, this
associate is also “studied” and should be a part of the encoded representation. This factor
becomes important for the Payne-Eakin paradigm at recognition.

Figure 8.
A graphical depiction of the implicit and explicit associations between
cue-target word pairs and their associates. The black arrow indicates the association
between the explicitly presented cue and target; the gray arrows indicate activated
implicit associates between the explicitly presented cue/target.

Three types of pairs are presented for recognition: a) a studied cue-target word
pair, b) a false-target word pair, and c) a control word pair. The studied word pair is a representation of one of the studied cue-target pairs. False-target test pairs are created by
re-pairing a studied cue with one of its associated words that was activated implicitly
during study of the original cue-target word pair. Control pairs were new, nonstudied test
pairs and served as the baseline false alarm rate for the study. According to PIER2,
presenting a studied word pair for recognition activates the same associations—both
explicit and implicit—present at study; the associates activated at study and test are the
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same, facilitating recognition. For false-target test pairs, because the target was
previously implicitly activated during study, presenting it explicitly with the studied cue,
creates a similar activation set at recognition. The difference is that the explicitly
presented target was only activated implicitly, not explicitly, during study. Payne and
Eakin (2017) hypothesized that this explicit presentation of the previously implicitly
activated target would produce a false recollection.
In the first test of the Payne-Eakin paradigm (2017a), participants studied the list
of 72 related word pairs (e.g., GARLIC – SPICE) at a rate of six seconds each. After a
10-minute distractor task, participants were given a standard old/new recognition test
containing a total of 102 word pairs. Of the 102 word pairs, 36 were studied pairs (e.g.,
GARLIC – SPICE), 36 were false-target pairs (e.g., GARLIC – SEASONING), and 20
were control pairs (e.g., SCHEDULE – MEETING). False-target test pairs were
significantly more likely to be falsely recognized (M = .22) than control test pairs (M =
.11), demonstrating a false memory effect for the false-target test pairs.
Although the Payne-Eakin paradigm (2017) produced false recognition, the
paradigm had not yet been tested in its ability to produce false recollections using either
Remember/Know judgments or a 6-point confidence recognition scale. Because of the
prior criticism of Remember/Know judgments, a demonstration of the Payne-Eakin
paradigm’s ability to produce a reliable false recollection effect using a 6-point
confidence recognition scale is required and served Aim 1 of this dissertation. Therefore,
a series of pilot experiments was conducted to determine whether using a 6-point
confidence recognition scale could produce a false recollection effect.
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Pilot Experiment 1
Payne and Eakin (2017) tested the paradigm by using a 6-point confidence
recognition scale instead of old/new judgments to determine the degree to which people
were experiencing recollection or familiarity when assessing recognition of the falsetarget test pairs. In this study, participants studied a list of 72 related word pairs (e.g.,
GARLIC-SPIC) at a rate of six seconds each. After a 10-minute distractor task,
participants were given a 6-point confidence recognition test consisting of a 102 test
word pairs: 36 were studied pairs (e.g., GARLIC – SPICE), 36 were false-target pairs
(e.g., GARLIC – SEASONING), and 20 were control pairs (e.g., SCHEDULE –
MEETING). Participants falsely recognized control test pairs at a rate of .14 (SD = .15);
however, they falsely recognized false-target test pairs at a nearly double rate of .27 (SD
= .19). Table 2 reports all means and standard errors for the conditions. A paired samples
t-test between the false-target false-alarm rate and control false-alarm rate was
significant, t = 7.88, p < .001. Consistent with Payne and Eakin (2017), participants were
significantly more likely to false alarm to the false-target test pairs than to control test
pairs. In addition, significantly more 6-responses were given to false-target (M = .17, SD
= .15) than control test pairs (M = .04, SD = .06), t(66) = 8.06, p < .001. Table 3 lists the
proportions and standard errors. Figure 9 shows the response distribution of the three test
pair types. These results demonstrate that the Payne-Eakin paradigm could produce a
significant false recollection effect.
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Table 2
Pilot Experiment 1 Recognition Rates and Standard Error
Recognition

Mean

SE

Hit Rate

.92

.009

False-Target FA Rate

.27

.02

Control FA Rate

.14

.02

Figure 9.

Proportion of responses by word pair type for Pilot Experiment 1.

The goal of Pilot Experiment 1 was to determine whether the Payne-Eakin
paradigm can produce a false recollection effect using a 6-point confidence recognition
scale. The results from the pilot experiment demonstrated that, overall, the paradigm can
produce a reliable false recollection effect; a significantly higher rate of false
recollections occurred for false-target test pairs (M = .18, SE = .02) than for control test
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pairs (M = .05, SE = .01), t(66) = 8.06, p < .001. Although Pilot Experiment 1
demonstrated that the Payne-Eakin paradigm could produce false recollections as defined
using a six-point confidence recognition scale, the study was limited by lack of variability
in responses on the scale; ideally, participants should use the full range of the scale when
making their confidence judgments. In fact, to model the recognition data using ROC
curves, it is critical that there be a distribution of judgments along the scale. One reason
participants tended to use the scale more dichotomously could have been because the
recognition task was not difficult; the mean hit rate was .92 (SD = .07). To test whether
this high hit rate contributed to the lack of variability in responses along the entire scale,
a second pilot experiment was conducted to reduce the hit rate by increasing the retention
interval between study and test, as well as making the distractor task more difficult.
Pilot Experiment 2
The goal of Pilot Experiment 2 was to determine whether more variation in
responses could be obtained with the implementation of a longer and more difficult
distractor task between study and the recognition test. Rather than complete the Stroop
during the interval, participants completed the operational span (Ospan) task for a longer
period (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). This task was chosen for its
difficulty, which both prevented rehearsal of the pairs as well increasing the length of the
interval between study and test.
In this study, participants studied the same list of 72 related word pairs (e.g.,
GARLIC-SPICE) at a rate of six seconds each. After study, the participants completed
the Ospan task (Unsworth et al., 2005). The Ospan task consisted of two parts:
memorizing a string of random letters and solving math problems. Participants
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memorized fourteen lists of random letters ranging from three to eight letters. After
participants studied each list of letters, participants were given a math equation to solve.
The math equations ranged from simple addition problems such as 2 + 2 = x to more
difficult problems such as (2*5) + 4 = x. After participants finished solving each
equation, they were asked to recall the string of letters that was shown to them before in
the correct order. This task lasted approximately 10 minutes. After the Ospan task,
participants were given a 6-point confidence recognition test containing the same total of
102 test pairs used in the first pilot experiment.
Overall, the implementation of the Ospan task was successful at reducing the hit
rate for studied pairs from .92 (SD = .02) in Pilot Experiment 1 to .88 (SD = .11) in this
pilot. A larger proportion of nonstudied items were falsely recognized, showing that the
longer, more difficult interval also impacted the overall false alarm rate. Participants
falsely recognized false-target test pairs at a rate of .36 (SE = .03), which was
significantly higher than the false recognition of control test pairs of .23 (SE = .03), t(50)
= 7.03, p < .001. The false-alarm rate was further divided into 4-, 5-, and 6- responses for
both false-target and control test pairs. False-target test pairs produced high-confidence 6responses at a rate of .22 (SE = .02), which was an increase from .18 (SE = .02) in Pilot
Experiment 1; control test pairs only produced high-confidence 6-response at a rate of .09
(SE = .02). A paired samples t-test found that the false-target rate of false recollection
was significantly higher than the control rate of false recollection, indicating that
participants were significantly more likely to falsely recollect the false target than the
control test pairs, t(50) = 7.89, p < .001.
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The main goal of this pilot experiment was to determine whether an increased
delay filled with a more difficult distractor task could produce more variability in the
responses obtained with a 6-point confidence recognition scale using the Payne-Eakin
paradigm. Overall, we did find a slight increase in the variability of responses given to
each type of word pair (See Figure 10). However, the increase was not sufficient to fulfill
Aim 4. Therefore, additional changes were implemented for the dissertation experiment
to bring down the hit rate and increase response variability. One change that was
implemented is that the duration of the Ospan task was increased to 40 minutes. A second
change that was implemented is that several more word pairs were added during study
and test, increasing the difficulty of discriminating between studied and nonstudied pairs.
These changes are discussed in further detail in the method section.

Figure 10.
Proportion of recognition responses by word pair type for Pilot
Experiment 2.
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SPECIFIC AIMS
Aim 1
To demonstrate whether the false memory effect obtained using the Payne-Eakin
paradigm is due to the activation of an implicitly associated word during study of an
explicitly presented cue-target pair.
One purpose of the dissertation was to determine whether the false memories
obtained using the Payne-Eakin paradigm were due to the activation of the implicitly
associated word during study of the explicitly presented cue-target paired associate. The
typical Payne-Eakin paradigm was modified to compare the false-target test pair—the
studied cue along with the implicitly activated false target (FTi)—to a condition for
which there should, theoretically, be no implicit associate activated at study (FTx). The
FTx test pairs were created by combining the studied cue with a new associated target;
the associate was only associated with the studied cue, not the studied target. These pairs,
according to PIER2, should not have been implicitly activated when the original cuetarget pair was studied; therefore, the test target should be completely new.
The associative recognition of the FTi, FTx, and control test pairs was measured
using a 6-point confidence recognition scale with a 6-reponse indicating that the test pair
was studied with high confidence and a 1-response indicating that it was not studied with
high confidence. One reason for using this scale was to determine whether the false
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memories obtained were the result of recollection or high familiarity, as defined by
Yonelinas et al. (2010). The comparison between the proportion of 6-responses for FTi
and control test pairs as well as the comparison between the proportion of 6-responses for
FTi and FTx test pairs will test both the assumptions of the PIER2 and CLS model.
According to the PIER2 model, FTi test pairs should be falsely recognized at a
significantly higher rate than FTx and control test pairs because of the activation of the
implicit associate at study. According to the CLS model, the result of this implicit
activation is that FTi test pairs should be falsely recognized at a higher rate than FTx and
control test pairs due to a match in the hippocampus which allows for recollection.
Therefore, FTi pairs should also receive a higher proportion of 6-responses on the scale
than FTx or Control test pairs.
H1: FTi test pairs will be falsely recognized at a higher rate than R-control test
pairs, evidenced by a significant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison between
the proportion of false alarms for the two test conditions.
H2: FTx test pairs will be falsely recognized at the same rate as R-control test
pairs, evidenced by a nonsignificant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison
between the proportion of false alarms for the two test conditions.
H3: FTi test pairs will be falsely recognized at a higher rate than FTx test pairs,
evidenced by a significant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison between the
proportion of false alarms for the two test conditions, due to the implicit associate in FTi
test pairs.
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H4: FTi test pairs will be falsely recollected at a higher rate than R-control test
pairs, evidenced by a significant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison between
the proportion of 6-responses for the two test conditions.
H5: FTx test pairs will be falsely recollected at the same rate as R-control test
pairs, evidenced by a nonsignificant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison
between the proportion of 6-responses for the two test conditions.
H6: FTi test pairs will be falsely recollected at a higher rate than FTx test pairs,
evidenced by a significant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison between the
proportion of 6-responses for the two test conditions, due to the implicit associate in FTi
test pairs.
Aim 2
To examine whether the false memories obtained using the Payne-Eakin paradigm
are due solely to familiarity or a combination of familiarity and recollection by
examining the pattern of given responses.
According to Elfman et al. (2008), responses resulting from recollection should
produce a different distribution than responses resulting from familiarity. Because
recollection is characterized as an all-or-none process, items impacted by this process
should lead to a disproportional increase in the number of high-confidence old responses.
However, because recollection has also been characterized to aid in the rejection of items
during paired associate recognition (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Rotello & Heit, 2000),
this rejection should also lead to a disproportional increase in the number of highconfidence new responses, creating a more dichotomous response distribution. In
contrast, because familiarity is described as a signal-detection process, it should produce
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a more Gaussian-shaped distribution (Elfman et al., 2008). Therefore, the following
hypotheses compare the shape of response distributions across test pair conditions by
comparing histograms and ROC curves of the responses.
H7: Response distributions for FTi test pairs will be more dichotomous, with most
responses falling into either the 1-response category or the 6-response category on the 6point confidence recognition scale, than response distributions for R-control test pairs.
The response distribution shape for the FTi test pairs will be examined using histograms
and ROC curves of the responses. We predict that the ROC curve with FTi test pairs
serving as the false alarm rate will be shifted to the right and more linear than the ROC
curve with R-control test pairs serving as the false alarm rate.
H8: Response distributions for FTx test pairs will be comparable to R-control test
pairs, with more responses falling into the 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-response categories on the 6point confidence recognition scale because of the larger contribution of familiarity. The
response distribution shape for the FTx test pairs will be examined using ROC curves of
the responses. We predict that the ROC curve for FTx and R-control test pairs will be
similarly curvilinear.
Aim 3
To determine whether the re-presentation of both a studied cue and target, though
not together, increases the level of familiarity associated with the pair presented at
test.
Both the FTi and FTx test pairs have in common that they repeat a studied cue.
Because the cue was previously studied, familiarity could play a role in recognition of
these pairs over control pairs. However, the unique role of familiarity is difficult to
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determine because the FTi and FTx pairs would make similar predictions regarding
familiarity. Therefore, a third type of word pair was included to test the potentially
differential impact of familiarity on recognition. A Re-Paired test pair consisting of a
studied cue and studied target, that were not studied together, was created. Because both
the cue and target were studied—albeit not together—their overall level of familiarity
should be higher than FTi or FTx pairs whose target was never studied. However, one
practical issue arose when creating these test pairs. All of the studied pairs were related
cues and targets and re-pairing these study pairs would have resulted in unrelated test
pairs, making them easily identifiable as new because no unrelated test pairs were
studied. Therefore, a new set of unrelated test pairs were added to the studied list and
only these unrelated pairs were re-sorted to serve as the Re-Paired test pairs. In addition,
a new set of nonstudied unrelated test pairs (U-control) were created to serve as controls
for these Re-Paired test pairs.
Although familiarity should be high because both the cue and target of the RePaired test pairs was previously studied, these words should not be recollected. Because
they are unrelated, they do not share any associates regardless of how they were
recombined; therefore, the Re-Paired target should never be an associate of the studied
cue-target pair or of the test cue. Any familiarity associated with the Re-Paired test pair
should stem exclusively from having been seen at study. Additionally, according to the
CLS model, because these Re-Paired test pairs were never studied together, the pairs
should be easily rejected by the hippocampus as new due to a mismatch; the presented
pair’s representation should have no overlap with the studied pair’s representation in the
hippocampus. However, due to their potential for high familiarity, the Re-Paired test
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pairs should create a high level of activation in the MTLC, leading them to be more likely
to be falsely recognized due to familiarity.
H9: Re-Paired test pairs will be falsely recognized at a higher rate than U-control
test pairs, as evidenced by a significant a priori planned comparison t-test comparison
between the proportion of false alarms for the two conditions, due to the increased
familiarity with the cue and target in the pair.
H10: Response distributions for Re-Paired test pairs will be more Gaussian than
U-control test pairs, with more responses falling into the 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-response
categories on the 6-point confidence recognition scale, indicating familiarity. The
response distribution shape for the FTi test pairs will be examined using ROC curves of
the responses. We predict that the ROC curve with Re-Paired test pairs serving as the
false alarm rate will be more curvilinear than the ROC curve with U-control test pairs
serving as the false alarm rate.
Aim 4
To determine whether the inclusion of a false recollection parameter is necessary for
fitting the false recognition produced by the behavioral data.
According to the DPSD model, recollection does not occur for nonstudied items
(Yonelinas, 1994, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010); therefore, false recollection cannot
occur. Although there is behavioral evidence to suggest otherwise (e.g., Higham &
Vokey, 2004; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), modeling the data
using the DPSD model allows for a direct test of the unique contribution of recollection
versus familiarity. Therefore, in addition to the behavioral analyses, we will also be using
statistical modeling to determine whether any false memory effects obtained in the
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experiment were due to recollection or familiarity. The standard DPSD model will be fit
to the data from the experiment. We will also fit two modified versions of the DPSD
model that allow for false recollection. Using model comparison tests, such as the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
Schwartz, 1978), we will compare the fit of each model to determine which model
provides the best account of the data.
H11: A model allowing for false recollection of the FTi test pairs will provide a
better account of the behavioral data better than the standard DPSD model as evidenced
by AIC and BIC tests.
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DISSERTATION EXPERIMENT
The aim of this experiment was to determine whether the false memory effect
obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm is due to recollection or familiarity using a
modified version of the Payne-Eakin paradigm. The Payne-Eakin paradigm is a
recognition paradigm designed to induce false memories by capitalizing on pre-existing
explicit and implicit associative relationships between words described by the PIER2
model (Nelson et al., 1998). In the paradigm, cue-target word pairs were created using the
University of South Florida Word Association Norms database. In the original PayneEakin paradigm, implicit associative relationships between words were manipulated to
create three types of stimuli: studied word pairs, false-target test pairs, and control test
pairs. However, the original paradigm failed to provide experimental conditions that
could test whether the false memory effects obtained by the paradigm are due to errors in
recollection or familiarity. Therefore, for the current study, we added three additional
word pair types for a total of six word pair types: Studied, false target implicit (FTi), false
target no implicit (FTx), Re-Paired (Re-Paired), related control (R-control), and unrelated
control (U-control). In the new paradigm, studied word pairs served as our baseline hit
condition, or the rate at which participants were able to identify previously studied word
pairs; FTi test pairs capitalized on the implicit associative relationship among words,
testing for false recollection; FTx test pairs provided a contrast condition to the FTi
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condition by using test pairs that had a repeated studied cue Re-Paired with a nonstudied
target that was not implicitly related to the original studied target; Re-Paired test pairs
tested for the influence of familiarity by re-pairing the targets of unrelated test pairs to
different studied cues, thus testing for the influence of overall familiarity from having
studied both words previously; R-control test pairs provided a baseline false alarm rate
for related word pairs; and U-control test pairs provided a baseline false alarm rate for
unrelated word pairs.
Method
Participants and Design
A total of 54 Mississippi State University undergraduate students recruited via the
Psychology Research Program SONA-system website participated in this study. The
sample size for this study was generated according to a sample size calculation conducted
using the G*Power analysis program (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), which
resulted in the requirement of 15 participants. However, prior studies that used this
paradigm had a minimum of 50 participants. As a result, we collected 54 participants.
Participants were at least 18 years old and native English speakers. The experiment was a
single-factor (Word Pair Type: Studied, FTi, FTx, Re-Paired, R-control, U-control)
within-subjects design.
Materials
Word list. A word list was created that consisted of six different types of word
pairs: studied, false target implicit (FTi), false target no implicit (FTx), Re-Paired, related
control (R-control), and unrelated control (U-control). The list was created using the
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University of South Florida Word Association Norms (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber,
2004). The associations between the pairs were confirmed using ListChecker Pro 1.2
(Eakin, 2010), a program designed to examine word associations using the University of
South Florida Word Association Norms (Nelson et al., 2004) as its database. ListChecker
Pro 1.2 (Eakin, 2010) was also used to test the requirement that each word was associated
only with its intended pair and not with any of the other words on the list. There were 108
related word pairs and 30 unrelated word pairs for a total of 138 word pairs presented at
study. At test, there were 36 studied test pairs, 36 FTi test pairs, 36 FTx test pairs, 30 RePaired test pairs, 20 R-control test pairs, and 10 U-control test pairs, for a total of 168 test
pairs. A list of each word pair type and examples of each are listed in Table 3 below.
Table 3
List of Word Pair Types and Examples for the Dissertation Experiment.
Study

Test
Example:

Word Pair Type:

DISCREET – PRIVATE

DISCREET – PRIVATE

Studied

FLANNEL – MATERIAL

FLANNEL – CLOTH

FTi

AIRCRAFT – PILOT

AIRCRAFT – CARRIER

FTx

MARSHMALLOW – HUT

MARSHMALLOW – ADDITION

Re-Paired

ADDITION – SHELL

ATMOSPHERE – OZONE

Related Control

-----

QUILL – TRICYCLE

Unrelated Control

False Target Implicit (FTi). A list of 72 related word pairs (e.g., GARLIC –
SPICE) was created for the study phase. For each word pair in the list, a second target,
associated with both the cue and target, was selected (e.g., GARLIC – SPICE; GARLIC –
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SEASONING; see Appendix A for full list of word pairs and characteristics). The
forward associative strength (FAS; likelihood of producing the target, given the cue)
from the cue to both targets was controlled for both targets. The FAS mean difference
between the two targets was .02 (SD = .13), and the BAS mean difference was .01 (SD =
.11), both of which are allowable differences according to typical list-construction
constraints. (These associative factors were controlled for although association strength is
less likely to impact recognition of cue-target pairs than cued recall of the target, given
the cue.) Each cue was associated only with its two targets and not to any other cue on
the list. Each of the targets were associated only with their cue and with each other, not to
any other target on the list.
The list of 72 word pairs and their corresponding implicit false target was divided
into two separate lists resulting in two lists of 36 studied word pairs and two lists of 36
FTi word pairs; having two lists allowed for an examination of whether any effects
obtained on one list could generalize to a different list. List 1 and List 2 were
counterbalanced across participants at study. The studied target versus the implicit false
target used within each list was not counterbalanced within each list; one target always
served as the studied target and the other target always served as the false target. The
reason for this was that, although the implicit false targets selected were always an
implicit associate of both the studied cue and target, the studied target was not always an
implicit associate of the false target. Therefore, the false target could not always serve as
a studied target because it would not implicitly activate that target during study. Also, as
shown in Appendix A, the words were organized as studied and implicit false targets in
such a way as to allow that the mean characteristics of set size, concreteness, printed
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word frequency, the number of mediators and the number of shared associates to be
equated for the two target types; each characteristic is defined in Appendix A. The
targets’ mean characteristics were also equated with the mean characteristics of the cue.
Having tight control over these characteristics necessitated that they serve in static
positions on the list; this method is conventional for list construction (Eakin, 2010).
False Target No Implicit (FTx). A list of 36 related word pairs (e.g., AIRCRAFT
– PILOT) was created for the study phase. For each word pair in the list, a second target,
associated with only the cue, was selected (e.g., AIRCRAFT – PILOT; AIRCRAFT –
CARRIER; see Appendix B for full list of word pairs). The forward associative strength
(FAS; likelihood of producing the target, given the cue) from the cue to both targets were
controlled for both targets (see Appendix A for a full list of mean word pair
characteristics by word pair type). The FAS mean difference between the two targets was
.02 (SD = .09), and the BAS mean difference was .01 (SD = .11), both of which are
allowable differences according to typical list-construction constraints. Each cue was
associated only with its two targets and not to any other cue on the list. Each of the
targets were associated only with their cue and not to any other target on the list.
The list of 36 word pairs and their corresponding FTx was counterbalanced across
participants at study. Half of the participants studied AIRCRAFT – PILOT and received
AIRCRAFT – CARRIER at test while the other half studied AIRCRAFT – CARRIER
and received AIRCRAFT – PILOT at test. Because the studied target and FTx were
always associated with the cue, and not each other, they could be counterbalanced
between serving as the studied target or the FTx. Also, as shown in Appendix A, the
words were organized in such a way as to allow that the mean characteristics of set size,
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concreteness, printed word frequency, the number of mediators and the number of shared
associates to be equated for the two target types; each characteristic is defined in
Appendix A.
Re-Paired. A list of 60 unrelated words was created for the study phase. This list
of 60 words was randomly arranged and paired with another word from the list to create
list of 30 unrelated word pairs (e.g., NEST – PRINCE; JOKE – CONTEST). At test, the
studied target was randomly Re-Paired with another studied cue to create a new test pair
(e.g., NEST – CONTEST). Each cue and target were not associated with each other or
with any other word on the list. The list of 30 test pairs was counterbalanced across
participants at study. Half of the participants studied NEST – PRINCE and received
NEST – CONTEST at test while the other half of participants studied NEST –
CONTEST and received NEST – PRINCE at test.
Related Control (R-control). A list of 20 related test pairs (e.g., APPOINTMENT
– SCHEDULE) was created for the test phase. These pairs were not studied; they
appeared on the test to serve as new items. Each of the cues and targets were associated
only with their intended cue and/or target, not to any other word on the list.
Unrelated Control (U-control). A list of 20 unrelated words (e.g., PRINCIPAL –
MELODY) was created for the test phase. This list of 20 words was randomly arranged
and paired with another word from the list to create list of 10 unrelated test pairs. These
pairs were also not studied, but served as new, unrelated pairs on the test.
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Recognition Test. Half of the FTi word pairs were selected to serve as the studied
cue-target test pairs on the recognition test. The other half of the FTi word pairs were
modified to serve as the FTi test pairs on the recognition test; the cue was Re-Paired with
its false target. The recognition test consisted of 36 studied test pairs, 36 FTi test pairs, 36
FTx test pairs, 30 Re-Paired test pairs, 20 R-control test pairs, and 10 U-control test pairs
resulting in a total of 168 test pairs.
6-point recognition confidence scale. The 6-point recognition confidence scale
was used as the response on the recognition test. This scale is a 6-point scale ranging
from 1 (Sure New) to 6 (Sure Old) responses. Responses 1 to 3 were located on the left
side of the screen with the label “NEW” above the responses, and the labels “Sure”
underneath the 1-response and “Unsure” underneath the 3-response. Responses 4 to 6
were located on the right side of the screen with the label “OLD” above those responses,
and the labels “Unsure” written underneath the 4-response and “Sure” underneath the 6response. See Figure 11 for a view of the scale. Participants were instructed to type in
their responses using the keyboard.
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Figure 11.
test.

The 6-point recognition confidence scale presented during the recognition

Ospan Task. The operational span (Ospan) task consisted of two parts:
memorizing a string of random letters and solving math problems. Participants
memorized twenty-five lists of random letters ranging from three to eight letters. After
participants studied each string of letters, participants were shown a math equation to
solve. The math equations ranged from simple addition problems such as 2 + 2 = x to
more difficult problems such as (2*5) + 4^2 = x. After participants finished solving each
equation, they were asked to recall the string of letters in the correct order that previously
was shown to them.
Consent Form. An IRB-approved and stamped informed consent form was used
to inform participants about the general aims and procedures of the experiment. It also
explained the minimal risks involved as well as the benefits for participating in this study.
Participants were informed that their participation in the study was voluntary and that
they may choose to cease participation at any time during the study without penalty (see
Appendix C).
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Debriefing Form. A debriefing form was given to participants with more detailed
post-experiment information. Participants were told about the purpose of the study and
the experimental manipulation, as well as given contact information in case they have any
further questions (see Appendix D).
Procedure
Participants were tested one at a time. Each participant sat at a testing station
equipped with a computer, chair, consent forms, and white noise machine to block out
any extraneous noise. After the consent forms were read, signed, and collected,
participants were told to direct their attention to the computer screen and to hit “ENTER”
to begin reading the instructions. The experiment was programmed using E-Prime 2.0
software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and was presented on a standard
PC computer.
Study Phase. The study phase consisted of 108 related word pairs and 30
unrelated word pairs. Each of the 138 word pairs was presented one at a time at a rate of
4 seconds each in random order. The presentation time was selected based on prior
research showing that longer presentation times produced ceiling effects in recognition
memory (Payne & Eakin, 2017). To encourage participants to engage in deep processing
of each pair, after each pair was presented, participants rated each for relatedness using a
scale of 1 (not at all related) to 7 (completely related).
Distractor Phase. After the study phase, participants completed the Ospan task
(Unsworth et al., 2005) for the distractor task. This task allowed for a filled interval to
both prevent rehearsal of the pairs and to allow time to pass; both were necessary to
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prevent ceiling effects in recognition and to increase the variability of responses on the
recognition confidence scale.
Recognition Phase. The recognition phase began with a practice phase. During
this practice phase, the ten word pairs presented in the study practice phase were
presented again. Participants practiced using the 6-point confidence recognition scale by
rating on a scale of 1 (Sure New) to 6 (Sure Old) how confident they were in having seen
the presented word pair during study. The 6-point scale remained at the top of the screen
for each word pair, as shown in Figure 11, and rating was self-paced.
After the practice phase, participants were presented with the recognition test.
Each of the word pairs were randomly presented and confidence ratings were made using
the 6-point recognition confidence scale to indicate the degree to which participants
thought the pair was old or new. Each word pair was presented one at a time in the
bottom center of the screen with the 6-point recognition scale at the top; rating was selfpaced. After rating all of the word pairs, participants were given a debriefing form and
assigned course credit.
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BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
The design was a single-factor (Word Pair Type: studied, FTi, FTx, Re-Paired, Rcontrol, U-control) within-subjects design. Old responses were operationalized as either a
4-, 5-, or 6- response, and New responses were operationalized as either a 1-, 2-, or 3response on the 6-point recognition confidence scale. All responses were converted to a
signal-detection framework: hits, misses, false alarms, and correct rejections. Hits were
operationalized as studied word pairs that received either a 4-, 5-, or 6-response. Misses
were operationalized as studied word pairs that received either a 1-, 2-, or 3-response.
False alarms were operationalized as FTi, FTx, Re-Paired, R-control, or U-control test
pairs that received either a 4-, 5-, or 6-response. Correct rejections were operationalized
as FTi, FTx, Re-Paired, R-control, or U-control test pairs that received either a 1-, 2-, or
3-response. For FTi test pairs, there were 36 false alarms possible; for FTx test pairs,
there were 36 false alarms possible; for Re-Paired test pairs, there were 30 false alarms
possible; for R-control test pairs there were 20 false alarms possible; and for U-control
test pairs there were 10 false alarms possible. Because counts were not equal across all
word pair conditions, all recognition counts were converted to proportions for analysis;
the number of hits was divided by the total number of hits possible and the number of
false alarms was divided by the total number of false alarms possible for each word pair
type.
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A total of 64 participants participated in this study for course credit. Six
participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete data; two participants
were removed due to a chance level of identifying new items as old or vice versa; and
two participants were removed due to a low rate of recognizing studied items as old,
identified by a boxplot analysis. Therefore, all behavioral analyses included a total of 54
participants. All alpha levels were set to .05.
To ensure that there were no differences in the dependent variables among the
four counterbalanced list conditions, the hit rate and false alarm rate for R-control test
pairs were compared across lists using a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA). There
were no significant effects in the hit rates among List 1, List 2, List 3, and List 4, F(3, 50)
= .464, p = .71, ηp2 = .027. Additionally, there were no significant effects in the false
alarm rates among List 1, List 2, List 3, and List 4, F(3, 50) = .149, p = .93, ηp2 = .009.
Therefore, all further analyses were collapsed across the list of counterbalance conditions
for the remainder of the results.
Overall, recognition for studied word pairs was high; the hit rate for the studied
word pairs was .85 (SD = .11). The false alarm rate was divided into separate rates for
FTi, FTx, Re-Paired, R-control, and U-control test pairs. Participants were most likely to
falsely recognize Re-Paired test pairs (M = .34, SD = .13), followed by FTi test pairs (M
= .33, SD = .17), FTx test pairs (M = .29, SD = .17), R-control test pairs (M = .17, SD =
.13), and U-control test pairs (M = .07, SD = .10). Table 4 reports all means and
standards errors for the conditions.
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Table 4
Recognition Rates and Standard Error
Recognition

Mean

SE

Hit Rate

.85

.01

FTi FA Rate

.33

.02

FTx FA Rate

.29

.02

Re-Paired FA Rate

.34

.02

R-control FA Rate

.17

.02

U-control FA Rate

.07

.01

Aim 1: Hypothesis Testing for Recognition Performance
The first three hypotheses of this dissertation sought to inform the overall
recognition aspect of Aim 1: to investigate whether the false memory effect obtained
using the Payne-Eakin paradigm is due to the activation of an implicitly associated word
during the study of an explicitly presented cue-target word pair. Therefore, the first set of
behavioral hypotheses compared only old/new judgments, by categorizing 1-, 2-, and 3responses as new and 4-, 5-, and 6-responses as old, using a priori planned comparison ttests to test critical conditions for significant differences.
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely recognized at a higher
rate than R-control test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was
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conducted between the proportion of false alarms for both word pair types. As shown in
Figure 12, the paired samples t-test between the FTi false-alarm rate and the R-control
false alarm rate was significant, t(53) = 8.66, p < .001, 95% CI [.13, .20], supporting our
hypothesis. As predicted, participants were significantly more likely to falsely recognize
FTi than R-control test pairs as old. Table 4 lists mean recognition rates and standard
error for each word pair type. This finding suggests that activation of the implicitly
associated false target during the explicit presentation of the studied word pair led to the
false recognition of the FTi test pair.

Figure 12.
Hypothesis 1 results: comparison between the rate of false recognition for
FTi test pairs and R-control test pairs.

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that FTx test pairs would be falsely recognized at the
same rate as R-control test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was
conducted between the proportion of false alarms for both word pair types. As Figure 13
shows, the paired samples t-test between the FTx false-alarm rate and the R-control false
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alarm rate was significant, t(53) = 7.29, p < .001, 95% CI [.09, .16]. Contrary to our
prediction, participants were significantly more likely to falsely recognize FTx than Rcontrol test pairs as old. This increased false alarm rate could be due to the repetition of
the presented cue. This result was surprising given a previous pilot study that found FTx
and R-control test pairs were falsely recognized at the same rate (Payne & Eakin, 2014),
which led us to predict that FTx test pairs would be falsely recognized at the same rate as
R-control test pairs due to the lack of implicit association between the studied word pair
and the FTx target. It could be that this false recognition effect is due to familiarity with
the cue. Because FTx test pairs re-present the same cue presented at study, it is likely that
familiarity with that cue drives the level of familiarity associated with the FTx test pair,
thus increasing the likelihood that they were falsely recognized.

Figure 13.
Hypothesis 2 results: comparison between the rate of false recognition for
FTx test pairs and R-control test pairs.

It also could be that the re-presentation of the studied cue during test for FTx test
pairs was responsible for the increased false-alarm rate observed for the FTi test pairs.
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However, we anticipate that FTi test pairs are significantly more likely to be falsely
recognized than FTx test pairs due to activation of the implicit FTi target during study.
This hypothesis was tested in Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that FTi test pairs would be falsely recognized at a higher rate
than FTx test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was conducted
between the proportion of false alarms for both word pair types. As shown in Figure 14,
the paired samples t-test between the FTx and FTi test pairs was significant, t(53) = 2.59,
p = .01, 95% CI [.01, .07]. Participants were significantly more likely to falsely recognize
the FTi test pairs than the FTx test pairs. This result supports the hypothesis that the
implicit activation of the FTi target during study resulted in false recollection for those
pairs. Although our results support the hypothesis that the increased false alarm rate for
FTi test pairs is due to recollection, it is possible that a portion of the increased false
alarm rate is due to familiarity with the re-presented cue. This possibility is further
explored in the next set of analyses.
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Figure 14.
Hypothesis 3 results: comparison between the rate of false recognition for
FTi test pairs and FTx test pairs.

Aim 1: Hypothesis Testing for High-Confidence Recognition Performance
The next two hypotheses sought to inform the recollection aspect of Aim 1, which
was to investigate whether the false memory effect obtained using the Payne-Eakin
paradigm was due to the activation of an implicitly associated word during the study of
an explicitly presented cue-target word pair. One defining aspect of recollection is the
presence of context; this definition is consistent across the CLS and DPSD model.
According to the CLS model, when information that was present during encoding is
presented during test, contextual information related to that studied event will be
retrieved. Therefore, we predicted that implicitly activated associates present during
encoding would result in the false recollection of that word pair when presented at test
both due to its presence during study and its shared context with the studied cue-target
word pairs.
According to Yonelinas (1994, 2002), a disproportional number of highconfidence old responses, or 6-responses, is indicative of an all-or-none retrieval process
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called recollection. Yonelinas et al. (2010) does state, though, that 6-response are not a
process pure measure of recollection; high-confidence familiarity can also contribute to
these responses. Instead, it is the disproportionate number of high-confidence response
that is indicative of recollection. Although Yonelinas et al. (2010) states that 6-responses
are not a pure process measure of recollection, for the purposes of the next set of
behavioral analyses, we operationalized 6-responses to nonstudied pairs as false
recollection and compared the critical word pair types using a priori planned comparison
t-tests. In the discussion, we temper this language to be more appropriate of 6-responses
can indicate high familiarity or recollection. The implications of these results and their
underlying process are discussed further in the analysis.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely recollected at a higher
rate than R-control test pairs, as evidenced by more 6-responses for FTi than R-control
test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was conducted between the
proportion of false-alarm 6-responses for both word pair types. The paired samples t-test
between the FTi 6-response rate and the R-control 6-response rate was significant, t(53) =
9.82, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .18]. Participants were significantly more likely to be highly
confident that they recognized FTi test pairs than R-control test pairs; a higher rate of
recollection for those word pairs was obtained. Six-responses on the 6-point recognition
confidence scale indicate a high degree of confidence that a word pair has been seen
before. Because participants were significantly more likely to indicate a high degree of
confidence in seeing FTi test pairs than R-control test pairs, suggests that the implicit
activation of the false targets for FTi test pairs might have led them to falsely recollect
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having seen those word pairs during study. The false recollection of these word pairs is
likely due to the retrieval of contextual information from the study event resulting from a
match in the hippocampus (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). Because the false target for FTi
test pairs was implicitly activated during study, the presentation of the cue and implicitly
activated target from study on the test resulted in the retrieval of contextual information
associated with that event, resulting in false recollection of that FTi pair (Norman &
O’Reilly, 2003). However, it also could be that the implicitly activated information
during study could have contributed to an increased familiarity signal which would be
consistent with the predictions of the DPSD model. This possibility is explored further in
the modeling analysis. Table 5 lists mean recollection and standard error for each of the
word pair types.
Table 5
Mean High-confidence Recognition Rates and Standard Error
Recollection

Mean

SE

Studied

.72

.19

FTi

.20

.02

FTx

.16

.02

Re-Paired

.19

.02

R-control

.06

.01

U-control

.02

.01
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Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that FTx test pairs would be falsely recollected at the same
rate as R-control test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was
conducted between the proportion of false alarms for both word pair types. The paired
samples t-test between the FTx 6-response rate and the R-control 6-response rate was
significant, t(53) = 7.20, p < .001, 95% CI [.08, .14]. Contrary to our prediction,
participants were significantly more likely to be highly confident that they recognized
FTx test pairs than related control test pairs, suggesting a possible higher rate of
recollection for FTx test pairs. However, it could be that because FTx test pairs involved
the re-presentation of the studied cue, a higher degree of familiarity was evoked for those
test pairs than R-control pairs, resulting in an increased number of 6-responses.
According to Yonelinas et al. (2010), high-confidence old responses are not necessarily
an indication of recollection. The DPSD model allows for high-confidence old responses
of nonstudied items, but the model predicts that they should occur infrequently, if based
on a normal distribution. What is evidence of recollection, as stated by Yonelinas (1994,
2002) is the disproportional rate at which high-confidence old responses occurs for
studied items. Specifically, Yonelinas (1994, 2002) has demonstrated that a higher
proportion of high-confidence responses are given to studied items than can be predicted
by a standard signal-detection model, and this disproportionate rate is evidence of a
second cognitive process. Therefore, it could be that the high rate of 6-responses to FTx
test pairs is being driven by familiarity with the studied cue and not recollection.
Theoretically, recollection is not likely to have occurred for these pairs because there
should not be any shared context between the studied cue-target pair and the FTx test pair
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at test to result in recollection. The reason for this is that the test target for FTx pairs is
not an associate of both the cue and target and, therefore, was not implicitly activated
during study of the original cue-target pair. This lack of activation during study should
result in the FTx pair being rejected by the hippocampus, not allowing for recollection.
Therefore, 6-responses for FTx test pairs should be evidence of a high familiarity
experience, not recollection.
One way to test this hypothesis is to compare the 6-response rate of FTx and FTi
test pairs. Both FTx and FTi test pairs should evoke familiarity processes due to the representation of the studied cue. However, we predict that FTi test pairs will have a higher
probability of receiving high-confidence old responses due to the presence of an
implicitly activated target during study, suggesting an influence from recollection. Table
6 demonstrates each word pair type and the retrieval information that each type presents
during encoding. Because of this implicit activation, FTi test pairs should evoke
recollection processes, resulting in shared context with the studied cue-target word pair.
Because FTi test pairs include this one additional piece of information, they should have
a higher likelihood of triggering recollection through pattern completion. Therefore, FTi
test pairs should be more likely to receive a 6-response than FTx test pairs, due to
recollection of the FTi pairs. This comparison was completed in Hypothesis 6.
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Table 6
Word Pair Type and Information Present During Test
Word Pair Type

Studied Cue

Studied Target

Context

Implicit Associate

Studied

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

FTi

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

FTx

Yes

No

No

No

Re-Paired

Yes

Yes

No

No

R-control

No

No

No

No

U-control

No

No

No

No

Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 stated that FTi test pairs would be falsely recollected at a higher rate
than FTx test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison was used between
the proportion of false alarms for both test pair types. The paired samples t-test between
the FTi 6-response rate and the FTx 6-response rate was significant, t(53) = 3.06, p < .01,
95% CI [.01, .07]. Consistent with our prediction, participants were significantly more
likely to be highly confident that they recognized FTi test pairs than FTx test pairs.
Because FTi test pairs consist of a re-presentation of the studied cue plus a false target, if
the same cognitive process (familiarity) is occurring for these test pairs, then they should
receive the same rate of 6-responses. However, this was not found to be the case; FTi test
pairs were significantly more likely to receive 6-responses than FTx test pairs. This
finding provides support that FTi pairs were retrieved via recollection.
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Summary
The findings from the first six hypotheses support the prediction of the CLS
model, that FTi test pairs would be falsely recognized at a higher rate than FTx or control
test pairs. This prediction was due to the hypothesis that the activated implicit associate
present at encoding was stored as part of the studied pair’s representation in the
hippocampus, resulting in a match between the stored and presented representations
during test. This match then allowed for the retrieval of the studied item’s representation
that included context from the studied event. This retrieved information, then resulted in
recollection for the FTi pairs. Therefore, these findings indicate that the false memory
effect obtained for the FTi test pairs is due to false recollection. This supposition is
supported by the finding that FTi test pairs were significantly more likely to receive 6responses than FTx or R-control test pairs.
However, the results obtained for the first six hypotheses also reveal that the false
memory effect obtained in the Payne-Eakin (2017) paradigm could be partly due to
familiarity, as predicted by the DPSD model. According to the DPSD model, both FTi
and FTx test pairs should receive more false alarms than R-control test pairs due to the
re-presentation of the cue at test and the semantic similarity between the studied target
and the false targets, which they did. However, the results from the first six hypotheses
also provide data that are problematic for the DPSD model. One limitation of the DPSD
theory (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002) is that it does not provide concrete explanations for how
an item is determined as more or less familiar. However, based on previous research
(Kim & Yassa, 2013; Mandler, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002), these predictions regarding the
familiarity of FTi and FTx test pairs can be made. The first prediction is that FTi and FTx
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test pairs should have similar levels of familiarity because the false target for FTi and
FTx test pairs are semantically similar (Kim & Yassa, 2013). The second prediction is
that both FTi and FTx test pairs should have similar levels of familiarity due to the representation of a studied cue during test (Mandler, 2008; Yonelinas, 2002). Therefore,
according to the DPSD theory, both types of word pairs should have the same level of
familiarity associated with them, which the DPSD model then would predict equal false
recognition rates for both types of word pairs, which they did not. Instead, FTi test pairs
were significantly more likely to be falsely recognized than FTx pairs.
Aim 2: Hypothesis Testing of Response Distributions
Another method to determine the degree to which the false memories obtained by
the Payne-Eakin (2017) paradigm are solely due to familiarity or familiarity and false
recollection is to examine the distribution of responses along the 6-point confidence
scale. Two hypotheses were developed to inform Aim 2, which sought to examine
whether the response distributions for the word pair types were different. According to
Elfman et al. (2008), response patterns resulting from a recollection process should
produce a different distribution shape than response patterns resulting from a familiarity
process. Because recollection is characterized as an all-or-none cognitive process, it
should lead to a disproportional increase in the number of high-confidence old responses,
or 6-responses. Additionally, because recollection has been characterized to aid in the
rejection of items during paired-associate learning (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003; Rotello &
Heit, 2000), this rejection should also lead to a disproportional increase in the number of
high-confidence new responses, or 1-responses. Therefore, items influenced by
recollection should produce response distributions that have more responses in the tails
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than in the middle when compared to items that are influenced by familiarity. In contrast,
because familiarity is described as a signal-detection process, responses resulting from
this process should create a more Gaussian-shaped distribution (Elfman et al., 2008).
Therefore, hypotheses 7 and 8 predicted that the shape of the response distribution among
the different types of word pairs would vary according to the recognition process
hypothesized to influence that word-pair type.
Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis 7 predicted that response distributions for FTi test pairs would be
more dichotomous with a higher proportion of responses landing in the 1- and 6-response
categories, as compared to R-control test pairs. The proportion of responses given to both
FTi and R-control test pairs was plotted as a histogram (Figure 15) and an ROC curve
(Figure 16). The histogram demonstrates that R-control test pairs appear to have received
more 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-responses than FTi test pairs; whereas FTi test pairs received more
5- and 6-responses. The finding that R-control test pairs possibly received more 1-, 2-,
and 3-responses than FTi test pairs is not surprising given that R-control test pairs were
not studied and were unrelated to any of the other words presented at either study or test.
Although the number of middle responses is low for both groups, R-control test pairs
appear to have received more middle responses than FTi test pairs.
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Figure 15.
Histogram for Hypothesis 7: comparison of responses between FTi and Rcontrol test pairs.

Figure 16.
ROC curves for Hypothesis 7: comparison of responses for FTi and Rcontrol test pairs.
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We predicted that the x-intercept of the ROC curve for FTi test pairs would be
shifted further to the right than the x-intercept of the ROC curve for R-control test pairs,
demonstrating that those word pairs received more 6-responses. We also predicted that
the ROC curve for FTi test pairs would be more linear (i.e., flatter curve) than the Rcontrol test pairs, demonstrating the influence of recollection rejection. Figure 16 shows
that the ROC for the FTi test pairs is shifted to the right, consistent with our hypothesis.
However, inconsistent with our hypothesis, the ROC for the FTi test pairs is not more
linear, demonstrating that FTi test pairs did not receive significantly fewer middle
responses than R-control test pairs. This finding is likely due to the overall low rate of
middle responses obtained across all word pair types, resulting in a floor effect. Although
the finding that response distributions for FTi test pairs was not more dichotomous than
R-control test pairs was inconsistent with our prediction, the ROC analysis does not
provide further insight into whether familiarity alone or a combination of familiarity and
recollection occurred during retrieval. The forthcoming modeling analysis will be used to
answer this question.
Hypothesis 8
Hypothesis 8 predicted that response distributions for FTx and R-control test pairs
should be comparable. Because FTx test pairs do not contain an implicitly activated
target, according to the CLS model, those word pairs should not be recollected but,
instead, should be rejected and recognized as new, similar to R-control test pairs.
Therefore, FTx test pairs should be retrieved via the same familiarity process as R-control
test pairs. Because familiarity produces a more Gaussian-shaped distribution than
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recollection, we predicted that response distributions for FTx and R-control test pairs
would produce similar Gaussian shapes, with more responses falling into the left tail.
The proportion of responses given to both FTx and R-control test pairs was
plotted as both a histogram (Figure 17) and a ROC curve (Figure 18). The histogram of
responses to FTx and R-control test pairs demonstrates that R-control test pairs appear to
have received more 1-, 2-, and 3-responses than FTx test pairs; whereas FTx test pairs
appear to have received more 5- and 6-responses, demonstrating that FTx test pairs were
more likely to be falsely recognized than R-control test pairs. As discussed in the results
for Hypothesis 2, it is likely that FTx test pairs received more 6- responses than R-control
test pairs due to the re-presentation of the studied cue. Although we did not predict that
the repetition of the cue for FTx test pairs would influence 6-responses, these results in
addition to the results from Hypothesis 2 and 5—and observation of the histogram
distribution—suggest that it did.

Figure 17.
Histogram for Hypothesis 8: comparison of responses for FTx and Rcontrol test pairs.
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Figure 18.
ROC curve for Hypothesis 8: comparison of responses for FTx and Rcontrol test pairs.
We predicted that the x-intercept of the ROC curve for FTx test pairs would be
equal to the x-intercept of the ROC curve for R-control test pairs. However, Figure 18
reveals that the x-intercept for FTx test pairs is shifted further right than R-control pairs,
demonstrating more 6-responses for FTx than R-control test pairs. It should also be noted
that the ROC curve for FTx test pairs is closer to the diagonal than the ROC curve for Rcontrol pairs. This shift indicates reduced discriminability for FTx pairs; FTx pairs were
more difficult to discriminate from studied words than R-control test pairs. This shift
suggests an increased influence of familiarity and adds to the evidence that suggests the
repetition of the studied cue for FTx test pairs produced a higher level of familiarity that
impacted false recognition. According to the CLS model, the repetition of the cue likely
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created more activation in the MTLC, resulting in a higher level of familiarity for those
word pairs. This finding is counter to our prediction that FTx test pairs and R-control test
pairs would be retrieved via the same process which was based on the notion that FTx
pairs would be rejected as new by the hippocampus. Finally, we also found that,
consistent with our hypothesis, the ROC for the FTx test pairs was similarly curvilinear
to the ROC curve for R-control test pairs. This finding was consistent with our prediction
and suggests that FTx and R-control pairs were both retrieved via familiarity.
Follow-Up Distribution Analysis
In addition to Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8, we also performed a follow-up
analysis of the response distribution for FTx and FTi test pairs. Because we predicted that
FTx test pairs would be retrieved via familiarity and FTi test pairs would be retrieved via
recollection, we predicted that FTx test pairs would have more of a Gaussian-shaped
response distribution and FTi test pairs would have a more dichotomous response
distribution. Because both FTi and FTx test pairs produced a ROC curve that was more
shifted to the right than R-control test pairs, we included a comparison of the ROC curves
for FTx and FTi test pairs. If FTi test pairs were more likely to be recollected than FTx
test pairs, then FTi test pairs—falsely recognized due to familiarity—should produce a
more dichotomous distribution of responses, resulting in a more linear ROC shape and
more 6-responses, producing a ROC curve with an increased x-intercept.
The proportion of responses given to both FTx and FTi test pairs was plotted as
both a histogram (Figure 19) and a ROC curve (Figure 20). The histogram shows that the
distribution of responses was similar for both FTx and FTi test pairs. Therefore, it could
be that both FTx and FTi test pairs were retrieved via familiarity. However, as
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demonstrated by the findings for Hypothesis 3, FTi test pairs were significantly more
likely to receive a high-confidence response, or 6-response, than FTx test pairs. This
disproportionate rate of 6-responses for FTi test pairs compared to FTx test pairs suggest
that either another process or factor was influencing the retrieval of those pairs. It could
be that FTx test pairs and some of the FTi test pairs were retrieved via familiarity, with
some additional FTi pairs being retrieved via recollection, but the distribution of
responses is inconclusive. This explanation seems plausible given that recollection is
theorized to only influence high-confidence responses, which would predict the
significantly higher number of 6-responses for FTi pairs. However, it also could be that
the implicit activation of the FTi target provided an additional influence on familiarity.
This question will be further explored in the modeling analysis.

Figure 19.
Histogram for follow-up analysis: comparison of responses for FTx and
FTi test pairs.
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Figure 20.
ROC curve for follow-up analysis: comparison of responses for FTi and
FTx test pairs.

Summary
The findings from Hypotheses 7 and 8 as well as the follow-up analysis were
inconclusive. Hypotheses 7 and 8 were designed to serve Aim 2, which was to examine
whether the false memories obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm were due solely to
familiarity or a combination of familiarity and recollection. According to the CLS model,
we predicted that FTi test pairs would have a more dichotomous response distribution
compared to that of R-control test pairs. This prediction was based on the hypothesis that
the activated implicit associate present during study in the FTi test pairs was stored as
part of the studied pair’s representation in the hippocampus, resulting in a match between
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the stored pair’s and presented pair’s representations allowing for the additional
contribution of recollection due to the retrieved context for those pairs. Although the
results from Hypothesis 7 revealed that response distribution for FTi test pairs was
somewhat dichotomous, people were not more likely to provide more middle responses
for the R-control pairs. Instead, the main difference in the type of responses provided for
the two types of word pair is that FTi test pairs were more likely to be falsely recognized
than R-control pairs. Additionally, the results for Hypothesis 8, that FTx test pairs would
receive a similar response distribution to the R-control pairs was not supported. People
were more likely to falsely recognize FTx test pairs than R-control test pairs, resulting in
an imbalanced response distribution. Although FTx test pairs were more likely to be
falsely recognized, we attribute this increase to familiarity with the cue.
In a follow-up analysis, we compared the response distribution for FTi and FTx
test pairs. We predicted that FTi test pairs would receive a more dichotomous distribution
of responses than FTx test pairs due to a greater influence of recollection. Based on the
CLS model, we predicted that FTi test pairs would have a greater influence on
recollection than familiarity, resulting in a dichotomous distribution, and that FTx test
pairs would have a more Gaussian shaped distribution of responses due to the influence
of familiarity. The follow up comparison did not support this prediction. We found no
difference in the distribution of responses for FTi and FTx test pairs. FTi test pairs did
receive more high-confidence old responses than FTx test pairs, resulting in a greater
number of responses in the right tail; however, this increase did not produce a large
enough difference to separate the rest of the two distributions. Therefore, it is unclear if
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our hypothesis that FTi test pairs were retrieved via recollection and FTx test pairs were
retrieved via familiarity is correct.
Although our findings did not support our predictions, they do provide some
insight into the retrieval processes that were used for FTi and FTx test pairs. It could be
that our original predictions, based on the CLS model, were incorrect. The biggest
weakness of the CLS model is its lack of explanation as to how the contribution of the
hippocampal and MTLC model work together to make recognition judgments. Based on
theoretical assumptions, we assumed that because FTx test pairs do not contain an
implicit associate, they would be rejected as new by the hippocampus, resulting in only
some activation from the MTLC. This prediction was also supported by a previous study
by Payne and Eakin (2014) that found FTx test pairs were falsely recognized at the same
rate as R-control test pairs. However, the results of the current study indicate that FTx
test pairs had a greater impact on familiarity than expected. Additionally, the results
pertaining to the FTi test pairs suggest that those word pairs are being retrieved from
recollection. The implications of these findings will be discussed in the forthcoming
discussion section.
Aim 3: Hypothesis Testing of Re-Paired Test pairs
The next set of hypotheses sought to inform Aim 3, which was to determine
whether increasing familiarity by re-presenting a studied cue and target at test—although
not in their original pairing—affected false recognition. As shown in the results for
Hypotheses 2 and 3, participants were significantly more likely to falsely recognize FTx
over control test pairs. In addition, false recognition was more frequent for FTi than FTx
test pairs. Although the FTi and FTx pairs have in common that they have a repeated
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studied cue, as shown in Table 3, producing similar levels of familiarity, apparently
another process other than familiarity with the cue contributed to the increased false
recognition of FTi test pairs. We hypothesized that this process was recollection,
resulting from the implicit activation of the presented target during study of the original
cue-target pair and the shared context with the studied pair. Although we anticipated this
finding—we expected FTx pairs to be similar to controls, based on previous studies—we
included a third type of word pair to further test the potentially differential impact of
familiarity on recognition by presenting not only familiar cues, but also familiar targets.
The Re-Paired test pair consists of a cue and target that were both studied but not
together as a pair. Each Re-Paired test pair was created by shuffling studied cue-target
pairs to create a new set of test pairs. Because the studied word pairs were semantically
associated, recombining them into new pairs created a set of unrelated test pairs,
providing a simple heuristic for people to easily identify these word pairs as new.
Therefore, we added a set of unrelated cue-target pairs during study to serve as the RePaired test pairs. The purpose of this recombination was to test familiarity. Because both
the cue and target were studied—albeit not together—their overall level of familiarity
should be higher than that for FTi or FTx pairs, whose target was never studied.
However, these words should not be recollected for several theoretical reasons. First,
according to the PIER2 model, because the cues and targets used for this condition are
not associated, no target should ever be implicitly activated during study. Second,
according to the CLS model, these Re-Paired pairs should not provide a close enough
match to the original studied pair to allow for pattern completion which would result in
the retrieval of contextual information necessary for recollection. Therefore,
107

identification of the Re-Paired test pairs should not be influenced by recollection. Instead,
the identification of the Re-Paired test pairs should only be influenced by familiarity.
Because of this feature, these pairs provide a comparison condition for the impact of high
familiarity in the absence of any influence of recollection. As comparison, a new set of
controls word pairs consisting of unstudied new unassociated cue-target word pairs were
created to serve as unrelated control—U-control—pairs. These pairs served as controls
for the Re-Paired test pairs for the next two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 9
Hypothesis 9 stated that Re-Paired test pairs would be falsely recognized at a
higher rate than U-control test pairs. An a priori planned comparison t-test comparison
was used between the proportion of false alarms for both word pair types. As Figure 21
shows, the paired samples t-test between the false-alarm rate for Re-Paired and U-control
test pairs was significant, t(53) = 14.46, p < .001, 95% CI [.23, .31]. Consistent with our
prediction, participants were significantly more likely to falsely recognize Re-Paired test
pairs than U-control test pairs. This finding is not surprising given that both the cue and
target for the Re-Paired test pairs were studied; therefore, the level of familiarity for those
word pairs should be higher.
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Figure 21.
Hypothesis 9 results: comparison between the rate of false recognition for
Re-Paired test pairs and U-control test pairs.

Hypothesis 10
Hypothesis 10 predicted that response distributions for Re-Paired test pairs would
be more Gaussian than U-control test pairs, with more responses falling into the middle
responses. The proportion of responses given to both Re-Paired and U-control test pairs
was plotted as both a histogram (Figure 22) and a ROC curve (Figure 23). The histogram
of responses for Re-Paired and U-control test pairs shows that, overall, responses for RePaired test pairs appear to be more distributed with more responses falling into the 4-, 5-,
and 6-response category than U-control test pairs. U-control test pairs appear to have
more responses falling into the 1- and 2-response category. The finding that U-control
test pairs received for 1- and 2-responses than Re-Paired controls pairs is not surprising
given that U-control test pairs were not studied. It should be noted, though, that RePaired test pairs received significantly more 6-responses (seen in Figure 22 and Figure
23), suggesting an influence of high familiarity.
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Figure 22.
Histogram for Hypothesis 10: comparison of responses between Re-Paired
and U-control test pairs.

Figure 23.
ROC curve for Hypothesis 10: comparison of responses between RePaired and U-control test pairs.
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Follow-Up Analysis
To further investigate the nature of the Re-Paired test pairs, we performed a
follow-up analysis. We predicted that Re-Paired test pairs would have a more Gaussianshaped response distribution than FTi test pairs due to a greater influence of familiarity
(Elfman et al., 2008). If Re-Paired test pairs were being impacted by familiarity, and not
recollection, then the Re-Paired test pairs should receive more middle-responses than FTi
test pairs. We also included FTx test pairs which were predicted to have a more
Gaussian-shaped response distribution. If the impact of familiarity is greater for RePaired test pairs than FTx test pairs, then we would expect that the magnitude of the
number of middle-responses would be greater for Re-Paired test pairs than FTx. Each of
these predictions were based on the CLS model. According to the CLS model, a
familiarity signal for both the studied cue and target in the Re-Paired condition should
result in an overall stronger familiarity signal. Although the Re-Paired test pairs were not
studied together, both the cue and target were studied one time. Because the cue and
target will have only been studied once, the process of sharpening (i.e., the process of
refining and strengthening the familiarity signal for items studied together) should not
have any influence on the pair. Therefore, we predicted that the influence of familiarity
should be greatest for Re-Paired test pairs. Figure 24 demonstrates the comparison of the
response distributions for Re-Paired, FTi, and FTx test pairs.
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Figure 24.

Comparison of responses among Re-Paired, FTi, and FTx test pairs.

Contrary to our predictions, the response distribution for Re-Paired, FTi, and FTx
appear to be similar. Although the histogram revealed no significant differences between
the response distributions, it appears that the number of 6-responses given to each of the
three types of test pairs varied. Therefore, we conducted a one-way repeated measures
ANOVA on the proportion of 6-responses given to each word pair type. From the
ANOVA, we found that there were significant differences in the number of 6-responses
given, F(1,53) = 9.33, p < .05 ηp2 = .07; FTi and Re-Paired test pairs received the most,
followed by FTx test pairs. Figure 25 shows the relationship between the three types of
test pairs. Interestingly, this result demonstrates that people provided an equally high
number of high-confidence 6-responses to FTi and Re-Paired test pairs rather than to just
Re-Paired test pairs. The purpose of the Re-Paired test pairs was to push the influence of
familiarity. Because both the cue and target in the Re-Paired condition had been
previously studied as part of a different pair, those word pairs should have the highest
level of familiarity associated with them. According to the CLS model, the familiarity
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signal for Re-Paired pairs should be higher than the familiarity signal for FTx pairs due to
both the studied cue and target being recently studied. However, we predicted that 6responses for FTi pairs would be higher than FTx pairs due to recollection. Therefore, the
finding that FTi and Re-Paired test pairs received an equal number of 6-responses is not
surprising. However, because the DPSD model would not predict any contribution of
recollection for FTi pairs, the model would attribute the increased number of 6-responses
to familiarity. Therefore, the results of the follow-up analysis do not provide any
discriminating evidence for the two processes.

Figure 25.

Comparison of 6-responses among Re-Paired, FTi, and FTx test pairs.

Discussion
Each of the word pair types in the dissertation experiment was designed to
manipulate one of the two recognition retrieval processes, familiarity or recollection.
Table 7 presents a list of each word pair type and the recognition process it was designed
to measure. The word pair types of interest were the FTi, FTx, and Re-Paired test pairs.
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FTi test pairs were designed to measure recollection by presenting a false target that was
implicitly activated during study along with a studied cue. The purpose of presenting a
studied cue re-paired with an implicit associate was to determine whether this implicit
activation during study led to false recollection at test. We predicted, based on the CLS
model, that because the FTi test pairs included a studied cue and an implicitly associated
false target, the representation of those pairs presented during test would allow for a
match with the studied item’s stored representation, allowing for recollection to occur.
Therefore, we theorized that recognition of FTi test pairs would be influenced by
recollection.
Table 7
Word Pair Type and Its Corresponding Recognition Process.
Word Pair Type:

Process:

Studied

Familiarity + Recollection

FTi

Recollection

FTx

Familiarity

Re-Paired

Familiarity

R-control

Familiarity + Recollection

U-control

Familiarity + Recollection

FTx test pairs were designed to measure familiarity and also served as a
comparison for FTi test pairs. The only difference between FTx and FTi test pairs was
that FTi pairs were chosen to ensure implicit activation of associated false target whereas
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FTx pairs were not. Therefore, based on predictions from the CLS model, when the FTx
pairs were presented during test, a mismatch between the FTx pair’s representation and
the studied item’s stored representation should have create a mismatch, resulting in the
pair being rejected as new by the hippocampus. However, recognition of the FTx test
pairs could have been based on familiarity. The cue for the FTx test pairs was a representation of a studied cue with a new associated target. Recognition of FTx test pairs
could be based activation in the MTLC due to repetition of this cue. Therefore, we
predicted that any recognition of FTx test pairs would be based on familiarity.
Finally, Re-Paired test pairs were designed to test the limits of familiarity. RePaired test pairs included the re-presentation of both a studied cue and target that were
not studied together. It was predicted, based on the CLS model, that both the studied cue
and target would elicit a stronger familiarity signal from the MTLC than the FTx, FTi, or
control test pairs. Because the Re-Paired test pairs repeated both a studied cue and target,
they should have been more familiar than either the FTi or FTx test pairs for which only
the cue was repeated. Additionally, recognition of these pairs was not thought to be based
on recollection. Because the cue and target in the Re-Paired pairs were not studied
together, according to the CLS model, they should be rejected by the hippocampus
resulting in a failure of recollection.
Aim 1
The results showed that recognition was high, which was expected and is typical
in the Payne-Eakin paradigm (e.g., Payne & Eakin, 2017, Pilot Experiments 1 & 2).
Despite having 108 word pairs to study, people correctly identified studied word pairs as
old 85% of the time. To avoid ceiling effects, we increased the number of studied items
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as well as the amount of time to complete the distractor task, O-Span (Unsworth et al.,
2005) used in a previous pilot study. As a result of these changes, we were able to bring
the hit rate down to 85% from 88%. Although the magnitude of the hit rate was not
drastically reduced, it was lowered. It should be noted, though, that recognition memory
is notoriously accurate (Heathcote et al., 2006; Pratte & Rouder, 2011; Yonelinas, 1994)
and, as a result, a high hit rate is difficult to avoid without including a large number of
stimuli. The typical technique is to use 250 or more stimuli to avoid ceiling effects.
Unfortunately, due to the manipulation of the associative relationship between word
pairs, finding 250 or more stimuli that met the criteria was not possible.
The critical comparisons related to the hypotheses delineated in Aim 1 of this
dissertation were among the proportion of false alarms across the five test pair conditions.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely recognized at a significantly
higher rate than R-control test pairs. Because the target presented in those pairs was
implicitly activated during study of the original pair, this target theoretically was part of
the representation of the studied pair. Therefore, the CLS model would predict that when
these pairs were presented explicitly with the studied cue at test, this prior implicit
activation should generate enough overlap between the stored representation of the
studied event and the FTi test pair representation to allow for pattern completion. If
pattern completion occurred, then contextual information associated with the studied
event would be retrieved and recollection would occur, resulting in a higher proportion of
high-confidence old responses for FTi test pairs. This hypothesis was supported in that
participants were significantly more likely to say old to and to give more 6-responses to
FTi than to R-control test pairs (i.e., Hypotheses 1 and 4).
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that FTx test pairs would be falsely recognized at the same
rate as R-control test pairs. This hypothesis was based on a prior finding that false
recognition was similar between FTx and R-control test pairs (Payne & Eakin, 2014) as
well as predictions from the CLS model. Because the false target used for FTx test pairs
was not activated within the context of the studied word pair, it should be rejected by the
hippocampus as new and not result in recollection. This hypothesis was not supported;
FTx test pairs were falsely recognized at a significantly higher rate than control test pairs.
It could be that the re-presentation of the studied cue influenced familiarity in a way that
we did not predict. Although recollection, processed in the hippocampus, should fail,
according to the CLS model, the re-presentation of the studied cue as part of the FTx test
pair could have increased activation in the MTLC. This increased activation could have
produced a higher level of familiarity for those test pairs over R-control test pairs,
resulting in an increased likelihood of being falsely recognized.
We did not originally predict this finding due to one of the limitations in the CLS
model discussed in Chapter II. In the CLS model’s (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003) current
state, the relationship between the hippocampus and MTLC is not explicitly stated.
Specifically, the model does not state how the hippocampal signal and MTLC familiarity
signal are used to produce overall recognition judgments (e.g., does the MTLC takeover
if the hippocampus rejects? Is a combination of both the hippocampal and MTLC results
used?). Therefore, it is difficult to predict what role the MTLC will have during
recognition if an item is rejected by the hippocampus. As a result of this, we originally
theorized that FTx test pairs would be rejected due to a mismatch in the hippocampus,
similarly to the R-control test pairs. However, it appears from the result for Hypothesis 2
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that, despite rejection by the hippocampus, familiarity from the repeated cue resulted in
initiation of the MTLC leading to false recognition due to familiarity. This finding
requires refinement of the assumptions of the CLS model and warrants further
exploration.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely recognized at a higher
rate than FTx test pairs due to the implicit activation of the FTi false target during study.
This hypothesis was supported in that participants were significantly more likely to give
an old response to FTi than to FTx test pairs. According to the PIER2 model, the implicit
activation of the false target during encoding resulted in the target being incorporated into
the representation of the studied cue-target pair (Nelson et al., 1998). The effect of the
implicit activation of this false target in producing false recollection is explained by the
CLS model, which predicted that the FTi test pairs would be falsely recalled by the
hippocampal model due to a match between the presented and stored representations
(Norman & O’Reilly, 2003). This match would then result in the retrieval of contextual
information associated with the studied event—which is necessary for recollection—and,
because the test target was implicitly activated during study, the context would be
associated with that target, resulting in a high-confidence recollection response.
Therefore, the results from Hypothesis 3 were predicted and can be explained by the CLS
model. This finding is, however, problematic for the DPSD model (Yonelinas, 2002).
According to the DPSD theory, any recognition of new test items must be due to
familiarity; the DPSD model does not allow for recollection of new test items. Therefore,
the DPSD would not attribute the higher false recognition rate of the FTi over the FTx
test pairs to recollection, only to familiarity. Both the FTx and FTi test pairs included a
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studied cue and a semantically similar false target. Therefore, both types of test pairs
should have elicited a similar level of familiarity (Kim & Yassa, 2013; Mandler, 2008;
Yonelinas, 2002). The results from Hypothesis 3 require that FTi test pairs were more
familiar than FTx test pairs to be explainable by the DSPD model. Alternatively, the
DPSD model could allow for FTi and FTx test pairs to have different thresholds for old
responses. Specifically, participants would have had to have a more liberal threshold for
saying old to FTi pairs than FTx. However, the possibility of these two types of test pairs
having different old thresholds within the same experiment is unlikely. Specifically,
having different thresholds would require participants to be able to consciously
differentiate between FTi and FTx test pairs. The likelihood of this occurring is minimal
given that the only difference between the two types of word pairs is the implicit
activation of the FTi false target; this information should not be consciously available.
Therefore, the only theoretical explanation for the results is that recollection is
responsible for the increased false recognition rate of FTi test pairs as predicted by the
CLS model and that familiarity is responsible for the false recognition rate of FTx pairs
as predicted by both the CLS and DPSD models. This prediction was further investigated
in Hypotheses 4 through 6.
According to the DPSD model, a high-confidence old response can be indicative
of either a high familiarity signal or recollection; however, a disproportionate number of
high-confidence old responses is indicative of recollection (Yonelinas et al., 2010).
Hypothesis 4 predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely recollected at a significantly
higher rate than R-control test pairs as indicated by more 6-responses for FTi than Rcontrol pairs. We predicted that the explicit presentation of the implicitly activated false
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target along with the studied cue would lead to a match between study representations in
the hippocampus and test representations, allowing for pattern completion. As a result of
the pattern completion, contextual information associated with the studied event would
then be retrieved—which is required for recollection (DPSD model, Yonelinas, 1994,
2002)—and would lead people to experience a false recollection for those pairs. The
result would be significantly more high-confidence old responses for FTi than R-control
test pairs, which was obtained. However, an alternative explanation could be possible.
Both the CLS and DPSD models would have predicted that, because the FTi test pairs
included a studied cue, these pairs would have a higher degree of familiarity associated
with them than the R-control pairs which was comprised of new cues and new targets.
We originally did not predict that familiarity could also play a role in the false
recognition of FTi test pairs because of the vague explanation by the CLS model as to
how familiarity and recollection work together. It could be that an increased level of
familiarity due to the re-presentation of a studied cue could have contributed to the
increased number of high-confidence old responses for some or all of the FTi test pairs.
This possibility and its implications were further explored in the follow-up analysis.
Hypothesis 5 predicted that FTx test pairs would be falsely recollected at the same
rate as R-control test pairs. Because the target for FTx test pairs was not implicitly
activated during study, those pairs should not result in a match in the hippocampus when
presented during test, resulting in a failure to retrieve the context necessary for
recollection. This lack of context should have resulted in the rejection of the FTx test pair
as old. This hypothesis was not supported in that participants were significantly more
likely to give FTx test pairs a 6-response than R-control test pairs. Originally, it was
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predicted that FTx test pairs would be falsely recollected at the same rate as control test
pairs due to predictions based on the CLS model and a prior study that showed an equal
false alarm rate for FTx and control test pairs. However, the results suggest that FTx
word pairs might have been influenced by familiarity instead, as predicted by the DPSD
model. According to the DPSD model, FTx pairs should have more familiarity associated
with them due to the use of a studied cue as the cue in the FTx test pair. This increased
familiarity should result in a greater likelihood of false recognition for pairs with a
repeated cue than those without a repetition of either the cue or target, which it did.
Hypothesis 6 was designed to investigate whether the increased likelihood of receiving a
high-confidence old response for FTi word pairs was also due to familiarity.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that FTi word pairs would be falsely recollected at a
higher rate than FTx word pairs. This prediction was based on the CLS model’s (Norman
& O’Reilly, 2003) predictions that the implicit activation of the false-target for FTi word
pairs would facilitate false recollection due to a match in the hippocampus for FTi, but
not FTx, test pairs. This hypothesis was supported in that participants were significantly
more likely to give FTi test pairs a high-confidence old response than FTx test pairs. This
finding could be problematic for the DPSD model. According to the DPSD model, FTi
and FTx test pairs should only be recognized due to familiarity. Because the FTi and FTx
test pairs both include a studied cue as part of their pairs as well as a semantically similar
false target, the DPSD theory would not predict that one test pair would produce a higher
familiarity signal than the other. According to the CLS model, the only reason FTi test
pairs should receive more high-confidence old responses is because of the influence of
recollection, which the DPSD model does not allow for.
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Although the CLS model suggests that the increased number of high-confidence
old responses for FTi pairs is due to recollection rather than familiarity, it is difficult to
disentangle the influence of the two processes based on standard behavioral analyses.
According to the DPSD model, a high-confidence old response can be due to both high
familiarity and recollection. Conversely, it could be that FTi test pairs received more
high-confidence responses than FTx pairs due to the implicit activation of the FTi target.
It could be that the activation of the implicit target during study contributed to activation
in the cortical areas, resulting in a stronger familiarity signal. Therefore, disentangling
what proportion of high-confidence responses is due to familiarity and what proportion is
due to recollection is difficult, even with theoretically based test-pair manipulations.
Elfman et al. (2008) suggested that looking at the overall distribution of responses should
provide some insight into which process is responsible for the results produced.
Therefore, hypotheses 7 through 10 were included to examine the overall response
distribution for FTi and FTx test pairs.
Aim 2
According to Elfman et al. (2008), response distributions resulting from
familiarity should produce a Gaussian-shaped distribution whereas recollection should
produce a dichotomous distribution. Therefore, Aim 2 was included to examine whether
the false memories obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm were due to familiarity or
recollection by examining the pattern of given responses. Unfortunately, none of the
predictions about the response distributions or ROC curve shapes were supported.
Although the previous analyses suggested that the responses for FTi test pairs would be
significantly less distributed than those for R-control test pairs, their overall response
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distributions did not appear different. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. This
pattern of results was obtained for Hypothesis 8 as well; the response distribution for FTx
test pairs was not significantly different from R-control test pairs, indicating the same
cognitive process was responsible for their recognition. Additionally, the shape of the
ROC curves was similar for the two test-pair types, further supporting that the same
retrieval process was used. FTx test pairs did receive significantly more 5- and 6responses than R-control test pairs; however, this finding could have been due to
familiarity with the test cue, as predicted by the DPSD model. The increase in highfamiliarity responses observed for the FTx pairs also resulted in a higher x-intercept on
the ROC curve.
An additional analysis of the response distribution for both FTi and FTx test pairs
was done to determine whether the response distribution for FTi test pairs was more
dichotomous than FTx word pairs, as would be expected if there was a differential
influence of recollection between the pairs. However, the response distributions for FTi
and FTx test pairs were not different from each other, suggesting that the same retrieval
process(es) was responsible for falsely recognizing both FTx and FTi test pairs. This
supposition was further supported by the ROC analysis which revealed that FTi test pairs
were less discriminable than FTx test pairs, evidenced by a reduced d’, which produced a
curve closer to the diagonal. These findings are consistent with the DPSD model’s
(Yonelinas, 1994, 2002) predictions and provides support for the assumption that only
one retrieval process occurs for nonstudied items. Although these findings provide
support for the DPDS model (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002), they are inconsistent with the
predictions of the CLS model.
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According to the CLS model, FTi test pairs should have had a higher probability
of being falsely recognized than FTx test pairs due to recollection. This prediction was
supported by the results for Hypotheses 3 and 6 finding higher false recognition and more
6-responses for FTi than FTx test pairs. Alternatively, it could be that FTi test pairs were
influenced by both recollection and familiarity. Because the CLS model is vague about
whether familiarity and recollection work together in sequence or parallel to produce
overall recognition judgments, it was hypothesized that a match between the studied and
test representations would occur in the hippocampus for FTi pairs, resulting in
recollection, and that FTx pairs would be rejected due to a mismatch, resulting in rejected
FTx pairs being identified as new. However, as suggested by the results for Hypotheses 2
and 5, familiarity could have played a role. False recognition of the FTx test pairs was
due to familiarity because the re-presentation of a studied cue resulted in familiarity
increasing the false-alarm rate for those test pairs over Control test pairs. However, a
studied cue was also re-presented as part of the FTi test pairs. Therefore, it could be that
recollection was not the only process that occurred for FTi pairs. Although the CLS
model does not specify this possibility, some of the FTi pairs could have been rejected by
the hippocampus due to a mismatch between the presented representation and the stored
representation, resulting in the false recognition of the rejected pairs due to familiarity,
similar to the FTx pairs.
This possibility is supported by assumption of the DPSD model that recollection
and familiarity occur in parallel. If recollection returns contextual information related to a
studied event, then the item is recognized as old without any consideration of the
familiarity signal (Yonelinas et al., 2010). However, if recollection does not occur, then
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recognition is based solely on familiarity, which always occurs. Therefore, if some of the
FTi pairs were rejected by the hippocampus due to a mismatch, then FTi pairs might have
been comparable to FTx pairs and processed according to the principles of the MTLC
model of the CLS model. Although the CLS model does not specify this two-step process
between hippocampal and MTLC processing, it seems reasonable. The results from the
follow-up analysis comparing FTi to FTx response distributions show that the
distributions and ROCs are similar between FTi and FTx test pairs, indicating that they
were based on the same cognitive process. However, the results from Hypothesis 3
showed that FTi test pairs had a higher rate of false recognition and Hypothesis 6 showed
that more of these were high-confidence 6-responses. These findings show that the
underlying cognitive processes might not be the same. Taken together, these findings
could be explained by the assumption that some FTi pairs were rejected by the
hippocampus and were falsely recognized due to familiarity, similar to FTx pairs,
whereas other FTi pairs produced a match in the hippocampus, resulting in retrieval of
the study context, and were recognized due to false recollection.
Although the results for Hypotheses 3 and 6 provide support for the hypothesis
that both familiarity and recollection influenced the recognition of FTi test pairs, the
results from the response distribution analysis suggested that the same recognition
processes were used for both FTi and FTx test pairs. One possible reason that the results
of the distribution analysis were not consistent with the results for Hypotheses 3 and 6 is
that fewer FTi test pairs were recognized due to recollection which could have resulted in
too few data points to detect its presence. This possibility is supported by the fact that the
false-alarm and false-recollection difference for FTx and FTi pairs was .04. Because there
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were 36 FTi test pairs, a difference of 4% would mean that, on average, only one test pair
would have had a response due to recollection. This small difference likely resulted in a
weak influence from recollection which could not be detected in the response
distributions and is consistent with Yonelinas et al.’s (2010) argument that false
recollection occurrence is too infrequent to model. Overall, this result suggests that 36
FTi and FTx test pairs did not provide enough data points to detect differences in the
overall response distributions. Typically, recognition studies use a minimum of 250
stimuli to investigate the influence of familiarity and recollection (e.g., Heathcote, 2003;
Pratte, Rouder, & Morey, 2010; Yonelinas, 1994). However, given the test-pair
characteristic constraints of the Payne-Eakin paradigm, creating 250 or more test pairs
was not possible. In addition to the limited number of test pairs, the lack of difference in
the response distributions also could be due to problems with using the 6-point
confidence recognition scale.
Recognition is typically characterized as producing a dichotomous result (i.e., old
or new). However, the 6-point scale requires participants to not only provide a
dichotomous response but to also break down their response into degrees of confidence.
Requiring participants to simultaneously perform two tasks might have made the task too
difficult or confusing, resulting in participants relying only on their initial dichotomous
response. This hypothesis is supported in that 69% of participant responses were
dichotomous (either a 1- or 6-response), demonstrating that participants were not using
the scale in the manner that it was intended. In addition, the current format of the 6response scale could be confusing. The current format of the 6-point scale breaks down
old/new responses into degrees of confidence. However, the degrees of confidence are
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presented in a reverse order for old judgments than for new judgments. Specifically, for
old judgments, the response category furthest to the right represents the highest degree of
confidence, but for new judgments, the opposite is true; the response category furthest to
the right represents the lowest degree of confidence. Therefore, it could be that using the
scale was not initially intuitive for participants and required several trials before
participants are able to correctly use the scale. Other recognition studies have eluded this
issue by having a large number of test trials (Heathcote, 2003; Pratte et al., 2010;
Yonelinas, 1994) that could have allowed participants more time to practice breaking
down their dichotomous response into six categories—perhaps due to implicit learning—
allowing them to use the scale more appropriately.
Aim 3
The critical comparisons related to the hypotheses delineated in Aim 3 of this
dissertation had to do with the extent to which familiarity influenced recognition of test
pairs. Re-Paired test pairs—pairs that recombined a studied cue and a studied target—
were created to test the limits of familiarity. According to the CLS model, test pairs that
contain both a studied cue and studied target, even in a configuration different from their
studied context, should produce a higher familiarity signal than either control or FTx test
pairs. The DPSD model would also predict that Re-Paired test pairs would be
significantly more likely to be falsely recognized than control and FTx test pairs due to
an overall higher familiarity signal resulting from the previous encounter with both the
cue and target. However, the CLS model would not predict that any 6-response given to
Re-Paired test pairs would be due to recollection because of a lack of feature overlap
between the Re-Paired item’s representation and the studied item’s stored representation.
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Because both the CLS and DPSD models predict that Re-Paired test pairs should be more
familiar than the FTx and control test pairs, then they would also predict that any highconfidence responses obtained would only be due to familiarity. Therefore, Hypothesis 9
predicted that Re-Paired test pairs would be falsely recognized at a higher rate than Ucontrol test pairs, and Hypothesis 10 predicted that, because this higher rate of false
recognition would be due to familiarity rather than recollection, the response distribution
of Re-Paired test pairs would be more Gaussian than U-control test pairs. Both
hypotheses were supported. The false recognition rate was higher for Re-Paired than Ucontrol test pairs, and the response distribution was similar for the two test pairs,
suggesting that the same cognitive process was used to recognize both.
A follow-up analysis compared the response distribution of Re-Paired test pairs
with those of FTi test pairs to determine whether different retrieval processes were used
for both pairs. We predicted that responses to Re-Paired test pairs would have a more
Gaussian-shaped response distribution than those to FTi test pairs, which were predicted
to have a dichotomous distribution due to recollection. If the implicit activation of the
FTi false target led to recollection, as predicted by the CLS model, then the Re-Paired
word pairs should have received significantly more middle-responses than FTi word pairs
and their response distributions would have been different. Response distributions of FTx
test pairs were also included to determine whether FTx and Re-Paired test pairs were
retrieved via the same retrieval process. FTx pairs were predicted to have a similar
Gaussian-shaped response distribution due to the influence of familiarity on false
recognition because the test cue had been studied. However, the impact of familiarity
should be greater for Re-Paired test pairs because both the test cue and test target were
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studied, which should have produced even more middle-responses on the scale than FTx
pairs. However, the response distributions were similar for FTi, FTx, and Re-Paired test
pairs. This finding suggests that the same cognitive processes were responsible for all
three test pairs, a finding that is contrary to the predictions of the CLS model. This
finding does provide support for the DPSD model, which states that any false recognition
should be due to familiarity and not recollection.
The follow-up analysis regarding 6-responses across the three test pairs does not
support this statement, however, because the three test pairs did receive a significantly
different number of 6-responses. FTi and Re-Paired test pairs were the most likely to
receive a 6-response, followed FTx test pairs. This result coupled with the response
distribution comparison for FTi, FTx, and Re-Paired test pairs is puzzling in that it
suggests that FTi and Re-Paired pairs had the highest familiarity signal. However,
according to predictions from the CLS and DPSD models, only the Re-Paired pairs
should have had high familiarity due to both the cue and target having been studied
previously. One explanation is that the implicit activation of the FTi false-target also led
to an increased level of familiarity. Because the false target was implicitly activated
during study, when it was presented with the studied cue at test, the degree of familiarity
for FTi test pairs could have been more similar to that of the Re-Paired test pairs; both
test pairs could have a higher degree of familiarity resulting from re-presentation of both
a studied cue and a studied target, albeit implicitly studied in the case of FTi test pairs.
This supposition would be supported by the results from the follow up analysis that
revealed that the two test pair types had similar response distributions. Therefore, it could
be that the implicit activation of the false target for FTi pairs led to an increased level of
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activation in the MTLC that resulted in a stronger familiarity signal, increasing false
recognition for those pairs.
Another explanation is that the false recognition of the Re-Paired test pairs was
based on some heuristic other than familiarity. This explanation has potential because the
manipulation of the Re-Paired test pairs was fundamentally flawed, allowing for another
mechanism for identifying old versus new Re-Paired test pairs. Although a new,
appropriate control test condition was created consisting of unrelated cue-target pairs to
prevent participants from using the heuristic that any unrelated pairs were not studied,
none of the unrelated pairs presented during study were presented again at test. Instead,
all of the unrelated studied pairs were rearranged to create the test pairs leaving no
unrelated studied pairs which participants could recognize as old. Therefore, the heuristic
that could have been used was to call any unrelated pairs new. However, the idea that
participants used relatedness as a heuristic to identify unrelated test pairs as new is not
supported by our data. If participants used relatedness as a heuristic for identifying
unrelated pairs new, then we would not have seen any false alarms for either Re-Paired
and U-control pairs. However, 41% of the time, participants falsely identified unrelated
test pairs (both Re-Paired and U-control) as old, demonstrating that they did not use
relatedness as a heuristic for identifying unrelated pairs as new.
It could be the case that, despite our best efforts to select appropriate test pairs to
examine the differential contribution of recollection versus familiarity to false
recognition, a behavioral analysis is not sufficient to disentangle these two processes. It
also could be that some FTi pairs were falsely recognized due to recollection, but that
familiarity resulted in false recollection of more FTi test pairs than recollection. Given
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the current behavioral data, the contribution of each is only open to supposition.
Significantly more false alarms and more 6-responses for FTi than FTx test pairs suggests
the influence of recollection, but the response distributions and ROC analyses suggest
only the influence of familiarity. Therefore, in an attempt to disentangle these two
processes and determine whether recollection also contributed to the recognition of FTi
test pairs, we conducted a modeling analysis. For the modeling analysis, we developed a
series of models that included a false recollection parameter to determine whether the
inclusion this parameter would provide a better fit of the behavioral data than the DPSD
model. If the false recollection effect is being overshadowed by familiarity in the
behavioral analysis, then the modeling analysis should be able to disentangle recollection
from familiarity by allowing for the influence of false recollection, something not
included in the DPSD model. By allowing for the influence of false recollection, the
modeling analysis will be able to determine whether a model with a false recollection
parameter or the DPSD model provides a better fit of the behavioral data. This analysis
will determine whether the inclusion of a false recollection parameter is necessary to fit
the data.
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MODELING RESULTS
Although a behavioral analysis provided some insight into the processes
impacting recognition by allowing us to test a priori hypotheses and view the response
distributions, this type of analysis is limited in terms of allowing us to directly test the
influence of familiarity versus recollection. Therefore, to compensate for this limitation,
we also performed a modeling analysis of the data. Modeling the data will allow us to test
whether a model that only allows for familiarity nonstudied items or a model that allows
for both familiarity and recollection provides a better fit of the data produced by the
experiment. We did this by fitting both the DPSD model as well as two models that
allowed for false recollection. To determine each model’s ability to capture data patterns,
while taking model complexity into account, a series of model fitting statistics including
the AIC and BIC were performed for model comparison. In the following sections, we
review the DPSD model and its subsequent amendments that included false recollection
parameters.
The DPSD Model
According to the DPSD model, performance on a recognition task is the direct
result of one of two retrieval processes: familiarity or recollection. In the model, when a
studied item is presented for judgment, one of two processes occurs. Recollection is an
all-or-none process that either occurs or not for the presented item. The model states that,
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during the recollection process, information associated with the presented studied item is
attempted to be consciously retrieved. If the item is successfully retrieved, then the
highest confidence old response is given. However, if recollection fails to occur, then
responses are based on familiarity. Figure 26 is a complete graphical representation of the
DPSD model. Because recollection is considered to be an all-or-none process,
recollection occurs with some probability between zero and one, denoted as R, in the
DPSD model. This probability is a free parameter that is estimated when the model is fit
to behavioral data, providing a measure of how often recollection occurs. When
recollection occurs, participants are assumed to respond “Sure Old”, or the highest
confidence old rating. Recollection will fail to occur with a probability of 1 – R, and if
this occurs, then responses are based on a signal-detection process, which is theorized to
represent familiarity. Also, because familiarity is only relied on after recollection has
failed, familiarity is represented as 1 – R. It should be noted, that according to Yonelinas
(1994, 2002), familiarity and recollection are not dependent. Familiarity always occurs
with or without recollection. The model states that familiarity is only needed if
recollection fails (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002).
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Figure 26.
A) A graphical representation of the DPSD model for studied items. B) A
graphical representation of the DPSD model for nonstudied items which includes a false
recollection parameter.

In the DPSD model, familiarity is modeled as an equal variance signal-detection
model, which assumes equal variance for both the studied and nonstudied item
distributions. From the signal detection model, two types of parameters can be gathered
that, together, determine how familiarity produces confidence recognition responses.
These two parameters are discriminability and criterion threshold. Discriminability is
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denoted as d’ and criterion threshold is annotated as Ck. Discriminability, or d’,
represents the space between studied and nonstudied distributions, and theoretically
represents the ability of a person to discriminate between studied and nonstudied items.
The criterion, or Ck, represents the threshold of strength that an item’s level of familiarity
must surpass to be categorized as one of the 6 responses. In a typical old/new test, there is
only one criterion threshold because there are only two possible categories that items can
be grouped into. However, having only two categories is not sufficient to fit the DSPD
model. Using a 6-point confidence recognition scale provides a more complete
representation of both the studied and nonstudied item distributions by further dividing
the distributions into six categories. The 6-point confidence recognition scale is favorable
to the typical old/new recognition test because different theories, such as DPSD, make
specific predictions regarding how these confidence ratings map on to process parameters
such as recollection and familiarity. By dividing the distributions into six categories, five
criteria values (shown in Figure 26) are used to map familiarity onto the possible six
responses. According to the theory, these five criteria values correspond to the different
levels of familiarity needed to provide a specific response. The item distribution area
between each criterion value is the probability of making that response. Also, according
to signal-detection theory, the criterion values are the same for both studied and
nonstudied item distributions; given a level of familiarity for an item, either studied or
nonstudied, the same response will be given. Therefore, the five criterion threshold
values, discriminability, and recollection each serve as a parameter in the DPSD model
for a total of seven parameters. It should be noted, though, that these parameters account
for situations in which there is a single nonstudied-item condition. For each additional
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nonstudied-item condition, there is a separate nonstudied parameter (i.e., two nonstudied
conditions equals two separate discriminability values). Because the Payne-Eakin
paradigm has five, separate nonstudied-item conditions, a separate discriminability value
was assigned to each nonstudied item condition to allow for varying rates of familiarity.
Additionally, for a modeling analysis, one parameter must always serve as the
fixed parameter to provide the model a starting point for all other parameter values.
Traditionally, in a signal-detection analysis, the mean of the nonstudied item distribution
is fixed at zero instead of the middle criterion, as seen in Figure 26B. However, for this
analysis, the middle criterion, C3, served as the fixed parameter; therefore, the value of
this parameter was always set to zero. Because this study had five nonstudied-item
conditions, two of which were control conditions, it was decided that fixing the middle
criterion would be more appropriate as it would allow for the mean of the nonstudied
item distributions to vary. As a result, dn values for nonstudied items will be both
positive and negative instead of just positive. Therefore, the DPSD model for this study
has a total of 11 parameters. Table 8 shows a full list of DPSD parameters.
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Table 8
A List of Parameters for the DPSD Model
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

FTi Discriminability

dFTi

FTx Discriminability

dFTx

Re-Paired Discriminability

dRP

R-control Discriminability

dRc

U-control Discriminability

dUc

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

Predictions of the DPSD model, and how different parameters affect these
predictions, were explored using ROC curves. An ROC curve is a plot where hits, or
studied items correctly identified as old, are plotted as a function of false alarms, or
nonstudied items incorrectly identified as old. On an ROC curve, each response (e.g., 6response) is plotted with the proportion of hits for that response as a function of the
proportion of false alarms for the response (i.e., the proportion of studied items given a 6response as a function of the proportion of nonstudied items given a 6-response). With
each additional response plotted on the curve, the curve point reflects a cumulative point
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(i.e., 6-responses + 5-reponses) to produce the entirety of the curve. Given the parameters
of the DPSD model, we can compute a predicted ROC curve:
PS (Ck) = RS + (1 – RS) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dS))
and
PN (Ck) = 1 – Φ (Ck – dn)
PS (Ck) is the cumulative probability of making each response, beginning with 6reponses; PN (Ck) is the probability that a given nonstudied item is recognized as old
given some level of criterion threshold; RS is the probability that a studied item is
recollected; dS is the mean level of discriminability for studied items; and Φ is the
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. The cumulative density
function is a calculation of the area underneath a normal curve up to a specific value. The
cumulative density function is used in the DPSD model to calculate the area underneath
the normal curve for each criterion threshold. By calculating the area underneath the
normal curve for each criterion, you can then calculate the area difference between two
criteria which then gives you the probability of making a given response. For instance, if
you calculate the area under the curve for C2 and C3, you can subtract the area for C2
from C3 to give you the area between C2 and C3 which represents the probability of
giving a 3-response, as shown in Figure 26.
Changing either the recollection, R, or discriminability, d’, causes the ROC curve
to change shape in different ways. If recollection is absent, or set to a null value, then the
model reduces to a signal detection model which predicts a symmetrical curve as seen by
the middle blue line in Figure 27. However, if recollection is high, then the model
predicts a large increase in the number of 6-responses which increases the start of the
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curve on the y-axis as seen by the dark blue line in Figure 27. This increase then causes
the curve to become asymmetrical by increasing the y-intercept. This asymmetry is often
found in typical recognition studies (e.g., Egan, 1975; Murdock, 1982; Yonelinas 1994)
and is the primary evidence Yonelinas (1994, 2002) has used to support the presence of
recollection. Discriminability on the ROC curve is equal to the distance of the curve from
the diagonal. Items that are easily discriminated from one another produce a larger
distance from the diagonal than items that are not easily discriminated; whereas changing
R increases the y-intercept of the ROC curve, either increasing or decreasing d’ will
move the curve either further away or closer to the diagonal (see light blue line in Figure
27 for a curve that has a reduced d’ value). Finally, five criteria values are plotted and the
summative area between each point is equal to the area of the curve.
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Figure 27.
ROC curve for the SDT model with d’ of 1; ROC curve of DPSD model
with recollection at .2 and d’ of 1; and ROC curve of DPSD model with d’ reduced to .5.
Modifying the DPSD Model
Critically, according to the DPSD model, recollection can only occur for studied
items. Therefore, the model states that judgments about nonstudied items can only be
made based on familiarity (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002; Yonelinas et al., 2010). Because the
DPSD model does not currently contain a mechanism to account for false recollection,
the fourth aim of this dissertation was to develop and test a new model of recognition that
contains a false recollection parameter. There is a large amount of behavioral evidence
suggesting the occurrence of false recollection (e.g., Higham & Vokey, 2004; Jones,
2013; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Strange et al., 2011).
Yonelinas et al. (2010) briefly acknowledges the possibility of recollection for nonstudied
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items; however, he argues that because false recollections occur at such a low rate, they
are violations of the boundary conditions of the DPSD model and as such, including a
mechanism to account for them is not necessary. However, we posited that increasing
their incidence using the Payne-Eakin paradigm, would result in false recollection being
able to be tested and evaluated a potential addition to the DPSD model. Therefore, we
tested two models that include a false recollection parameter for nonstudied items to
determine if they could provide a better account of the behavioral data produced by the
Payne-Eakin paradigm than the DPSD model.
DPSD-FR
To amend the DPSD model, we developed a series of models that include a false
recollection parameter. The first model that we developed is the dual process signal
detection – false recollection model, or DPSD-FR model. The DPSD-FR model includes
a separate false recollection parameter for each nonstudied item condition, for a total of
five false recollection parameters. The inclusion of these five false recollection
parameters increases the total number of parameters from 11 in the DPSD model to 16 in
the DPSD-FR model. Table 9 provides a full list of the parameters.
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Table 9
A List of Parameters for the DPSD-FR Model
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

FTi Discriminability

dFTi

FTx Discriminability

dFTx

Re-Paired Discriminability

dRP

R-control Discriminability

dRc

U-control Discriminability

dUc

False Recollection - FTi

FRFTi

False Recollection - FTx

FRFTx

False Recollection - Re-Paired

FRRP

False Recollection - R-control

FRRc

False Recollection - U-control

FRUc

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

The purpose of the DPSD-FR model was to test whether false recollection occurs
for all nonstudied test pair conditions at varying rates. As a result, the ROC curve
predicted by the DPSD-FR model for both studied and nonstudied items is now:
PS (Ck) = RS + (1 – RS) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dS))
and
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PN (Ck) = FRN + (1 – FRN) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dnk))
This model is almost identical to the DPSD model defined above, except for the inclusion
of FRN. FRN is the probability that a nonstudied item is recollected. The inclusion of a
false recollection parameter for all nonstudied items makes straightforward predictions
about the ROC curve. Figure 28 shows a predicted ROC curve for the standard DPSD
model in dark blue and a predicted ROC curve for nonstudied item conditions for the
DPSD-FR model in red. Instead of the ROC curve having only an increased y-intercept,
as seen with the DSPD model, if false recollection occurs, then the false recollection
parameter will shift the x-intercept to the right for each of the nonstudied item conditions.
This shift will occur because of an increased number of high-confidence responses for
nonstudied test pairs.
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Figure 28.
ROC curves for the DPSD model and DPSD-FR models. The dark blue
line indicates a DPSD model with a recollection rate of .2, and the red line indicates a
DPSD-FR model with a recollection rate of .2 and a false recollection rate of .15.
DPSD-FR1-FTi Model
The second model that we developed was the dual process signal detection–false
recollection 1-FTi model, or DPSD-FR1-FTi model. The DPSD-FR1-FTi model includes
a single false recollection parameter for FTi test pairs. The inclusion of this one false
recollection parameter increases the total number of parameters from 11 in the DPSD
model to 12 in the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. Table 10 provides a full list of each parameter.

144

Table 10
A List of Parameters for the DPSD-FR1-FTi Model
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

FTi Discriminability

dFTi

FTx Discriminability

dFTx

Re-Paired Discriminability

dRP

R-control Discriminability

dRc

U-control Discriminability

dUc

False Recollection - FTi

FRFTi

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

The purpose of the DPSD-FR1-FTi model was to test whether false recollection
occurs only for FTi test pairs. Because we originally hypothesized that FTi word pairs
would be the only test pairs to facilitate false recollection, the DPSD-FR1-FTi model
directly tests this hypothesis. The ROC curve predicted by the DPSD-FR1-FTi model for
studied, nonstudied, and FTi items is now:
PS (Ck) = RS + (1 – RS) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dS)),
PN (Ck) = FRN + (1 – FRN) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dS))
and
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PFTi (Ck) = FRFTi + (1 – FRFTi) * (1 – Φ (Ck – dFTi)),
This model is almost identical to the DPSD-FR model defined above, except for the FRFTi
parameter. FRFTi is the probability that a FTi test pair is recollected. The inclusion of a
false recollection parameter for FTi test pairs makes straightforward predictions about the
ROC curve. The same ROC predictions made for the DPSD-FR model can be made for
the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. Instead of the ROC curve only having an increased yintercept, as seen with the DSPD model, the false recollection parameter will shift the xintercept to the right for FTi test pairs because of an increased number of high-confidence
responses. The only difference between the two models’ predictions is that the DPSD-FR
model will predict a shift in the x-intercept for all nonstudied test pairs and the DPSDFR1-FTi model will predict a shift in the x-intercept for FTi test pairs. Therefore, Figure
28 also shows a predicted ROC curve for the DPSD-FR1-FTi model in red.
Model Fitting and Comparison
Model fit was determined using a maximum likelihood estimation procedure
(Myung, 2003). To calculate the maximum likelihood estimate, a likelihood function was
computed for each model (Heathcote et al., 2006). The maximum likelihood estimate
finds the model parameters that maximizes the likelihood function for each model. During
this procedure, a search algorithm is used to search through the parameter space to find
the maximum likelihood value given the best-fitting parameters, denoted L̂. This
likelihood value can then be used to determine which model provide the best account of
the data using a variety of model comparison approaches.
More flexible models provide a better fit of the data due to added complexity, and
not necessarily due to accuracy of the model’s representation of the cognitive process.
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Any method for comparing models must therefore consider both a model’s fit to the data
as well as the flexibility of the model (Pratte & Rouder, 2011). There is no one statistical
test that can determine which of a set of models provides the best account of the data.
Therefore, we used a method that also has been used by other recognition memory
researchers to test DPSD and similar models (Heathcote et al., 2006). One way to
consider both model fit and complexity is to compare models using the AIC and BIC
model fit indices. These statistics characterize model fit using the maximum likelihood
value, and penalize models for added complexity as characterized by the number of
parameters in a model.
AIC = 2 k – 2 ln (L̂)
and
BIC = ln (n) k – 2 ln (L̂)
L̂ denotes likelihood value of the given model, k denotes the number of parameters in
each model, and n denotes the number of data points in the given data set. Each of these
statistics quantifies model flexibility in terms of the number of parameters in the model,
and attempts to mitigate the advantageous impact of model flexibility by providing a
penalty for each parameter within the model. The main difference between the two
statistics is that the BIC statistic has a stronger penalty for parameters and, as a result,
tends to favor simpler models.
For the modeling analysis, we used both the AIC and BIC to determine which of
our models provided the best account of the data. An AIC and BIC statistic was
calculated for each model; smaller AIC and BIC values indicate better models. For all
comparisons, the false recollection model (i.e., either DPSD-FR or DPSD-FR1-FTi)
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always served as the comparison model. For example, the criterion value for the false
recollection model was always subtracted from the criterion value for the DPSD model.
Therefore, negative difference values indicate an advantage of the DPSD model and
positive values indicate an advantage of a false recollection model.
Although there are no strict cut off points for what differences in the AIC and BIC
indicate a significantly better model, there are conventions that can be used to determine
whether the difference between two models provides strong or weak evidence for one
model over the other. According to Raftery (1995), a difference of 10 or larger indicates
“very strong” evidence for one model over the other; a difference of 6 or more provides
“strong” evidence for one model over the other; a difference of 2 or more provides
“some” evidence for one model over the other; and a difference of 2 or less provides
“weak” evidence for one model over the other. These conventions were used to determine
the strength of evidence for each of our model comparisons.
Modeling Results
For the modeling analysis, we fit the behavioral data obtained from the
dissertation experiment to the DPSD, DPSD-FR, and DPSD-FR1-FTi models at the
aggregate level, or data averaged across individuals, as well as at the individual level.
The modeling analysis sought to determine whether the inclusion of a false recollection
parameter was necessary for fitting the false memory data produced by the Payne-Eakin
paradigm. Hypothesis 11 predicted that either the DPSD-FR or DPSD-FR1-FTi model
would provide a better fit of the behavioral data than the DPSD model.
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Participants
A total of 64 participants participated in this study for course credit. Ten
participants were removed from the behavioral analysis due to incomplete data, a chance
level of identifying new items as old or vice versa, and a low rate of recognizing studied
items as old, resulting in a total of 54 participants. These participants were also excluded
from the modeling analysis. For the modeling analysis, an additional 16 participants were
removed due to limited variability in responses. Specifically, participants whose
responses consisted of 90% or more 1- and 6-responses were removed, resulting in a total
of 38 participants in the modeling analysis. This criterion was determined necessary due
to the difficulty of extracting meaningful information from fitting models to data missing
responses from the 6-point confidence recognition scale.
Aggregate. One caveat with modeling the behavioral data was a possible lack of
power due to participants not using the entire 6-point confidence recognition scale. To
address this possible issue, we started with an analysis of the aggregated data to ensure
adequate power. The proportion of responses for each condition was plotted as an ROC
curve with responses to nonstudied items plotted as a function of responses to studied
items. Those data are represented as points in Figure 29. We first fit the DPSD model to
the aggregated data, as shown in Figure 29. Each nonstudied test condition was estimated
to have a different d’ value by the model with FTi word pairs being the least
discriminable, evidenced by the ROC curve being closer to the diagonal. The reason for
this is that the DPSD model can only account for varying rates of false alarm by allowing
dn to vary. Table 11 below provides a list of the estimated parameter values for the
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DPSD model. According to the DPSD model, recollection is occurring at a rate of
approximately 10% for the aggregated data.

Figure 29.
ROC curves for each condition (aggregated over participants). Behavioral
data are represented by the points whereas predictions from the DPSD model are
represented by the lines.

150

Table 11
Estimated Parameter Values for the Aggregated Data from the DPSD Model
Parameters:

DPSD

R

.10

dS

.98

dFTi

-.34

dFTx

-.41

dRP

-.37

dRc

-.73

dUc

-1.10

C1

-.78

C2

-.30

C3

0

C4

.30

C5

.61

Although the DPSD model is providing a good fit for a portion of the data, it is
failing to account for all nonstudied-item conditions. Specifically, the DPSD model
appears to be failing to account for, or predict, a shift in the x-intercept for several of the
nonstudied-item conditions particularly for the U-control and R-control conditions, as
shown in Figure 29. A possible reason for this is due to the DPSD model’s recollection
constraint. Because the DPSD model has a single recollection parameter that can only
occur for studied items, it cannot account for a large increase in the number of highconfidence false alarms. Therefore, to account for this increase in high-confidence false
alarms, the first model that we tested was the DPSD-FR model.
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DPSD-FR model. The DPSD-FR model includes a separate false recollection
parameter for each of the nonstudied item conditions. By allowing for a separate false
recollection parameter for each nonstudied condition, the model allows for varying rates
of false recollection for each condition. The purpose of the DPSD-FR model was to
determine whether false recollection occurs for all nonstudied item conditions. To do this,
we fit the DPSD-FR model to the aggregated behavioral data. The DPSD-FR model has a
total of 16 parameters: R, ds, five FR parameters, five dn parameters, and four criteria
(Table 9). The behavioral data is again presented as points in Figure 30 with the
predictions of the DPSD and DPSD-FR models represented as lines.
The model predicted each nonstudied item condition to have a different dn value
with FTi word pairs being the least discriminable, evidenced by the ROC curve being
closer to the diagonal. Additionally, the model allowed for a different FR value for each
of the nonstudied-item conditions, evidenced by the different x-intercept values.
According to the DPSD-FR model’s predictions, false recollection is occurring at the
highest rate for FTi word pairs (.20) followed by FTx word pairs (.17), Re-Paired word
pairs (.17), R-control word pairs (.04), and U-control word pairs (.01). These estimates
seem to support our hypothesis that the false memory effect obtained in the Payne-Eakin
paradigm is due to false recollection, not familiarity, facilitated by the implicitly activated
FTi false targets. Evidenced by the ROC curves in Figure 30, by allowing the model to
account for false recollection, the model appears to be able to account for a substantially
larger portion of the data.
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Figure 30.
Comparison of DPSD and DPSD-FR model fits. The behavioral data is
represented by the points, and the predicted model data is represented by lines.

Because the DPSD-FR model includes an additional five parameters which allow
for greater flexibility, the DPSD and DPSD-FR models were compared using criteria that
test the fit of the two models while accounting for model likelihood and complexity (i.e.,
number of parameters). We used the AIC and BIC statistics which provide a penalty for
the number of parameters in a model to mitigate the advantage of model complexity.
However, the BIC has a higher penalty for model complexity, often resulting in the test
favoring the simpler model.
For all AIC and BIC comparisons, the false recollection model (i.e., DPSD-FR or
DPSD-FR1-FTi) always served as the comparison model; the information criterion value
for the false recollection model was subtracted from the information criterion value for
the DPSD model. Therefore, negative test values indicate an advantage of the DPSD
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model and positive values indicate an advantage of the false recollection model. Table 12
shows the difference test values for the DPSD and DPSD-FR models. According to
Raftery (1995), both the AIC and BIC comparisons reveal very strong evidence that the
additional fit that the DPSD-FR model provides to the data justifies the inclusion five
extra parameters in the model. This result demonstrates that the inclusion of a false
recollection parameter for each nonstudied condition is necessary to fit the data produced
by the Payne-Eakin paradigm, supporting our hypothesis.
Table 12
AIC and BIC Difference Scores for the Aggregated Data
Model Comparison

AIC’

BIC’

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR

93.48

77.71

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR1-FTi

19.58

17.94

DPSD-FR vs. DPSD-FR1-FTi

-73.90

-85.29

Although the DPSD-FR model supports our hypothesis by providing a better fit of
the data than the DPSD model, it could be that only one false recollection parameter was
necessary to fit the data. We originally predicted that the implicit activation of the false
target during encoding for FTi word pairs would facilitate false recollection. However,
we did not make specific predictions regarding false recollection for other nonstudied test
pairs. Therefore, we also tested a model containing only one false recollection parameter
for FTi test pairs (i.e., no false recollection for the other four nonstudied item conditions).
DPSD-FR1-FTi. The DPSD-FR1-FTi model includes only one false recollection
parameter for FTi test pairs, resulting in a total of 12 parameters: R, ds, five dn, one
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FRFTi, and four criteria (see Table 10). By having only one false recollection parameter,
false recollection for all other nonstudied item conditions was set to zero. The purpose of
this model is to determine whether false recollection only occurs for FTi word pairs and
not for other nonstudied pairs. To do this, we fit the DPSD-FR1-FTi model to the
aggregated behavioral data. The behavioral data is presented as points in Figure 31 with
the predictions of the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi models represented as lines.
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Figure 31.
Comparison of DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi model fits. The behavioral data
is represented by the points, and the predicted model data is represented by lines.

The DPSD-FR1-FTi model estimated each nonstudied item condition to have a
different dn value with FTi word pairs being the least discriminable, evidenced by the
ROC curve being closer to the diagonal. Additionally, the model predicted a different FR
value for the FTi word pairs, evidenced by a different x-intercept value. According to the
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DPSD-FR1-FTi model’s predictions, false recollection is occurring approximately 9% of
the time for FTi word pairs. Additionally, evidenced by the ROC curves in Figure 31, it
appears that the DPSD-FR1-FTi model is accounting for a larger portion of the data than
the DSPD model. However, it also seems that it is accounting for a smaller portion of the
data than the DPSD-FR model. This finding that that the DPSD-FR1-FTi model is
seemingly accounting for less of the data than the DPSD-FR model is likely to due to the
higher degree of restriction in the DPSD-FR1-FTi model.
Because the DPSD-FR1-FTi model includes an additional parameter that allows
for greater flexibility, the DPSD and DPSD-FR models were compared using the AIC
and BIC fit indices. Table 12 shows the difference test values for the DPSD, DPSD-FR1FTi, and DPSD-FR models. According to both the AIC and BIC comparison, the
inclusion of a false recollection parameter in the DPSD-FR1-FTi model provided a better
fit of the data than that DPSD model. According to Raftery (1995), both the AIC and BIC
tests reveal strong evidence that the additional fit to the data justifies the one additional
parameter in the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. This finding demonstrates that the inclusion of a
false recollection parameter for FTi test pairs was necessary to fit the data. Therefore, the
modeling results of the aggregated data supports Hypothesis 11, which predicted that a
model containing a false recollection parameter would provide a better fit of the PayneEakin data than the DPSD model.1

1

Several other models were also tested; however, the theoretical motivation for those
models were not within the scope of this dissertation and not included. For a full list of
models that were tested and their results, see Appendix F.
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We also compared the fit of the DPSD-FR1-FTi model to the DPSD-FR model.
The comparison revealed that the DPSD-FR model provided a better account of the data
than the DPSD-FR1-FTi model, suggesting that false recollection occurs for more than
one test-pair condition. This result is interesting in that it demonstrates that, although the
DPSD-FR model contains five additional parameters and the DPSD-FR1-FTi model
contains only one additional parameter, the added benefit of those five parameters
outweighs the penalty of the AIC and BIC comparisons.
Individual. Fitting the model to aggregate data can be a very useful tool.
However, it can also fail to account for process effects occurring at the individual level.
Because responses are collapsed across participants, response patterns for individuals can
be qualitatively different from the individual level (Pratte et al., 2010). Pratte et al. (2010)
discussed the impact of qualitative differences between aggregate and individual level
data on modeling data by demonstrating that averaging over participant responses can
result in unaccounted participant variability, resulting in masking the underlying
cognitive process. The implication of their findings can be seen in our data when
comparing individual participant ROC curves to the aggregated data (see Figure 32). For
instance, one difference that can be seen is that is that participants 4 and 29 have a higher
recollection rate, demonstrated by the y-intercept, than participant 33 or the aggregate.
These large differences in the rate of recollection can result in a large amount of
unaccounted variability in the aggregate form. This unaccounted variability then impacts
the ability of the model to accurately estimate recollection due to missing data, which
results in a masking of the recollection process as stated by Pratte et al. (2010).
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Therefore, the analysis on the aggregate data does not provide a final determination as to
which model provides the most accurate account of the data.

Figure 32.
Comparison of response patterns between a group of individual
participants and aggregate data.

DPSD. We fit the DPSD model to each individual participant. The parameter
values and standard errors estimated by the DPSD model are reported below in Table 13.
Contrary to the aggregate analysis, the estimated value for recollection increased from
10% for the aggregate to 34% for the individual. This increase shows a vast
underestimation of recollection in the aggregate analysis and demonstrates that more
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people were relying on recollection. Consistent with the aggregate analysis, each
nonstudied item condition was estimated to have a different dn value by the model with
FTi word pairs having the lowest dn value. However, the DPSD model also estimated the
dn for Re-Paired test pairs to be similar (not significantly different) to FTi word pairs,
suggesting the same level of discriminability for both types of pairs. This finding
suggests that within the DPSD model, both FTi and Re-Paired test pairs were inherently
more familiar than the other nonstudied test pairs. However, in the next section, we will
again introduce two false recollection models that will test whether the reduced
discriminability for FTi pairs is partly due to the influence of recollection.
Table 13
Summary of DPSD Estimated Parameter Values for Individual Data
Parameter:

M

SE

R

.34

.05

dS

.54

.20

dFTi

-.38

.07

dFTx

-.47

.08

dRP

-.39

.06

dRc

-.82

.07

dUc

-1.48

.19

C1

-1.09

.13

C2

-.41

.05

C3

0

0

C4

.55

.05

C5

2.86

.26
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Evidence from the aggregate analysis suggested that false recollection can occur
for nonstudied items, suggesting that the DPSD model should be amended with the
inclusion of a false recollection parameter. Therefore, we next fit the DPSD-FR model to
the individual data. This model contains a separate false recollection parameter for each
nonstudied item condition, increasing the number of parameters from 11 to 16. The
purpose of fitting this model was to see if false recollection occurs for all items, both
studied and nonstudied.
DPSD-FR. The next model that we fit to the individual data was the DPSD-FR
model. The DPSD-FR model has a total of 16 parameters: R, ds, five dn, five FR, and
four Ck. A sample of participants was selected to demonstrate how the DPSD-FR model
was fitting the data at the individual level compared with the DPSD model (see Figure
33). Overall, the DPSD model is accounting for a large portion of the data but is failing to
predict a portion of the FTi word pairs, as seen with participant 4 and 29. It appears that
the primary reason the DPSD model is unable to account for the FTi word pairs is due to
its inability to move along the x-axis, representing false recollection. Therefore, it seems
that the inclusion of a false recollection parameter would allow the model to capture more
of those data points. This prediction can be seen in the fit of the DPSD-FR model.
Overall, the DPSD-FR model appears to capture more of the data points, including FTi
word pairs and Re-Paired word pairs. However, to determine which model provides the
best account of the data, a series of fit tests are needed to determine whether the inclusion
of a false recollection parameter was worth the added fit.
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Figure 33.
Comparison of model fits between the DPSD, DPSD-FR, and DPSD-FR1FTi models for participant 4 and 29. A) The predicted model fit for the DPSD model. B)
The predicted model fit for the DPSD-FR model. C) The predicted model fit for the
DPSD-FR1-FTi model.

The fits of the DPSD and DPSD-FR models were compared using AIC and BIC
tests. Table 14 shows the mean difference test values and standard error. The mean test
value for both the AIC and BIC tests reveals that the added fit to the data does not justify
the five extra parameters in the DPSD-FR model. We evaluated these test values for each
participant to see how many participants’ data was better fit by the DPSD model. At the
individual level, we found that the DPSD model had the advantage (smaller AIC value)
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for 29 out of 38 participants, demonstrating that the addition of the five false recollection
parameters was not necessary to fit their data. However, 6 of the 29 participants who
favored the DPSD model had weak evidence to support the model (i.e., AIC difference
value of two or less), suggesting that a definitive conclusion could not be drawn for those
participants. For the BIC test, 36 out of 38 participants favored the DPSD model with the
majority of them having strong evidence to favor the DPSD model. Therefore, contrary to
the aggregate analysis, the individual analysis does not support our hypothesis that the
inclusion of a false recollection parameter was necessary to fit the nonstudied conditions.
Table 14
Mean and Standard Error AIC and BIC Difference Scores for the Individual Data
AIC’

Model Comparison

BIC’

M

SE

M

SE

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR

-2.28

1.37

-18.00

1.37

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR1-FTi

-0.79

.82

-3.93

.82

DPSD-FR vs. DPSD-FR1-FTi

1.67

1.00

14.07

1.38

Although the model comparison tests do not support our hypothesis, interestingly,
the DPSD-FR model did provide estimates of false recollection for each of the
nonstudied item conditions. Table 15 provides a list of means and standard errors for
each false recollection parameter. To test for differences between each of the false
recollection estimates, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. False recollection
estimates were significantly different across the five test pairs, F(1, 37) = 57.84, p < .001,
ηp2 = .61. FTi test pairs were estimated to have the highest rate of false recollection,
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followed by Re-Paired, FTx, R-control, and U-control pairs, suggesting that FTi test pairs
were falsely recollected at a higher rate than other test pairs, consistent with our
predictions. This finding, combined with the results from Hypotheses 4 and 5, provides
support that the implicit activation of the FTi target during study did lead to false
recollection of those pairs.
Table 15
Summary of DPSD-FR Estimated Parameter Values for Individual Data
Parameter:

M

SE

R

.34

.05

dS

.54

.20

dFTi

-.38

.07

dFTx

-.47

.08

dRP

-.39

.06

dRc

-.82

.07

dUc

-1.48

.19

FRFTi

.17

.02

FRFTx

.15

.02

FRRP

.14

.02

FRRc

.03

.01

FRUc

.01

.00

C1

-1.09

.13

C2

-.41

.05

C3

0

0

C4

.55

.05

C5

2.86

.26
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Although the model comparison tests do not support the DPSD-FR model, it
could be that the additional five false recollection parameters were too much added
complexity for the individual data. Specifically, it could be that some nonstudied
conditions had false recollection and some did not. This supposition is supported by the
finding that false recollection for control test pairs was estimated to be less than .05.
Therefore, the inclusion of a false recollection parameter for conditions that do not have
false recollection could have led to an overly complex model that does not provide a
good fit of the data. Both the AIC and BIC statistics attempt to prevent this possibility
from occurring by providing a penalty for each parameter included in a model. It also
could be that false recollection only occurs for FTi word pairs and not for other
nonstudied test pairs. We originally predicted that false recollection would only occur for
FTi test pairs and not for other nonstudied pairs. However, we tested the full model to
determine whether false recollection occurs for all nonstudied items at a lower rate.
Therefore, the next model that we tested was the DPSD-FR1-FTi model to determine
whether the inclusion of a single false recollection parameter for FTi word pairs would
provide a better fit of the data.
DPSD-FR1-FTi. The DPSD-FR1-FTi model has a total of 12 parameters: R, ds,
FRFTi, five dn, and four Ck. Although, the initial result of the DPSD-FR1-FTi analysis for
the aggregated data showed

no real added benefit of the single false recollection parameter over

the DPSD and DPSD-FR models, we hypothesized that the inclusion of a single false
recollection parameter might still be an option for the individual data due to the lack of
influence from participant variability. We first compared the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi
models using an AIC and BIC test. Table 14 above shows the mean and standard error of
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the difference of the test values. The mean test value for the AIC and BIC tests reveals
that the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi model cannot be distinguished from one another
using Raftery’s (1995) standards. Because the mean AIC difference was -.79 and the
mean BIC difference was -3.93, it cannot be concluded as to which model provides a
better fit of the data. Although the BIC test provides some evidence to suggest the DPSD
model over the DPSD-FR1-FTi model, it has not been determined in the literature as to
whether the AIC or BIC provides a more definitive result (Heathcote et al., 2006).
Instead, the convention is to choose the model that garners support from both tests, which
our analysis does not. Therefore, we cannot conclusively determine whether the DPSD or
DPSD-FR1-FTi model provides a better account of the behavioral data.
We broke down the AIC and BIC difference scores for each individual to see how
many people adhered to this inconclusive finding. We found that the DPSD model had
the slight advantage (smaller AIC value) for 24 out of 38 participants on the AIC test and
the slight advantage for 31 out of 38 participants on the BIC test, suggesting that the
addition of the false recollection parameter was not necessary to fit their data. However,
the difference between these scores was negligible. For 22 out of 24 participants who
supported the DPSD model on the AIC test, the evidence to support the DPSD model was
weak evidence (i.e., difference value was 2 or less). For the 7 of the 31 participants who
supported the DPSD model on the BIC test, the evidence to support the DPSD model was
also weak evidence, further confirming the inconclusive result.
The second model comparison that we performed was between the DPSD-FR and
DPSD-FR1-FTi models. Table 14 shows the mean and standard error of the difference of
the test values. The mean difference AIC value reveals that the DPSD-FR and DPSD166

FR1-FTi model cannot be distinguished from one another using Raftery’s (1995)
standards. Because both tests did not support one model over the other due to the
inconclusive evidence from the AIC values, the DSPD-FR and DPSD-FR1-FTi models
cannot be distinguished from each other. We evaluated the individual participant AIC and
BIC difference scores to determine how many were consistent with the mean. For the
AIC statistic, a total of 29 out of 38 participants favored the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. Of
these 29 participants, 24 had some evidence (value larger than 2) to support the DPSDFR1-FTi model over the DPSD-FR model (M = 5.01, SD = 1.42), suggesting a greater
advantage for that model. For the BIC statistic, 35 out of 38 participants had strong
evidence to favor the DSPD-FR1-FTi model over the DPSD-FR model, indicating an
advantage of the DSPD-FR1-FTi model. The individual AIC data coupled with the
individual BIC data seem to support that the inclusion of a single false recollection
parameter provided a better account of the behavioral data produced by the Payne-Eakin
paradigm than a false recollection parameter for each nonstudied item condition,
supporting our initial hypothesis.
Power Limitation in the Individual Analysis
A potential problem with the analysis of the individual participant data is that it
might not have enough response variability to allow the model to adequately fit their
data, resulting in inconclusive findings. One requirement of fitting models to behavioral
data is that the data needs to have responses from the entire scale to extract meaningful
information from the model fitting. Unfortunately, despite our attempt to mitigate this
possibility by removing participants whose responses were 90% or more 1- or 6responses, 56% of the remaining 38 participant responses were primarily 1- and 6167

responses. Therefore, it could be that the inconclusive results obtained for the DPSD and
DPSD-FR1-FTi comparison for the individual analysis was due to a lack of response
variability.
To determine whether the lack of variability in responses on the 6-point
confidence recognition scale contributed to the inconclusive result, we performed a
follow up analysis of the data. For this comparison, we concentrated on the comparison
between the DPSD and the DPSD-FR1-FTi models as it was the most critical given our
prediction that FTi test pairs would be falsely recollected due to the presence of an
implicitly activated false target. To evaluate this possibility, I calculated the proportion of
high-confidence responses (i.e., 1- or 6-response) that a participant gave on the 6-point
confidence recognition scale. For example, a score of .80 indicates that 80% of that
participant’s responses were either 1- or 6-responses. Next, I calculated the AIC
difference score for each participant between the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi models.
Each participant’s AIC difference score was plotted as a function of the proportion of
high-confidence responses, shown in Figure 34A. Because smaller AIC values indicate a
better fit, positive AIC difference values indicate an advantage of the DPSD-FR1-FTi
model and negative difference scores indicate an advantage of the DPSD model.
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Figure 34.
A) Comparison of AIC difference values between the DPSD and DPSDFR1-FTi models plotted as a function of the proportion of dichotomous responses. B)
Comparison of AIC difference values between the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi models
plotted as a function of the proportion of dichotomous responses without outliers.

A linear model was calculated to determine whether the probability that a
participant gave a dichotomous response predicted the outcome of the DPSD or DPSDFR1-FTi model providing a better fit. The initial analysis revealed a significant negative
trend in the data, F(1,36) = 4.22, p < .05, R2 = .11, demonstrating that as the proportion of
dichotomous responses increased, so did the likelihood that the DPSD model provided a
better fit of the data over the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. This finding indicates that the
advantage of the DPSD model over the model with false recollection was driven by
participants who responded primarily with high confidence ratings. However, this
analysis included an outlier that could have skewed the results. Therefore, we ran the
analysis again without the outlier, shown in Figure 34B. The analysis that excluded the
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outlier found the trend to be nonsignificant, F(1,35) = 2.54, p = .12, R2 = .07, suggesting
that the reduced response variability might not have contributed to the inability to
distinguish between the two models.
Although the analysis that excluded the outlier did not support our hypothesis that
dichotomous responses contributed to the advantageous fit of the DPSD model over the
DPSD-FR1-FTi model, we suspect that the reduced response variability made it difficult
to detect the presence of false recollection. Because participants gave mostly
dichotomous responses (56%), their response data resulted in producing a straight line
which can be difficult model. A consequence of linear data is that it becomes difficult to
parse apart recollection from familiarity, resulting in the simpler model (i.e., the DPSD
model) being favored. This supposition is illustrated by the results for Participant 4 and
29, shown in Figure 34, which demonstrate the impact of response variability on the
ability of the false recollection models to fit the data. Specifically, Participant 29 had
more response variability than Participant 4, and, as a result, the models were seemingly
able to more adequately fit the data for Participant 29 than for Participant 4. Therefore, it
is still likely that the reduced response variability contributed to the inconclusive results
for the modeling analysis of the individual data.
Discussion
The purpose of the modeling analysis was to examine the role of recollection in
the retrieval of FTi test pairs. It was predicted that FTi test pairs would be falsely
recollected due to the presence of the implicitly activated false target during study.
Although a behavioral analysis provided some insight into the processes impacting
recognition of FTi test pairs, this type of analysis was limited in terms of allowing us to
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directly measure the influence of familiarity versus recollection. Therefore, we also
performed a modeling analysis of the data by comparing the fit of the DPSD model to
two amended models that allowed for false recollection. To amend the DPSD model, we
developed two models that included a false recollection parameter. The first model that
we developed was the DPSD-FR model. The DPSD-FR model included a separate false
recollection parameter for each nonstudied item condition, for a total of five false
recollection parameters. The purpose of this model was to determine whether false
recollection occurs for all nonstudied items. The second amended model was the DPSDFR1-FTi model which included one false recollection parameter for FTi test pairs and
tested whether false recollection occurred for those pairs.
We first fit each of the models to the aggregated form of the data. One possible
limitation with modeling the behavioral data was a possible lack of power due to
participants not using the entire 6-point confidence recognition scale. We attempted to
address this issue by removing participants who gave primarily high-confidence
responses. However, to further avoid this issue, we also started with an analysis of the
aggregated data to ensure adequate power. The results of the aggregate analysis revealed
strong evidence that the DPSD-FR model provided the best account of the aggregated
data over both the DPSD and DPSD-FR1-FTi models, suggesting that false recollection
occurs for all nonstudied test pairs. This finding contradicts our predictions that false
recollection would only occur for FTi test pairs and, instead, indicates that false
recollection occurred for all test pairs. This finding is problematic for the CLS model,
which posits that false recollection should only occur if there is a high degree of feature
overlap (80%) between a test item’s representation and a studied item’s stored
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representation. Although we originally interpreted this condition of the CLS model to
mean that both a studied cue and target would have to be present to match, it could be
that only a small level of feature overlap based on representation of the cue is necessary
to facilitate a match than was originally posited.
If the presentation of a portion of a studied pair provides enough feature overlap
to allow for recollection, then we would predict that FTi test pairs would have the highest
false recollection rate, followed by Re-Paired, and then the FTx test pairs. This prediction
is based on the amount of studied information presented during test and is supported by
the false recollection estimates provided by the DPSD-FR model. FTi test pairs would
have had the highest false recollection rate due to the presence of both a studied cue and
an implicitly activated target which would have had the highest level of feature overlap of
the test pairs. Re-Paired test pairs would have the second highest false recollection rate
due to the presence of a studied cue and target, but not overlapping features. Although
presenting a studied cue and studied target from two different studied events would
increase the probability that false recollection would occur, FTi test pairs would still have
a higher likelihood of a match occurring due to more features overlapping for a single
studied event. Finally, FTx test pairs would have the lowest false recollection rate of the
experimental test pairs due to including only a studied cue. The false recollection
parameter values estimated by the DPSD-FR model support each of these predictions,
lending further credence to the possibility that false recollection could occur with a
smaller rate of feature overlap than originally predicted by the CLS model.
Although the aggregate analysis revealed that the inclusion of a false recollection
parameter for each test pair condition was necessary to fit the behavioral data, fitting the
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model to aggregated data can fail to account for effects due to cognitive processing at the
individual level. Response patterns for individuals can occur in a wide variety of patterns
that are qualitatively different from patterns detected in the aggregated data (Pratte et al.,
2010). The impact of qualitative differences between aggregate and individual level data
on modeling can result in masking the underlying cognitive process. This possibility was
evaluated in Figure 32 which showed how different response patterns can be between
individual and aggregate data. Therefore, we also performed the modeling analysis on the
individual participant data.
The DPSD, DPSD-FR, and DPSD-FR1-FTi models were fit to each of the
individual participant’s data. The results of the individual analysis revealed inconclusive
evidence as to whether the DPSD or the DPSD-FR1-FTi model provided the best account
of the data. This inconclusive result suggests that the behavioral data might not have had
enough response variability to detect false recollection. This supposition was supported
by the follow up analysis that investigated the relationship between the AIC difference
score for the DSPD and DSPD-FR1-FTi models and the proportion of dichotomous
responses in the data set. The follow up analysis revealed a trend that as the proportion of
dichotomous responses increased in a particular data set, the likelihood that the DSPD
model was favored also increased. This finding demonstrated that as the proportion of
dichotomous responses increased, the likelihood that false recollection was detected was
reduced, suggesting the deleterious impact of the reduced response variability at the
individual level. Although this result does not provide a definitive determination that
false recollection did not occur, it does demonstrate that individual data with more

173

response variability is needed to determine whether the false recognition effect obtained
by the Payne-Eakin paradigm was due to familiarity or recollection.
Because the analysis of the individual data yielded inconclusive results due to
limited response variability, it could be that the aggregate form of the data provides a
more accurate depiction of the recognition processes that occurred. According to Pratte et
al. (2010), aggregated data should not be used to determine the effect of a cognitive
process effects due to the possibility that participant variance can interfere with those
effects. It could be that for our behavioral data, the aggregate data provides the most
accurate depiction of the recognition processes that occurred because it provides enough
power for these effects to be observed. Because the individual data had such low
response variability, detecting the differential influence of familiarity and recollection
proved impossible, but aggregating the data provided enough power that strong evidence
to suggest that the DPSD-FR model provided the best account of the data over the DPSD
and DPSD-FR1-FTi models. Therefore, it could be that false recollection did occur for
each of the nonstudied test pairs, but the individual data did not have the power to detect
it. This supposition is supported by the DPSD-FR model estimates from the individual
data. According to the DPSD-FR model, each of the test pairs was estimated to have
some level of familiarity and false recollection, with FTi pairs having the highest rate.
Although the control test pairs were estimated to have significantly lower rates of false
recollection than FTi, FTx, and Re-Paired pairs, it provides support that false recollection
might have occurred for all test pair types but that our lack of response variability
hindered the model from providing an adequate fit.
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Another possibility is that the decision to exclude participants with 90% or more
dichotomous responses contributed to our inconclusive findings. This decision was
originally deemed necessary due to the difficulty of extracting meaningful information
from fitting models to data missing responses from the 6-point confidence recognition
scale. However, a key experimental condition, FTi test pairs, actually predicted
dichotomous confidence judgements. In addition, with a high hit rate for studied test pairs
and a low false alarm rate for control test pairs, these conditions would also be predicted
to produce non-variable responses of all 6-responses or all 1-responses, respectively.
Also, as previously discussed, with such a small number of test pairs, participants might
not have had time to learn to use the relatively complex 6-point scale. Therefore, it could
be that removing those participants actually eliminated our ability to detect false
recollection, especially in the experimental conditions that predicted that response
distribution. Although recollection was predicted to occur most frequently for studied and
FTi test pairs, as the DPSD-FR model demonstrates for the aggregated data, false
recollection could have occurred for all of the experimental conditions, including for FTx
and Re-Paired test pairs. Therefore, because recollection is theorized to be an all-or-none
process that impacts high-confidence responses, removing participants with a high
proportion of those responses could have resulted in participants whose judgments were
primarily influenced by recollection being removed. Despite this possibility, recollection
was predicted only to occur for studied and FTi pairs which consisted of 43% of
responses. As a result, we would have predicted that approximately 43% of responses
should have been primarily dichotomous. Therefore, our decision to remove participants
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with 90% or more dichotomous responses would have only resulted in the elimination of
people who would have relied on recollection for all word pair types.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main goal of this dissertation was to determine whether the false recognition
effect obtained by the Payne-Eakin paradigm was due solely to familiarity, as predicted
by the DPSD model, or a combination of familiarity and recollection, as predicted by the
CLS model. False recollection has been found to occur under a variety of experimental
conditions (e.g., Higham & Vokey, 2004; Jones, 2013; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Payne &
Eakin, 2017; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Although evidence for false recollection has
been well-documented in the false memory literature, many of the current dominant
accounts of recognition, such as Yonelinas’s (1994, 2002) DPSD model, do not contain a
mechanism for the retrieval of contextual information for nonstudied items. Instead, the
DPSD model attributes any false recognition of nonstudied items to familiarity.
Yonelinas et al. (2010) addressed the issue of false recollection by characterizing it as a
violation of a boundary condition in the DPSD model. According to Yonelinas et al.
(2010), boundary conditions are conditions that are typical for recognition and, as such,
are within the scope of the model. Yonelinas et al. (2010) cites conditions such as false
recollection as atypical, non-systematic, and occurring at rates as low as 0-5% (but see
Higham & Vokey, 2004); therefore, false recollection is a violation of those boundary
conditions. Although Yonelinas et al. (2010) acknowledges the possibility for false
recollection, he states that amending the model to account for them is unwarranted due to
177

it being such a small, random effect. Yonelinas et al. (2010) does, however, acknowledge
that if false recollection effects could be increased so that the nature of the effects could
be fully analyzed, then an amendment to the model should be considered. This
dissertation sought to increase the rate of false recollection by utilizing the Payne-Eakin
paradigm, which was based on manipulations theorized to impact recollection.
PIER2 and CLS Models
According to assumptions based on the PIER2 and CLS models, any associate of
both a cue and target explicitly presented at study is also implicitly activated, resulting in
the associate being part of the representation of the studied cue-target pair. The studied
representation is then stored as a sparse representation of shared, overlapping features in
the hippocampus that contains a limited number of unique features from the studied
event, including features of the implicit associate. As a result, when the implicitly
activated associate is presented as the false target in a test pair that also contains a studied
cue, a match between the test item’s representation and the studied representation in the
hippocampus is detected. This match then results in the retrieval of context from the
studied event, which is critical for recollection, and results in false recognition due to
recollection.
The results from this dissertation provide some evidence to support the
predictions of the PIER2 and CLS models. Test pairs containing an implicit associate as a
false target (i.e., FTi test pairs) were significantly more likely to be falsely recognized, as
well as more likely to be falsely recognized with high confidence, than test pairs without
an implicitly associated target (i.e., FTx test pairs). Although these findings support the
predictions of both models, identifying the underlying recognition process responsible for
178

them proved challenging. To identify the recognition process responsible for the false
recognition for each test pair type, we analyzed the response distributions for each of the
word pairs by examining histograms and ROC curves. According to Elfman et al. (2008),
response distributions can provide some insight as to the underlying process, with
familiarity producing Gaussian-shaped distributions and recollection producing
dichotomous, linear distributions. Although, we predicted that FTi test pairs would have a
dichotomous distribution because their false recognition was predicted to be due to
recollection, the analysis revealed no obvious differences in the response distributions
between the FTi and FTx test pairs. This finding suggests that the same cognitive
processes were responsible for false recognition of both test pairs.
One explanation as to why the response distributions for FTi and FTx test pairs
did appear different, which would be supported by the CLS model, is that most of the FTi
test pairs were recognized via familiarity and only a small number of them were
recognized via recollection. For FTi test pairs that were rejected by the hippocampus due
to a mismatch between the test item’s representation and the stored representation,
because FTi pairs also included a studied cue, those pairs could have been falsely
recognized due to familiarity stemming from activation in the MTLC. This possibility
was not originally predicted because the explanation as to how familiarity and
recollection work together in the CLS model is not clearly defined. Therefore, our
understanding was that FTi test pairs that were not recollected in the hippocampus would
be rejected and recognized as new. However, it is possible that, because FTi test pairs
were identical in every other way to the FTx pairs (i.e., both test pairs had a repeated,
studied cue and a semantically associated target), familiarity also could have produced
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false recognition for some of those pairs. This explanation would require an adjustment to
the CLS model to allow for familiarity processes to occur when the hippocampus rejects
recollection. False recognition could have been higher for FTi than FTx pairs, despite
their similar familiarity, because of the additional potential for recollection of some of the
FTi test pairs due to the prior implicit activation of the false target for FTi, but not FTx
test pairs. This combination of recollection plus familiarity could have produced the
higher proportion of false recognition for the FTi over the FTx test pairs.
Alternatively, as the lack of difference between the response distributions for the
FTi versus the FTx test pairs suggests, a single recognition process—familiarity—could
have led to the higher rate of false recognition for FTi pairs over FTx pairs. It could be
that the presentation of the implicitly activated false target strengthened the familiarity
signal for those pairs over the FTx test pairs. Although we predicted that the representation of an implicitly activated false target during study would increase the
probability of a match occurring in the hippocampus between the test and studied
representations, allowing for false recollection to occur, it could be that the implicitly
activated target increased familiarity with those test pairs instead. This alternative
explanation is supported by the finding that Re-Paired test pairs, predicted to be most
familiar because both the cue and target for those pairs had been studied, garnered the
same proportion of false recognition and 6-responses as the FTi test pairs. A reasonable
explanation would be that FTi and Re-Paired test pairs were equally familiar; the FTi test
pairs because the implicit activation of the test target resulted in the FTi test pairs
effectively being a repetition of both a studied cue and (implicitly) studied target and the
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Re-Paired test pairs being an explicit repetition of both a studied cue and (explicitly)
studied target.
The CLS model states that the impact of recognizing a studied item due to
familiarity results from a process known as sharpening. According to the model,
sharpening occurs as items are encountered over time. During an item’s first encounter, a
large number of nodes are activated; some of these nodes are relevant and some are not.
Over time, this sharpening process constricts activation to only items that were studied,
resulting in only items that have been sharpened being recognized. Therefore, we
predicted that the model would argue against the idea that the implicitly activated target
initiating the sharpening process required for recognition due to activation in the MTLC.
However, it could be that the CLS model did not consider the role of implicitly activated
information in the sharpening process and that the implicitly activated material is
included in the sharpened nodes. This finding requires further exploration to perhaps
inform and expand the assumptions of the CLS model to allow for the influence of
implicitly activated information at study on familiarity and be added as part of the
constrained activation in the MTLC.
Finally, another explanation for why the response distributions did not differ for
FTi, FTx, and Re-Paired test pairs is that a combination of recollection and familiarity
occurred for each of them. Although we predicted that false recollection would only
occur for FTi test pairs based on assumptions from the CLS model, it could be that
recollection also occurred for the other test pairs. This hypothesis was supported by the
findings in the modeling analysis of the aggregated data which demonstrated strong
evidence for the false recollection of all nonstudied items. Further, the analysis of the
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individual data also revealed estimates of false recollection for each of the nonstudied
pairs. According to the CLS model, the purpose of the sparse representation is to create a
higher degree of specificity in the level of feature overlap to allow for a match and can
only be fulfilled by the presentation of the studied cue and target. Based on this
assumption, we predicted that only test pairs that contained a studied cue and target –
either implicitly or explicitly – could accomplish this level of feature specificity.
However, despite the CLS model’s assumption that both a studied cue and target would
be necessary to facilitate a match between the sparse study representation and the test
representation in the hippocampus, it could be that the degree of feature overlap
necessary for a match could be accomplished with the presentation of a single studied
item. It could be that the presentation of a studied cue provided enough feature overlap in
the hippocampus to allow for a match between the test item representation and the sparse
representation.
This explanation is supported by several findings in this dissertation. The first
finding to provide support is that FTx test pairs received significantly more 6-responses
than control test pairs but significantly fewer 6-responses than FTi test pairs. If the
presentation of a studied cue provided enough feature overlap for a match, then those
items would have a higher likelihood of receiving a high-confidence old response.
However, because the FTx pairs do not share the same level of feature overlap as a test
pair that contains a studied cue and an implicitly activated false target, they would not
have been recognized at the same rate as FTi test pairs. In the same vein, the finding that
Re-Paired test pairs received the same proportion of false recognition and 6-responses as
the FTi test pairs suggests that those pairs were equally likely to be recognized. Because
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the Re-Paired test pairs presented a studied cue and a studied target, the presentation of
either one could have allowed for a large enough feature overlap for a match to occur in
the hippocampus, resulting in an increased likelihood of some of those pairs being
recollected. Finally, the last finding to support this explanation is that the DPSD-FR
model provided the best account of the aggregate data and estimated that false
recollection occurred for approximately 20% of the data. In the DPSD-FR model, each
nonstudied test-pair condition was allowed to have a unique rate of false recollection. The
results of the modeling analysis of the aggregated data demonstrated that Re-Paired and
FTi test pairs were the most likely to be falsely recollected, followed by FTx test pairs.
This account of the data by the DPSD-FR model was compared to the DPSD model
which only allowed for familiarity and was found to provide a better fit of the data.
Although this explanation requires further exploration, it could inform the CLS model to
allow for a portion of re-presented studied event to match, resulting in recollection.
DPSD Model
Although the findings that tested the assumptions of the CLS model leave some
questions, the manipulations for each of the test pair types did serve one goal: to increase
the number of false recognitions that received 6-responses on the 6-point recognition
confidence scale. This goal was set to address Yonelinas et al.’s (2010) call for a
paradigm that produced more than a minimal, error-based number of false recollections
to determine whether model corrections should be made to account for false recollection.
According to Yonelinas et al. (2010), false recollection was deemed an inconsequential
effect in recognition data due to the low rate at which it occurs, typically less than 5%. As
a result, Yonelinas et al. (2010) goes on to state that because it is such a small effect,
183

amending the DPSD model to include a parameter to account for them is unnecessary,
unless the effect can be increased to a level that can be evaluated. The results of this
dissertation demonstrated that a false memory effect, based on theoretical manipulations
assumed to impact false recollection, could occur at a large enough rate to be evaluated,
evidenced by the modeling analysis.
Because the false memory effect in this dissertation was large enough to be
evaluated, several of the findings of that investigation provided support for the DPSD
model. One finding that supported the DPSD model was that the nature of the response
distributions for each of the test pair types were not significantly different from one
another. According to Elfman et al. (2008), response distributions resulting from
familiarity versus recollection should produce two distinguishable shapes; Gaussian for
familiarity and dichotomous for recollection. Therefore, we predicted that test pairs
containing an implicit associate as a false target (i.e., FTi test pairs) would be more
dichotomous than test pairs without an implicitly associated target (i.e., FTx and RePaired test pairs), demonstrating the impact of recollection. This prediction was not
supported; all three types of test pairs appeared to have similar response distributions,
suggesting either a single cognitive process was responsible for the false recognition or
the same cognitive processes were responsible for the recognition of each test pair type.
This finding is consistent with predictions from the DPSD model (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002)
which assumes that familiarity is the only process that can contribute to the recognition of
nonstudied items. Although the response distributions for the types of word pairs did not
differ significantly and provides support for Yonelinas’s (2002) explanation that all false
recognition occurs due to familiarity, it does not dissuade the limitation of a familiarity
184

explanation that it is difficult to pre-experimentally predict. Because Yonelinas (2002)
does not provide concrete characteristics that impact familiarity, predicting what will and
will not be recognized due to familiarity is difficult. Instead, only a post-hoc explanation
can determine which items were familiar enough to be recognized and which ones were
not.
An alternative explanation that was offered for the lack of difference in response
distributions for the different word pair types was that despite our manipulations to
increase the false recollection rate, it might have occurred at too small a rate to be
detected by a behavioral analysis. Although the Payne-Eakin paradigm was successful at
generating a larger number of false memory items than other false memory paradigms
(e.g., Higham & Vokey, 2004; Jones, 2013; Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995), it could be that the paradigm still did not produce enough items
necessary for a full evaluation of false recollection. It could be that because false
recollection is such a small effect, it could not cause a large enough difference to overall
response distributions to be detected by standard behavioral analyses. Although this
explanation is inconsistent with the predictions of the DPSD model, which would predict
that familiarity is only process responsible for false memories, it is consistent with
Yonelinas et al.’s (2010) explanation that false recollection is too small to warrant
evaluation and do not warrant an amendment to the model. The findings from our
modeling analysis also support his argument.
The results of the individual modeling analysis could not provide strong evidence
to suggest the benefit of a false recollection parameter in the DSPD model, suggesting
that familiarity alone might be enough to account for the false memory effects obtained in
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the Payne-Eakin paradigm. We predicted that the inclusion of a false recollection
parameter would be necessary to fit the behavioral data due to the influence of false
recollection on FTi test pairs. However, the modeling analysis of the individual data,
which is argued to be the most accurate evaluation of a cognitive process, could not
determine whether a false recollection parameter was necessary to account for the data
for the majority of participants. However, when a false recollection parameter was
allowed for each test pair type, the model did provide a robust estimate of false
recollection, suggesting that false recollection did occur but could not be properly
measured with the given data set. It was suspected that low variability in responses
caused this inconclusive result and as supported by a follow up analysis that revealed as
participant response variability decreased, the likelihood that false recollection was
detected also decreased. Although we predict that if response variability is increased, the
inclusion of a false recollection parameter will be necessary to fit the data; however, it
could be that an analysis of data with increased response variability will favor the DPSD
model. We do not consider this to be a strong possibility due to the result of the modeling
analysis of the aggregate data which revealed strong evidence that false recollection was
necessary to fit the data. However, it could be that the aggregate analysis does not
accurately reflect the recollection effect in the data due to the influence of unaccounted
for participant variability (Pratte et al., 2010).
Although the findings of this dissertation provide some support for the DPSD
model and Yonelinas et al.’s (2010) argument that false recollection is too small to
warrant an amendment to the model, these findings also add to the evidence that false
recollection can occur, even if at low rates (e.g., Higham & Vokey, 2004; Jones, 2013;
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Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Despite false recollection
occurring at low rates, the finding that it occurs at all warrants an examination of our
current models of recognition. Because current models such as the DPSD model do not
allow for the contribution of false recollection in recognizing nonstudied items, our
current understanding of how recognition works is incomplete. The impact of this
incompleteness can hinder our ability to make accurate predictions regarding recognition.
Specifically, despite false recognition occurring less than 5% of the time, because
recognition models do not contain a mechanism to allow for it, we cannot predict those
occurrences at all. As a result, the models could be discredited due to their limitation in
predicting even the smallest aspects of recognition.
Limitations
There are some limitations of this dissertation that should be kept in mind. One
design flaw is that we failed to include an unrelated studied test pair condition. Because
recombining studied cues and targets for the Re-Paired test pair condition produced
unrelated word pairs, a new unrelated control condition was included to provide a
baseline measure of the degree to which nonstudied unrelated pairs could be recognized.
However, due to an oversight, we failed to include a studied test condition to measure the
degree to which studied unrelated test pairs could be recognized. As a result, the degree
to which we can make conclusions about the nature of the Re-Paired test pairs is limited.
All comparisons of the false alarm rates for Re-Paired tests pairs were made to the hit rate
for related studied test pairs. It could also be that unrelated test pairs are inherently more
difficult to discriminate from studied unrelated pairs which would have resulted in a
reduced hit rate for those pairs. This supposition is supported by the finding that R187

control (M = .17, SE = .02) test pairs were more likely to be falsely identified as old than
U-control (M = .07, SE = .01) test pairs, t(54) = 5.32, p < .001, demonstrating that they
were more difficult to discriminate. A reduced hit rate could have then resulted in the RePaired test pairs having a reduced d’ value from what is estimated for the hit rate for
related studied test pairs. A consequence of being able to accurately calculate d’ could be
that differences between the Re-Paired and FTi test pairs could have been detected.
Specifically, if d’ for Re-Paired pairs was calculated based on an unrelated hit rate, rather
than a related hit rate, then the value could have been reduced. This reduced value could
then have been significantly different from the d’ value for FTi test pairs which would
have provided a more accurate depiction of the relationship between the two types of test
pairs. It also could be that different criterion threshold values (i.e., more conservative or
more liberal) were used for unrelated than related test pairs. This difference in criterion
could have skewed the degree to which Re-Paired word pairs were recognized, affecting
both the hit and false alarm rates; however, criterion cannot be calculated without the
unrelated studied test condition. Therefore, this hypothesis cannot be fully tested using
the current set of materials.
A second limitation of this dissertation experiment was that the lack of variability
in responses. In the pilot data for this dissertation, we attempted to increase the variability
of responses by increasing the time and complexity of the distractor task. We further
attempted to increase the variability by increasing the overall number of stimuli for the
dissertation experiment over the pilot studies. Although the behavioral data did show an
increase in the variability of responses for some participants, others continued to only use
the outside responses. One reason for this result could be that the task was too easy.
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Overall, we obtained a high hit rate, demonstrating that people were good at identifying
studied test pairs. Typically, recognition studies use hundreds of stimuli as a means of
reducing ceiling effects and increasing response variability. However, this was not a
viable option for this study because of the experimental constraints on test-pair
construction. Loosening these constraints could have blurred the lines between the
different types of test pairs, reducing measurement sensitivity.
Related to the fewer number of stimuli is another potential problem that could
have contributed to the low variability in the response distributions, that is the use of the
6-point confidence recognition scale. Overall, 69% of participants’ responses were
dichotomous (either a 1- or 6-response), suggesting that they were not using the scale as
was intended. Using this scale is not intuitive or seemingly associated with the
recognition process itself. Typically, recognition is characterized as a dichotomous result;
an item is either recognized as old or rejected as new. However, the 6-point confidence
recognition scale requires participants to break down this dichotomous decision into
degrees of confidence, which could result in the task being too difficult or confusing. In
addition, the scale itself has unusual anchors for a typical Likert-type scale which
measures varying degrees of a single factor (e.g., confidence on a scale of 1 (very low
confidence) – 7 (very high confidence). The 6-point confidence recognition scale
measured two factors—newness and oldness—using the same scale with 1 (very high
confidence new) – 3 (very low confidence new) and 6 (very high confidence old) – 4
(very low confidence old). Certainly, other studies have shown that participants can learn
to use this scale, but most of those studies use huge numbers of test trials (e.g., Pratte &
Rouder, 2011; Pratte et al., 2010; Yonelinas, 1994). Having so much practice with the
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scale could result in implicit learning to convert their dichotomous decisions into degrees
of confidence and splitting the range of the scale to report their confidence. With only
168 test trials that were further reduced into 5 test-pair conditions, there was little time
for implicit learning to take place. The result was low variability in responses, with
people maintaining the dichotomous use of the scale on most of the trials.
This low variability in participant responses contributed to issues in the modeling
analysis. The modeling analysis of the individual participant data returned inconclusive
evidence to support the DPSD over the DPSD-FR1-FTi model. The cause of this
inconclusive finding was determined to be the result of low variability in participant
responses on the 6-point confidence recognition scale through a follow up analysis. The
follow up analysis investigated the relationship between the proportion of dichotomous
responses to the likelihood that one model was favored over the other. The analysis
revealed that as the proportion of dichotomous responses increased, the likelihood that
false recollection was detected was decreased, demonstrating the deleterious impact of
response variability on the analysis. The hypothesis that the inconclusive results of the
individual data is supported by the results of aggregate data which revealed strong
evidence of false recollection. Although we predict that increased response variability at
the individual level will result in the detection of false recollection, the possibility that a
model containing a false recollection parameter will provide a better account of the data
than the DSPD model (Yonelinas, 1994, 2002) still needs further investigation.
Future Directions
Beyond correcting some of the methodological problems stated previously, such
as including a studied unrelated test pair condition and finding a way to create more test
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items for all five types of test pairs to create more response variability, one future
direction for this line of research is to investigate the role of context in familiarity and
recollection. One future study that we would like to explore is to manipulate font using
the Payne-Eakin paradigm. Specifically, we would like to manipulate the color of the font
as well as the placement on the screen to push the limits of recollection.
Another future direction for this line of research is to investigate the role of
implicit associations on recognition. In this dissertation, we found evidence to support the
hypothesis that the implicit activation of the false-target in FTi test pairs increased
recognition. However, it is unclear as to whether this increased recognition is due to an
increased familiarity signal, recollection, or a combination of both. Therefore, we would
like to investigate the role of implicit associations by manipulating the strength of the
associate and further evaluating the subsequent and differential impact of familiarity and
recollection.
Conclusion
The findings of this dissertation constitute a step toward a more solid
understanding of recognition of nonstudied items. This dissertation demonstrates that
modeling false recollection is possible. Previously, it had been suggested that modeling
false recollection was not possible due to the low rates at which it typically occurs in
recognition studies (Yonelinas et al., 2010). However, the current dissertation
demonstrates that, using the Payne-Eakin paradigm produced a large enough number of
false recognitions to examine using modeling methods. As a result, this dissertation
provides an examination of current models of recognition and the impact of false
recollection on those models. The results of this dissertation suggest that, because current
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models of recognition do not provide a mechanism to account for false recollection, our
understanding of recognition is incorrect. Specifically, this dissertation highlights that the
current understanding of how false recollection contributes to recognition performance is
poorly understood and is an area in need of further development.
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Figure A1.

Summary of mean word list characteristics.
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Table B1
Summary Scheme of Counterbalanced Lists
List 1

List 3
Study:

Test:

Study:

Test:

Studied – a

Studied – a

Studied – a

FTi – a

Studied – b

FTi – b

Studied – b

Studied – b

FTx – a

FTx – b

FTx – b

FTx – a

Unrelated

Re-Paired

Unrelated

Re-Paired

R-Control

R-Control

U-Control

U-Control

List 2

List 4
Study:

Test:

Study:

Test:

Studied – a

FTi – a

Studied – a

Studied – a

Studied – b

Studied – b

Studied – b

FTi – b

FTx – a

FTx – b

FTx – b

FTx – a

Unrelated

Re-Paired

Unrelated

Re-Paired

R-Control

R-Control

U-Control

U-Control
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Figure C1.

A copy of approval from Mississippi State University’s IRB.
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EXPERIMENT CONSENT FORM
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Figure D1.

A copy of the consent form used in the dissertation experiment.
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EXPERIMENT DEBRIEFING FORM
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Figure E1.

A copy of the debriefing form used in the dissertation experiment.
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ADDITIONAL MODELS
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DPSD-FR2-FTi & Re-Paired Model
Another model that we developed was the dual process signal detection–false
recollection 2-FTi and Re-Paired model, or DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP model. The DPSDFR2-FTi & RP model includes two false recollection parameters for FTi and Re-Paired
test pairs. The inclusion of this one false recollection parameter increases the total
number of parameters from 11 in the DPSD model to 13 in the DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP
model. Table F1 provides a full list of each parameter.
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Table F1
A List of Parameters for the DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP Model.
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

FTi Discriminability

dFTi

FTx Discriminability

dFTx

Re-Paired Discriminability

dRP

R-control Discriminability

dRc

U-control Discriminability

dUc

False Recollection - FTi

FRFTi

False Recollection – Re-Paired

FRRP

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

Results
Fits to the aggregated data are shown in Figure F1. The DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP
model served as the comparison model; the information criterion value for this was
subtracted from the information criterion value for the DPSD model. Therefore, negative
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test values indicate an advantage of the DPSD model and positive values indicate an
advantage of the DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP model. Table F2 shows the difference test values
for the DPSD and DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP models. According to Raftery (1995), both the
AIC and BIC comparisons reveal very strong evidence that the additional fit that the
DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP model provides a better account of the data than the DPSD model
for the aggregated data. However, for the analysis of the individual data supports the
DPSD model.

Figure F1.
Comparison of DPSD and DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP model fits to the
aggregated data. The behavioral data is represented by the points, and the predicted
model data is represented by lines.

217

Table F2
Mean and Standard Error AIC and BIC Difference Scores
Aggregate
Model Comparison

AIC

Individual

BIC

AIC

BIC

M

SE

M

SE

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR2-FTi & RP

22.30

19.13

-1.33

.63

-4.50

.63

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR

9.84

6.67

-2.14

1.10

-5.31

1.10

DPSD vs. DPSD-FR-ff

14.36

12.78

-3.76

1.63

-5.35

1.63

DPSD-FR2-FTi & Fixed Recollection Model
Another model that we developed was the dual process signal detection–false
recollection 2-FTi and fixed false recollection model, or DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR model.
The DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR model includes two false recollection parameters; one
parameter is for FTi pairs and the other parameter is a fixed parameter for all other test
pairs. The inclusion of this one false recollection parameter increases the total number of
parameters from 11 in the DPSD model to 13 in the DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR model. Table
F3 provides a full list of each parameter.
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Table F3
A List of Parameters for the DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR Model
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

FTi Discriminability

dFTi

FTx Discriminability

dFTx

Re-Paired Discriminability

dRP

R-control Discriminability

dRc

U-control Discriminability

dUc

False Recollection - FTi

FRFTi

False Recollection – Fixed

FRF

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

Results
Fits to the aggregated data are shown in Figure F2. The DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR
model served as the comparison model; the information criterion value for this was
subtracted from the information criterion value for the DPSD model. Therefore, negative
test values indicate an advantage of the DPSD model and positive values indicate an
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advantage of the DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR model. Table F2 shows the difference test values
for the DPSD and DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR models. Both the AIC and BIC comparisons
reveal strong evidence that the additional fit that the DPSD-FR2-FTi & fFR model
provides a better account of the data than the DPSD model for the aggregated data.
However, for the analysis of the individual data supports the DPSD model.

Figure F2.
Comparison of DPSD and DPSD-FR2-FTi & Fixed False Recollection
model fits to the aggregated data. The behavioral data is represented by the points, and
the predicted model data is represented by lines.

DPSD-FR-ff Model
Another model that we developed was the dual process signal detection–false
recollection –fixed familiarity model, or DPSD-FR-ff model. The DPSD-FR-ff model
includes five false recollection parameters – one parameter for each of the test pairs – and
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a single familiarity parameter. Therefore, instead of five familiarity parameters like the
DPSD model, this model has one dn parameter. The inclusion of the five false
recollection parameter and one nonstudied familiarity parameter changes the total number
of parameters from 11 in the DPSD model to 1 in the DPSD-FR-ff model. Table F4
provides a full list of each parameter.
Table F4
A List of Parameters for the DPSD-FR-ff Model
Parameter:

Abbreviation:

Recollection

R

Studied Discriminability

dS

Fixed Discriminability

dF

False Recollection

FRff

Criterion 1

C1

Criterion 2

C2

Criterion 3

0

Criterion 4

C4

Criterion 4

C5

Results
Fits to the aggregated data are shown in Figure F3. The DPSD-FR-ff model
served as the comparison model; the information criterion value for this was subtracted
from the information criterion value for the DPSD model. Therefore, negative test values
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indicate an advantage of the DPSD model and positive values indicate an advantage of
the DPSD-FR-ff model. Table F2 shows the difference test values for the DPSD and
DPSD-FR-ff models. Both the AIC and BIC comparisons reveal very strong evidence
that the additional fit that the DPSD-FR-ff model provides a better account of the data
than the DPSD model for the aggregated data. However, for the analysis of the individual
data supports the DPSD model.

Figure F3.
Comparison of DPSD and DPSD-FR-ff model fits to the aggregated data.
The behavioral data is represented by the points, and the predicted model data is
represented by lines.
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